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ABSTRACT

This thesis examines the campaign for a naval defence of Australia and the role
of its most significant advocate. William Rooke Creswell is recognised as a
dominant force in the foundation of the Australian Navy. This thesis is neither a
naval history, nor a biography of Creswell. It is about the influence of people
and events on the status and direction of Australia, expressed through achieving
that defining symbol of a maritime state, a naval defence.

The campaign for a naval defence would be caught up in the aspirations for, and
of, a commonwealth for Australia – in its destiny and identity. In creating a
commonwealth out of six self-governing colonies, common defence was given
as a reason for its being, entwined with a doctrine of self-preservation, but with
a relaxed and comfortable attitude about subsidised British naval protection.

This thesis seeks to establish both the nature of Creswell’s contribution to the
foundation of the Australian navy and the reasons why the process of its
formation was such a protracted and fraught process. Major factors working
against this process were the expense of a navy and the infrastructure to support
it, a small and isolated population, the intransigence of the British government
and Admiralty, and the differences of opinion among Australian politicians over
whether and how an Australian Navy should come into existence.

3

Creswell as a former Royal Navy officer understood and accepted the
significance of Britain and of the Royal Navy in the defence of Australia. Yet
he remained undaunted in his career-long self-imposed mission of a navy for
Australia. His achievement was a naval defence with warships appropriate to
Australian conditions and requirements and an infrastructure to support the fleet.
It was Creswell who more than any other individual
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Lawson, H. Australia’s Peril in Cronin, L., (ed) A Fantasy if Man: Henry Lawson Complete Works
1901-1922, Lansdowne Press, Willoughby NSW, 1984. p.246
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Sir William Rooke Creswell, KCMG, KBE

It is not the critic who counts, not the man who points out how the strong man stumbled,
or where the doer of deeds could have done better. The credit belongs to the man who is
actually in the arena; whose face is marred by dust and sweat and blood; who strives
valiantly; who errs and comes short again and again, because there is no effort without
error or shortcomings; who knows the great enthusiasms, the great devotions; who
spends himself in a worthy course; who, at best, knows in the end the triumph of high
achievement, and who, at worst, if he fails, at least fails while daring greatly; so that
his place shall never be with those cold and timid souls who know neither victory or
defeat.2

2

Theodore Roosevelt, Speech to the Sorbonne (1910) in Fullilove, Michael. ‘Men and Women of
Australia’ Our Greatest Modern Speeches, Vintage, Sydney, 2005 (Forward: G. Freudenberg). p 61
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INTRODUCTION

To study the foundation of the Australian navy, one simply follows the trail that
documents, historians, biographers and other writers have left us since the navy’s
inception. The prevailing accounts have remained so unchallenged that there is little
reference made to how it all started or who campaigned for it. The writings of John La
Nauze (Alfred Deakin: A Biography, 1979), George Macandie (The Genesis of the
Royal Australian Navy, 1949), Neville Meaney (A History of Australian Defence and
Foreign Policy 1901-1923: Volume 1: The Search for Security in the Pacific 19011914, 1976), Rev. Tom Frame (for example, No Pleasure Cruise: The Story of the
Royal Australian Navy, 2004; First In, Last Out: The Navy at Gallipoli, 1990), and an
unpublished doctoral thesis written thirty six years ago have become the basic
references.3 Professional historians have attempted to redress this: particularly David
Stevens and John Reeve through their facilitation of the King-Hall Naval History
Conferences, their edited publications of Conference papers, and with their own
writings and recently David Day with his biography of

Prime Minister, Andrew

Fisher.4

Current descriptions of the navy’s foundation appear to accept the available material
without adequately questioning it. A thorough review of the limited literature and
documentation actually suggests a different interpretation from the prevailing account.
This thesis will consider several questions: What was the context (political, imperial,

3

4

Webster, Stephen D., Creswell, The Australian Navalist: A Career Biography of Vice Admiral Sir
William Rooke Creswell, KCMG, KBE, Unpublished Thesis, Monash University, 1976
Dr David Stevens is Director of Strategic Historical Studies, Sea Power Centre, Canberra
Dr John Reeve is Senior Lecturer, History Programme and Osborne Fellow in Naval History, UNSW
at ADFA, Canberra
Dr David Day Historian and Author
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social, and economic) for the navy’s foundation? What part did naval theory, regional
influences and public attitudes play in the formation of a navy? Why did a Gibraltarborn, ex-Royal Navy officer campaign strenuously for its creation?

This thesis seeks to challenge the conventual approach and consider more diverse
available material (newspapers, parliamentary reports and debates, correspondence) in
seeking answers to the above questions, specifically the significant role of ViceAdmiral William Rooke Creswell who unrelentingly campaigned for a naval defence of
Australia for over three decades. His public career has not been subject to close enquiry
by professional historians, nor his actions or rationale evaluated. There is no biography
and little written about Creswell the naval officer and less about the man. My thesis is
not intended to be a biography of Creswell. Such an undertaking would be virtually
impossible given the paucity of his private papers which have survived. What my work
provides is an analysis of the extent to which Creswell shaped early naval defence and
his challenge of early defence policy. In so doing it reveals a shrewd political strategist
and tactician: In 1886 his articles on seapower in the Adelaide Register were the
prologue to his campaign in the press, in correspondence and in reports to parliament to
convince the public that Australia should have a naval defence. He was a politically
astute advocate for a self-reliant naval force within the British Empire, a naval force the
British Admiralty would not contemplate and did its best to crush what would be a
successful campaign.

When Theodore Roosevelt, the great champion of the United States Navy, addressed the
Sorbonne in 1910 he could have been characterising Creswell, when he said, “The cedit
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belongs to the man who is actually in the arena.”5 This thesis seeks to balance the
conventional approach of naval historians with insights into his character and his vision
of a naval defence for Australia from the small amount of material available. The
argument put forward in this thesis is that the role and the contribution in the
establishment of a naval defence of Vice-Admiral Creswell have been under-estimated
and misunderstood. “Captain Creswell recognised that to be able to truly develop as a
nation, a strong Australia needed a strong Australian Navy. Australia's future was
dependant on maritime trade and its security lay in the protection of its sea lines of
communication. In many ways Australia's strategic circumstances have not changed in
100 years” Vice-Admiral Matt Tripovich said in 2008 in acclaiming Creswell’s
achievement. Competency and self-reliance were at the core of the Creswell vision for
Tripovich noted:

In an attempt to introduce what we now refer to as network centric warfare, he
lobbied for all of the vessels to be fitted with wireless, to enable
communications with shore and each other, and to allow dispersed vessels to act
together for greater effect. … To enhance his vision for an independent
Australian Navy supported by a local industrial base, he proposed that the first
of the class of larger vessels be built in the UK, but that the remainder should be
built in Australia.
Creswell was relentless in his advocacy, ”taking every opportunity to remind the
Government of the consequences of continuing to fund the expansion of the Army at the
expense of naval forces.”6 He was the campaigner in the struggle to establish a naval
defence and, as importantly, a realist and pragmatist who advanced this grand vision by
taking important small and practical steps, often in the face of widespread scepticism,
5

6

Theodore Roosevelt, Speech to the Sorbonne (1910) in Fullilove, Michael. ‘Men and Women of
Australia’ Our Greatest Modern Speeches, Vintage, Sydney, 2005. p 61
Vice-Admiral Tripovich, AM, CSC, RAN Chief of Capability Development, Australian
Defence Force, 107th Australian Navy Foundation Day Creswell Oration: Navy Capability From
Creswell to Tomorrow, 1 March 2008
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suspicion and criticism. Creswell believed that the Royal Navy was mighty, but
‘situated as we are at the extremity of the Empire’7, Australia could not be adequately
protected and a strong local naval force could add to the Royal Navy being ‘mightier
yet’.

Creswell’s advocacy occurred at a time when British imperialism was reaching its
zenith. Britain’s attitude to the members of its empire and the response of Australia to
this imperialism are emphasised in this thesis. Amongst the Britons who promoted the
ideals of imperialism was Professor John Ruskin. On 8 February 1870, he delivered his
inaugural lecture, entitled Imperial Duty, at Oxford University. Ruskin’s oratory
inspired generations with his charismatic message, which would be shared by many
beyond Britain’s shores. It was a powerful imprimateur of British society: its people, its
economy and its institutions (including the Royal Navy). To Ruskin, ‘there is a destiny
now possible to us — the highest ever set before a nation to be accepted or refused. …
an inheritance of honour, bequeathed to us’ extending to other lands the British race,
society and religion, which Britain would govern and defend. These people were
melded to Britain, for ‘though they live on a distant plot of ground, they are no more to
consider themselves therefore disenfranchised from their native land, than the sailors of
her fleets do, because they float on distant waves. So that literally, these colonies must
be fastened fleets.’8

This sentiment still resonated throughout the Empire thirty years later. William
Creswell, the Commandant of the Queensland Naval Forces, advancing the cause of a
7

8

CPP, Report: The Best Method of Employing Australian Seamen in the Defence of Commerce and
Ports by WR Creswell p.156
John Ruskin, from Lectures on Art, in The Norton Anthology of English Literature, Norton Topics
Online: http://www.wwnorton.com/college/english/nael/20century/topic_1/jnruskin.html
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national naval defence in September 1901, declared the need ‘to develop locally those
qualities of race and that sea profession which first gave us, and has since held for us,
the land we live in.’9 Creswell as a former Royal Navy officer understood and accepted
the significance of Britain and of the Royal Navy in the defence of the new
Commonwealth but, in Creswell’s view, only in co-operation with a local sea defence
force.
Creswell, shortly after reviving his naval career in South Australia, ‘began to give shape
to some ideas on the subject of Australian defence.’ In 1886 he published his ideas in a
series of articles in the Adelaide Register thinking they might raise local interest in
naval matters. His task, he soon realised, was ‘Imperial in its dimensions.’10 Within a
decade across the Pacific the writings of a United States naval theorist emerged which
would influence the way the great seapowers would perceive their navies. Rear-Admiral
Alfred Thayer Mahan determined that there were three critical elements of seapower:
firstly, first-class warships with supply bases; secondly, significant, secure sea
commerce delivering wealth, supplies and manpower; and thirdly colonies provisioning
the seapower with bases and resources. Investment capital, international trade, raw
material supplying colonies, a shared heritage with people throughout the empire and
the greatest seapower the world had seen were all features of the enduring British
imperialism.

It is hard to disagree, ‘Mahan sought to change the way Americans thought about their
security. He declared that Americans must

9

10

see themselves

as inhabitants

of a

Commonwealth Parliamentary Papers, Report: The Best Method of Employing Australian Seamen in
the Defence of Commerce and Ports by WR Creswell, p.156
Thompson, P. (ed), Close to the Wind. The Early Memoirs (1866-1879) of Admiral Sir William
Creswell, KCMG, KBE. Heinemann, London, 1965. Pp. 195/200
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maritime state in a world of opposing navies.’11 Creswell shared this sentiment and
attempted to persuade Australians to envisage a navy as a symbol of the new nation’s
identity in the same way Mahan defined seapower being broadly social and national,
not just military. Both nations were maritime and both Admirals asserted seapower as a
national interest. In his first public lecture in 1894, Creswell defined ‘‘Sea-Power’ not
so much the naval strength as the commerce of the nation, the national industry and
everything that tended to send her products beyond her borders.’12 While Mahan
sought to change Americans’ thinking about their own navy, Creswell started from a
lower base: he endeavoured to convince Australians of the need to have a navy at all.
What ensured Mahan’s success in the United States was the support and political
leadership of Theodore Roosevelt, who between 1897 and 1909 developed the navy into
a major naval power. Success for Creswell was delayed by the lack of a ‘local navy’
policy arising mostly from adherence by Commonwealth governments to the Naval
Agreement and imperial naval policy.

Hirst claimed, ‘Historians have often expressed great satisfaction in the peaceful and
seemingly inevitable process that brought together the six self-governing colonies.’13
Inevitable, but Neville Meaney has noted:

Geo-politics was the determining condition of Australian nationalism. Distance
from the Mother Country and proximity to each other enabled the Australian
colonies to acquire a sense of possessing a community of interests. Although this
set them apart from the British Isles on the other side of the world, it also
provided the basis of a common identity.14

11
12
13

14

Baer, G., One Hundred Years of Sea Power, Stanford University Press, Stanford, Introduction, 1993.
Adelaide Register 10 April 1894
Hirst, J., The Sentimental Nation. The Making of the Australian Commonwealth. Oxford University,
Press, South Melbourne, 2000. pp. 1-2.
Meaney, N.K., A History of Australian Defence and Foreign Policy 1901-1923: Volume 1: The
Search for Security in the Pacific 1901-1914, Sydney University Press, University of Sydney, 1976,
Pp.8-9
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Less convincing, was Meaney’s assertion:
From the end of the nineteenth century successive Australian governments
...were aware of their peculiar geo-political circumstances and within the formal
framework of the British Empire they evolved consistent, cohesive and
comprehensive defence and external policies to provide for the security of their
own country.15
For much of the first decade of the twentieth century the thinking of the ‘short-lived’
Commonwealth governments about defence and external affairs extended no further
than Britain would allow. Their only consistent, cohesive and comprehensive policy
related to a White Australia. Creswell developed his ideas within this broader geopolitical context and it was this which gave such prescience to his work.

Creswell’s campaign came at a time when imperial policies (defence, foreign relations,
economic and trade) sought to prevail over an emerging autonomous nation. Did the
prevailing imperialism hinder his campaign for an Australian naval defence, the timing
of its establishment and what form and development it would take? Why were early
Commonwealth governments opposed to Creswell’s schemes? A number of
parliamentarians asserted a common national defence as the prime reason for federation,
but did this include a national navy?

As early as the 1870’s politicians and the press had promoted Australia’s ambitions in
the Pacific, according to a local interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine: this was more
assertive and aggressive in attitude associated with territorial claims, unlike the original
Monroe proclamation. They also perceived successively and even simultaneously at
times, threats by France, Russia, Japan and Germany. The proposition that Australia, as

15

Meaney, A History of Australian Defence and Foreign Policy 1901-1923: Volume 1: Pp.1-2
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an island continent, needed its own naval defence was a matter of increasing debate
following Federation. Politicians (e.g. Sir John Quick, Richard Crouch, and Senator
Chataway) would reference Creswell in their parliamentary advocacy for an Australian
navy, while journalist Richard Jebb in his study of the Empire in 1902 noted Creswell’s
1901 scheme as ‘the basis of an immediate programme.’16 After 1906 Creswell’s public
comments, schemes and annual reports to parliament reveal an evolution in his strategic
thinking to a ‘blue water’ navy and Australian political journals, such as Lone Hand and
The Call supported the Creswell stance for an Australian built, crewed and commanded
local navy. The Age told its readers in 1908 that Australia’s geographic position
demanded that it must have a navy:
Australia is an island continent. Our destiny lies on the sea. No friend or enemy
can reach us save by the sea. ...We must arm, and inasmuch as the sea while we
possess no war ships puts us at the mercy of any hostile Power possessing ships,
it is our first duty to arm navally.17
In the first decade of the twentieth century Australia’s Commonwealth Naval Force was
not a well established organisation with the full suite of infrastructure, requiring
government oversight of materiel purchase, new naval designs or the deployment of
appropriate naval forces in support of foreign policy - as was to be found within
Britain’s government-Admiralty relationship. It was not an autonomous national navy;
it was hardly a navy at all: Britain would not tolerate independent colonial or dominion
navies, accepting only ‘One Flag, One Fleet’. The nature of this context shaped the
nature of the civil and naval relationship. Creswell found himself in an uneasy, even,
at times, antagonistic relationship with the civil authority (parliament, government)
and this extended to the Admiralty and the Committee of Imperial Defence. In Australia
conflict arose through the differences in experience and outlook of the various players:
16
17

Jebb, R., Studies in Colonial Nationalism, Edward Arnold, London, 1905, p.288
The Age, Melbourne, 17 March 1908.
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Creswell, parliamentarians, journalists and the general public. These differences were
partly ideological, partly traditional. Small tenuous steps were taken to formalise the
civil - naval relationship by the Reid-McLean government in 1905, which followed
through on the intentions of the short-lived 1904 Watson government. The HughesOnslow incident demonstrated in 1913 the civil authority-navy relationship remained
awkward and underdeveloped. Though to Creswell the principles were clear:

With parliament and the Government rests the responsibility of deciding what
amount shall be set apart for naval defences. As the officer charged with the care
of those defences, my responsibility extends only to making the most of the
means placed at my disposal. As professional adviser, it is, however, my duty to
represent what is needed. … it is my plain duty to make them.18

Creswell did not waver from this stance for the next twenty-five years. Shortly before
he died, he told Herbert Brookes that his battle for a naval defence was purely on the
naval side, not the political field. In this battle, as he advised graduating cadetmidshipmen from the Naval College in December 1917, two elements for their careers
were important: the greatest confidence is shown in officers who, firstly, were
absolutely straightforward in everything and who, secondly, never left a job or duty
until it was completed.

While Creswell’s reputation has not had widespread recognition, some historians and
other writers (as early as Murdoch and La Nauze) accepted the politician Alfred Deakin
as the pre-eminent advocate and a founder of the Australian Navy. The significance of
his role is problematic at best, despite the defence of his granddaughter, Judith Harley:

18

Report of the Naval Commandant, 1 August 1895, South Australian Parliamentary Papers, 99/1895
in Hyslop, R., Australian Naval Administration 1900-1939, The Hawthorn Press, Melbourne, 1973,
p.26
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Deakin has been criticised in his handling of naval issues as being political and
erratic and as lacking expertise. But he had to be political and flexible as a
democratic leader and diplomatic negotiator. And while Deakin was not a naval
person, he had a certain strategic insight ahead of his time – Japan became a
threat to Australia and the American alliance was important in defeating it.
Above all, Deakin had a vision for Australian naval power.19
My thesis argues that Deakin was not the catalyst for acquiring an Australian naval
defence and his role should be re-examined in a more critical light. There are good
reasons for thinking that an Australian navy came into being despite Deakin, and
certainly not because of him. Deakin, as Prime Minister, lacked executive assertiveness
and rarely delivered substance to his words in parliament, public addresses or writings
in advocating an Australian navy. Deakin desired a local navy within an Imperial Fleet,
as he desired for himself a major role within the councils of the Empire. He failed to
achieve either. Deakin accepted that the instruments of British naval defence would
protect the interests of Australia, but he did not transcend the orthodoxies of his day: in
Deakin’s view only with the consent, expertise and unity of control of the British Navy,
whose fleet would remain the prime protector in Australian waters, would a local naval
force be possible. Creswell, by contrast, challenged the established viewpoint.
Reflecting on the mission he had set himself, Creswell wrote:

When I entered the lists to fight for the cause of Australian naval defence, I
thought of the magnitude of the struggle in which I had engaged. In point of fact,
the battle was destined to be waged for three and twenty years, no less. At the
time the righting of what I conceived to be a glaring wrong seemed simple
enough. A wholly unsound policy had only to be explained was my fond
thought, and correction must straightaway follow.20

What followed was a two-decade struggle for Creswell. Eventually, Australia gained a
naval defence replete with warships, support infrastructure such as training schools,
19

20

Harley, J., Alfred Deakin and the Australian Naval Story in Stevens, D. and Reeve, J. (Eds.), The
Navy and the Nation: The influence of the Navy on modern Australia, Allen & Unwin, Crows Nest,
2005, p.303
Thompson, P. Pp.196-197.

19

engineering facilities and an intelligence service under the directive of an Australian
naval board.

There are many threads to the story of the birth of this naval defence: the setting of time
and place, the actions and behaviour of people and powers played out in the arena, are
integral to the origins of Australian naval defence. This thesis contends that Creswell
played the fundamental role in the establishment of a naval defence. While his advocacy
was as much about a call for identity as about security for a nation, at a political level
duality of loyalty blurred the identity of nationhood. The Commonwealth Parliament,
under the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act of 1900, had the power to make
laws and to govern for external affairs and defence. Yet for forty years, until the Statute
of Westminster, which was not ratified in Australia until 1942, it did not exercise the
external affairs power, relying on British representation. As for defence, Britain
considered Australia ‘safe’ on land to manage its own affairs and encouraged
Commonwealth governments to commit most of the defence budget to the army. After
all, Australia was ‘girt by sea’: an army was confined within a natural border, unlikely
to stumble into Imperial affairs, but available to augment the armies of the Empire. As
for the navy, that was a different matter. Localised navies in the dominions split
responsibility in Britain’s view and, in the first half of the twentieth century; it would
accept no deviation from having one Royal Navy and sole command of the Empire’s
fleets. Imperial ideology stumped national practicality; Australians became increasingly
aware that British naval protection was half a world away. An Australian navy could
challenge the threat of an enemy at sea, staving off invasion until the Royal Navy
arrived. For a maritime continent, the sine qua non that a navy built, crewed and
commanded by Australians was the nation’s first line of defence was not accepted by
20

Britain. ‘One Flag, One Fleet,’ ‘concentration of naval forces’ and ‘unity of control’
were aspects of Britain’s command of all the oceans: This was imperial ideology
pervading British naval policy. This thesis demonstrates what a swirling sea Creswell
set himself on when, at first, he only asked to share, what Joseph Chamberlain called for
at the time, ‘some assistance and some support’ for ‘the weary titan’. 21 (but for Britain
this offer of help was not welcome).

21

Jebb, p.138
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Chapter I

1885-1900 The Imperial Mission: “Have a fixed purpose of some kind for your
country and yourselves”

Britain had a clear view of Empire and what it wanted from it: there was a clear sense
of Imperial Mission. From the mid-nineteenth century, Britons, particularly those in
high office or authority, generally subscribed to John Ruskin’s invocation:

This is what England must either do or perish: she must found colonies as fast
and as far as she is able, … and there teaching those of her colonists that their
chief virtue is to be fidelity to their country, and their first aim is to advance the
power of England by land and by sea … If we get men, for little pay, to cast
themselves against the cannon-mouths for England, we may find men who will
plough and sow for her, and bring up their children to love her.22
The spirit of his words guided peoples’ thinking and actions: Africa was explored;
regiments and naval squadrons were deployed throughout the world to protect British
interests, to suppress slavery and piracy, to forestall or contain foreign powers; and
wherever they settled, these people were ‘Britons’ and Britain was ‘Home’.

Britain could do all this because, at the conclusion of twenty-five years of European
conflict (1790-1815), it had ‘the ability to use the seas and oceans for military or
commercial purposes and to preclude an enemy from the same.’23 There would follow
one hundred years of relative peace known as Pax Britannica (1815-1914) or the
Trafalgar Century (1805-1905). These were not necessarily interchangeable terms: the
span of the Pax – at least in Europe - was from the 1815 peace treaty between Britain
22
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and France to the outbreak of the Great War, while the latter Century denoted Britain’s
world supremacy of the sea from Trafalgar to the rise of other naval powers, particularly
Germany and Japan. This relative peace allowed the Royal Navy freedom of movement
to explore, its hydrographic office to chart the world’s oceans and Britain to trade.
Captain Peter Hore has argued that:

it was the Royal Navy, not the US Navy, which policed the Monroe Doctrine in
its early years, for Britain was undisputedly the one world power, and her navy
was supreme… Without the victory of seapower, little of this would have been
possible.24

What made British seapower great and secured its Empire was not that it had warships
on every ocean and all the seas of the world but that it had a small number of geostrategic naval stations which based squadrons with the aspect of ‘fleets in being’.
Britain effectively controlled the Suez Canal, the Mediterranean, the English Channel
and the North Sea and thus ‘could virtually dictate the terms of Europe’s access to the
‘outer world’. Under conditions prevailing until near the end of the nineteenth century,
control of these four narrow seas had political and military effects felt around the globe.
…. in effect a global command of the seas.’25 It was a clear illustration of sea power: the
ability, through strength, capacity and mobility, of a nation to possess an effective naval
defence which permitted its commerce to travel freely across the seas to markets and
suppliers in peace and, in time of war, to prevent, repel or attack and destroy an enemy
when required. Unlike the permanency that can be associated with conquered territory, a
maritime nation’s command of the sea is limited by the geographical area of control for
the protection of
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infrastructure, naval capability and its government’s policy will allow. Britain’s
command of the seas came in two phases: firstly, as a seapower, vigilant on the world’s
oceans, reinforcing Pax Britannica - an instrument for the preservation of peace and
security. The second, with the onset of an Anglo-German naval rivalry from 1904,
Britain’s naval policy was predicated not only on keeping British sea communication
secure, but with a seapower preparing for ‘Armageddon’, possessing a navy modern in
training, armaments and construction, which would attack and destroy an enemy when
required.

There was an emerging vulnerability to this mastery of the seas: acquisition of an
extensive empire, rich in commerce, raw materials and agriculture, demanded the
protection of sea trade and commerce and the defence of imperial territories. By the
middle of the nineteenth century Britain, unchallenged at sea, became arguably at least
somewhat complacent in the power of its navy. A Royal Commission on the Defence of
the United Kingdom in 1860 brought forcefully to the attention of the British
Government, and the Admiralty in particular, the urgent need to address the defence of
its far-flung Empire. It had become burdensome for Britain to maintain a large and
expensive empire on its own. A key finding was that the colonies could not rely solely
on Britain for protection. British domestic pressure was increasing for a reduction in the
costs of maintaining its colonies, many of which were now self-governing and well able
to compete on the open economic market.

This was particularly the case for the Australian colonies with their emerging
aspirations for national autonomy within the British Empire. The protection of these
colonies was as much a matter of economic value and good governance for Britain as it
24

was a strategic piece in its foreign policy and defence ‘chess game’. For the first 70
years of British colonial rule Australian governors and governments reported to London
through the Secretary of State for War and the Colonies. In 1854 the Colonial Office
and the War Office were separated. The Australian colonial governments’ concerned
about the war between Britain and Russia in the Crimea - there were reports of Russian
men-of-war in the Pacific - were already stirred to respond: the New South Wales
government locally built a gunboat, the Spitfire, while the Victorians ordered from
England an armed screw steamer, the Victoria, which arrived in May 1856.

On 25 March 1859 the Admiralty, anticipating the Royal Commission’s findings and
recognising the need for dedicated naval protection for the Empire’s resource rich
colonies, separated the Australian colonies from the East Indian Station and established
Australia Station. It was the initial, though important, step in recognising a naval
defence was required for this sea-bound continent. Thirty-five years later the United
States naval theorist Alfred Thayer Mahan would declare an enduring maxim:

Some nations more than others, but all maritime nations more or less depend for
their prosperity upon maritime commerce, and probably upon it more than any
other single factor. Either under their own flag or under that of a neutral, either
by foreign trade or coasting trade, the sea is the greatest of boons to such a state;
and under every form its sea-borne trade is at the mercy of a foe decisively
superior.26

Though written at a time when maritime nations, particularly Britain, were re-assessing
their positions as sea powers, Mahan’s July 1894 article in the North American Review,
seemed to be a précis of the situation for the Australian colonies: foreign warships could
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proceed unchallenged in Australian waters and, therefore, the Royal Navy needed a
presence equal to any other power in the region.

‘After 1861,’ according to Lambert, ‘British strategy shifted away from the stationed
forces, both land and sea, of the previous 60 years towards the mobile, centrally
controlled units … … … urged as an economy measure by Gladstone,’ 27 who, when he
became Prime Minister in late 1868, promptly adopted his long-held ‘Flying Squadron’
strategy. To give effect to this government policy of showing the might of the navy to
its British possessions, Rear-Admiral Sir Geoffrey Phipps Hornby was given command
of a flying squadron and was sent on a training cruise for new midshipmen around the
world, which included a visit to Australia in late 1869. One of the midshipmen was
William Creswell, who had joined the 35-gun, screw frigate, HMS Phoebe, following
graduation from HMS Britannia at Dartmouth in 1867. Recalling his time as a
midshipman, Creswell wrote, ‘Showing the flag was … a very necessary duty. Primitive
states like the Central American republics would be less likely to infringe international
law to the detriment of our shipping or of British subjects if they were occasionally
visited by a powerful protector.’28

Away from well governed colonies in less stable areas of the world, Britain still needed
to protect its citizens, provide access to its territory and preserve the security of its
trade routes or commercial interests from the threat by pirates, slavers or rebels. To
counter these threats, incursions or illicit trade, Britain deployed the Royal Navy not
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for war, but to influence and preserve peace, protect sea commerce and permit free
movement of goods and people across the seas. It did so in the form of small,
shallow draft vessels, which could work close to shore and access coastal rivers
systems, commanded by junior naval officers. ‘This was, perhaps, the last era in history
when, unfettered by global communications, the junior officer could exercise his
initiative to the full in the Hornblower tradition.’29

Lieutenant William Rooke Creswell, taken from Thompson P. (Ed.), Close to the Wind

This was the type of naval operation, of which Midshipman Creswell wanted to be part,
in which small steam driven vessels – gun boats, built in their hundreds - became the
instrument of diplomacy (asserting British foreign policy) and policing (protecting trade
or the rights and interests of Britons in foreign lands or British colonies). He was
promoted to Sub-Lieutenant on 20 October 1871 and, after a time with the Channel
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Squadron, transferred to the China Station at Hong Kong in 1873. From here Creswell
was sent to Penang, with the chance of command, to subdue piracy. David Howarth has
said, ‘the young men who commanded the gunboats were often thousands of miles
away from their senior officers, and British policy put a big responsibility on them.’30
On 21 August 1873 Sub-Lieutenant Creswell, commanding a cutter, used rocket fire to
silence a gun in a Chinese pirate fort at the mouth of the Larut River; the following
month, 6 September, while onboard the schooner, HMS Badger, he fought off two large
Chinese pirate galleys on the Larut River, and, though severely wounded in the
engagement, remained at his post. For his gallantry, Creswell was promoted to
Lieutenant, invalided home and went on to study at the Royal Naval College,
Greenwich.

By 1875 ‘there was no active service going on anywhere’ the ambitious William
Creswell recalled. ‘The lists were crowded, and promotion at its slowest.’31 The Royal
Navy’s work in suppressing the slave trade in East Africa offered the young Creswell,
hope of promotion, higher pay and action so he transferred to HMS Undaunted, the
flagship of the East Indies Station, in late 1875. Creswell seemed to echo the sentiments
of John Ruskin’s call to British youth: “all that I ask of you is to have a fixed purpose of
some kind for your country and yourselves.”32 He was taught Swahili (which brought
him extra pay as an interpreter) to add to his fluency in Spanish and then joined the
unarmoured wooden screw vessel HMS London in Zanzibar in 1876. Hunting slave
traders and stopping local rulers from interfering with ‘legitimate’ trade, provided
opportunities for Creswell to use his initiative, be decisive and be able to articulate and
30
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defend his decisions. Writing of such junior naval officers David Howarth noted that
‘Single-handed, they were expected to weigh up a local situation, judge who was right
and who was wrong, and decide whether tact or a salvo of shells was a better
solution.’33 Perrett observed that ‘their actions demonstrated the qualities of high
courage, leadership, self-sacrifice, independence, initiative, ingenuity and sometimes
astonishing impudence’34 - qualities which would be evident in Creswell during his
thirty-three year advocacy for an Australian naval defence. In 1876 in Zanzibar,
following a bout of malaria, Creswell was invalided home. Before he left Creswell was
advised of his father’s death and this contributed to his decision at age 26 to resign his
commission in the Royal Navy.

A visit to Australia in 1869 as a midshipman on board the frigate HMS Phoebe as part
of Admiral Phipps-Hornby Flying Squadron revealed to Creswell ‘a land of infinite
promise, as it seemed, for a man still young, with his way to make in the world…’ and,
without any urging, arrived in Sydney on 4 February 1879 with his younger brother,
Charles ‘… as a prospective settler in search of a fortune.’35 He took up a selection in
the Curlewis area of Queensland with two partners, Abbot and Chataway.36 However,
the man may leave the navy, but the navy does not leave the man. In the first half of
1885, Commander John Walcott, the Commandant of the South Australian Naval
Forces wrote to Creswell, his ex-shipmate, asking him to join the colonial navy in South
Australia as First Lieutenant. Creswell declined but following the deteriorating health of
his brother, for which a milder climate was recommended, Creswell accepted a second
invitation from Walcott. When Creswell took up the position with the South Australian
33
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Naval Forces on 12 October 1885, already on board Protector were two men with
whom he would be associated in the early Royal Australian Navy: Chapman Clare and
William Clarkson.

First Lieutenant Creswell already knew the vastness of this continent as a visiting
midshipman in 1869 and as a Queensland stockman. ‘To while away the many solitary
evenings which, as a bachelor aboard the Protector fell to my lot,’ Creswell wrote in his
early memoirs, ‘I began to give shape to some ideas on the subject of Australian
defence.’37 The enormity of the coastline and the distance from Britain were significant
considerations for formulating a maritime doctrine: a coastline of 19540 kilometres and
19200 kilometres from Western Europe, far from help (‘Home’ or neighbouring naval
stations) or threat (an attack, Britons and colonists presumed, would come from a
European power) for the Australian colonies. Geoffrey Blainey described the
inadequacy of Britain’s reach to govern Australia in concert with the colonial
administrations, as ‘a tyranny of distance.’ It was a dual tyranny: imperial policy,
directives and expectations communicated through the Colonial Office to colonies,
which, in turn, incorporated their realities of Australia and its environs with producing
localised policy interpretations, reactions and fears. From the time of early white
settlement, a particular reality of the colonies was their isolation as an outpost in the
South, which in part, generated their fear of the threat of armed invasion from one
European nation or another – firstly, France, then Russia and later Germany. Added to
this was the invasion by migration from Asia: the influx of Chinese miners during the
gold rushes in Victoria and Queensland had aroused concerns among the white
population of an influx of ‘Asiatics’ from the north willing to work hard at jobs the
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locals were not keen to take on and for very little pay. This concern eventually included
the Japanese and Pacific Islanders.

British supremacy of the oceans made it highly unlikely that any enemy would harass
coastal shipping, bombard ports or invade Australia. Based on this assumption two
British engineering officers, Lieutenant Colonel William Jervois and Major Peter
Scratchley, commissioned in 1876 by the British government at the request of colonial
governments, examined the condition of colonial Australia’s existing port and coastal
defences. The sea, they characterized, was Australia’s first line of defence and British
warships at sea would intercept an invading enemy fleet or marauding enemy cruiser.
The only thing the colonists had to fear was coastal raids in which the objective would
be plunder, the extortion of money after the capture of merchant ships or bombardment
of coastal cities. Yet all this would only be possible after the defeat of the Royal Navy.
In 1879 Sir William Jervois recommended that the individual colonies acquire torpedo
boats for coastal and river defence for the protection of their principal ports ‘whilst the
Imperial Navy undertakes the protection of the British mercantile marine generally, and
of the highways of communication between the several parts of the Empire’.

Generally, the colonies did not respond positively to the Jervois-Scratchley report. An
Inter-colonial Conference in Sydney in January 1881 considered financially
contributing to additional naval forces locally, but it did not gain general support. To the
contrary, the colonial premiers resolved that not only should the British retain
responsibility for the naval defence of Australia, but the strength of the Royal Navy
should be increased on the Australia Station. The Secretary of State for the Colonies
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was not impressed with the premiers’ resolution that the colonial naval defence ‘should
continue to be an exclusive charge upon the Imperial Treasury.’38

When the colonists’ invasion fears were heightened by German expansionary activities
in the South Pacific, the Queensland Government decided to act, annexing in March
1883 the eastern half of New Guinea on behalf of the Empire. The annexation of the
island of New Guinea had long been a priority for colonial governments for its
possession would create a barrier between mainland Australia and Asia to the north. The
demarcation between imperial policy and colonial aspirations were sharply drawn when
the British Gladstone government repudiated the colonial government’s action. Britain’s
refusal to sanction an active colonial policy was received with ‘profound regret in
Australia and New Zealand’. Victorian politician, James Service, in London at the time
was quoted in the Post newspaper saying, ‘….from Queensland in the north to New
Zealand in the south, from Western Australia in the west to Fiji in the extreme east, the
cry is echoed ‘the islands of Australasia shall belong to the people of Australia’39.

Queensland’s action and Service’s comments were a clear declaration of Monroe
Doctrine dimensions. These sentiments were re-affirmed at the Sydney Inter-Colonial
Conference of Australian Colonial Premiers in November 1883. The Conference, which
included New Zealand representation, demanded that Britain annex the unclaimed parts
of New Guinea and nearby islands (Victoria, for instance, favoured the annexation of
Fiji) as a buffer for the security and defence of the six colonies. Taking the concepts of
the Monroe Doctrine and applying them to the South Pacific, the Conference declared
that no foreign power be allowed to annex territory south of the equator and that any
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further annexations be viewed as a threat to Australia and the Empire, in reality
asserting an Australasian Monroe Doctrine.40 As far as Victorian Premier, James
Service, was concerned, ‘the object they had in view was to keep the English people in
these distant lands as far removed as possible from danger arising from European
complications…. by keeping the colonies safe, through their remoteness’ while ‘the
loyal people of Australia would be free to lend their assistance to the dear old
motherland in any struggle in which she might be engaged.’ The intention, in the view
of the colonies, was to advance the Imperial cause, which in turn would strengthen their
security.

The London Pall Mall Gazette of December 6th, 1883 reacted to the colonial premiers’
declaration with ‘it is hands off all round, with the exceptions of course, of the hands of
Englishmen. To Frenchmen, Germans, Americans and all other foreigners the whole of
the Pacific, south of the equator, is forbidden round.’41 The British government were
dismissive. Publicly the resolutions of the Sydney conference were `warmly welcomed’
by the Colonial Office and would be ‘carefully considered’ by the government in
London, which was ever mindful of public opinion both at home, and in the Pacific
colonies. Privately the government was not so polite: in a letter to Prime Minister
Gladstone, Lord Derby a former Secretary of State for the Colonies, expressed his
contempt of the resolutions: ‘…this is mere raving: and one can scarcely suppose it to
be seriously intended: though it is hard to fix the limits of colonial self-esteem…’42 The
notion that even lowly colonials may have independent thoughts and ideas concerning
their wellbeing and security seemed curious to the British premier.
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Queensland Premier Samuel Griffith suggested ‘that a Federal Australasian Council
should be created to deal, inter-alia, with the maritime defences of Australasia, beyond
the territorial limits.’ Griffith realised it was a responsibility the colonies should have,
which he underlined later in a memorandum of June 1885:
‘it is manifest that the ships at present on station are insufficient both in number
and quality to afford such offensive and defensive force as a community of over
3,000,000 persons, with wealth far beyond that possessed by a similar number in
most other parts of the world, ought to have at its command.

This was more than righteous indignation. As the next thirty years would attest, colonial
and then federal governments were not prepared to fund a local navy of such size and
versatility that, in their view, should be provided by the Imperial government – not
withstanding colonial ‘wealth far beyond that possessed’43 by others. Emboldened by
their 1883 deliberations, the colonies agreed to Premier Griffith’s proposal that a
council be established to consider a federation or union of the Pacific colonies. Britain
concurred passing the Federal Council of Australia Act in 1885. However, with council
membership voluntary, self interest ensured that New South Wales, South Australia and
New Zealand did not participate in the Council.

The colonies’ resolutions proved to be feeble when, unimpeded, Germany annexed the
north-eastern part of New Guinea. Reluctantly Britain accepted the call for the
annexation of New Guinea in October-November 1884. However, as a consequence of
its procrastinations, the declared protectorate covered only approximately one third of
the land area; the Germans having already colonized the other two thirds, much to the
consternation of the Australian colonies.
43
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resolutions agreed to at the conference in Sydney received further attention when it
became known that Germany was interested in expanding its empire into the Pacific
beyond New Guinea. Even then the British did not think that they ‘could reasonably
assent to what amounted to a Monroe Doctrine over the Western Pacific’.

Germany’s reply to Australia’s plans for the islands in the Pacific was blunt and
succinct. German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck, found the ‘grasping policy of the
English colonists as offensive and irritating as the original ‘insolent Monroe dogma’.44
He rejected Australia’s claims to New Guinea and any other unclaimed islands in the
region. Herbert Bismarck, the Chancellor’s son, warned his father that the German
annexation of New Guinea was a mistake and ‘that you will in time have a great trouble
there. Australia is expanding in strength and population. In a generation or two … She
will feel strong enough to wage war, like the Old European Powers, and will clear out
all foreigners from the neighbourhood’. Australia’s desire to extend its empire into the
Pacific was a response to its geographic location,

Roger Thompson observed.

Australians regarded themselves as being ‘on an imperial frontier next door to noman’s-land that might be taken over by another imperial power’45. By claiming nearby
territory, in the name of the British Crown, Australia was in fact enacting a Monroe
style doctrine as a way to set up a buffer against any encroachment by possible hostile
powers.

It was inconceivable to successive British governments that the Australian colonies
would be threatened by foreign aggression. Confirmation of this had come twelve
44
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months earlier from an R N officer on the Australia Station, who advised the Admiralty
on 23 October 1883 in his report, Naval Geography and Protection of British Ports and
Commerce, that ‘the position of our Australasian colonies, lying at the utmost distance
possible from the territories of the great states of Europe and America, is in itself an
almost impregnable safeguard against invasion.’ Captain Cyprian Bridge, R.N. the
report’s author, reminded the Admiralty that:

possibly the Imperial authorities are agreed that our Australian possessions run
no risk of invasion. Such is not the conviction of the colonists themselves; and
with them, be it remembered, the power of ultimately deciding on a defensive
policy rests, and with them alone.46

In this, Bridge was being either hopeful or naïve: colonial governments, in concert,
would not accept and British governments for the next thirty years would resist a local,
autonomous defence policy.

Bridge contemplated in his report the potential threat of European powers in Asia- as
had the colonists – and the closeness of such a threat. If the Netherlands were conquered
by a significant European naval power, Bridge contended, then Surabaya, the chief
naval base of the Dutch East Indies, 1200 miles from Darwin, would be a threat in
assembling and despatching an invasion force. Likewise potential threats could come
from Manila, 1800 miles away and Saigon, the capital of the French colony of CochinChina, 2000 miles from Darwin. Bridge, however, did not draw from his own analysis
that Darwin, as Thring and Hughes-Onslow would in 1912, could be a potential British
naval base. He was bemused that the raising of corps of cavalry was favoured by the
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public in New South Wales to somehow counter an invasion from the sea rather than the
protection offered by a warship for sea trade and the security of the coast. Bridge
reported that:

Probably nothing will awaken the popular mind in the colonies to the true
character of the risk which they must expect to incur in war but a plain statement
of the vital necessity to them of a proper system of naval defence … If our
colonies in the southern hemisphere be provided with a suitable naval defence
invasion of them may be erased from the list of possibilities.47

Adelaide, circa 1890: Governor of South Australia with various members of the local armed forces
including Lieutenant Commander William Rooke Creswell [seated, right] (Naval Historical Collection,
South Australian Archives)

To William Creswell, First Lieutenant aboard the HMCS Protector, the sole vessel of
the South Australian Naval Forces, placing one’s fate entirely in the hands of land
forces was incomprehensible for a maritime nation:

The landing of an enemy force on Australian soil was, to the general run of
people, the danger most to be feared. They would not, apparently, realize that
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invasion by an enemy expeditionary force was impossible so long as the British
Navy had command of the seas.48
Creswell acknowledged years later that he failed to comprehend at the time why the
development of a local navy had so little support in Australia and Britain, compared
with encouragement for an army:

With a navy supreme and unchallenged on all seven seas, the mother country
neither asked for nor desired naval aid from overseas. But with what was the
smallest army in the world, having regard to the immensity of its commitments,
she could not but place the highest value on the existence of a reserve of trained
troops in the outlying parts of her vast domain.49
Britain would get Australians soldiers ‘to cast themselves against the cannon-mouths for
England’50 several times before Creswell’s naval career ended.

Creswell considered himself ‘a zealous naval lieutenant, thoroughly convinced of the
necessity of cherishing to the utmost the naval services of his country – the country of
his adoption’51. To this end he spent his ‘many solitary evenings’ aboard the Protector
contemplating a naval defence for Australia, committing his ideas to print in a series of
articles in the Adelaide Register in 1886. His often repeated themes, first expressed at
this time, were the vulnerability of Australia to naval attack and the protection of
seaborne commerce as part of a developing naval defence. Not surprisingly, in his first
public lecture, entitled ‘Sea-Power’, at a meeting of the Australian Natives Association
in Adelaide in 1894, Creswell defined ‘‘Sea-Power’ not so much the naval strength as
the commerce of the nation, the national industry and everything that tended to send her
products beyond her borders.’52 This would be at risk if British seapower faltered.
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Creswell further argued that Britain’s vulnerability was Australia’s vulnerability:
Britain, through distance or defeat, would not be able to defend Australia soon enough
or in enough naval strength to resist or repel an invading or raiding force. Nor were
local based British naval forces reliable: they may be recalled ‘Home’ or sent elsewhere
at any time.

Cyprian Bridge provided the earliest indication that this would be the case. If the
Australian colonies did not draw up a scheme of naval defence, Bridge concluded in his
1883 report:

A sudden outbreak of war would find our fellow-countrymen in the colonies not
only quite unprepared to defend interests that are vital, but as far as can be seen,
altogether unaware of the true dangers to which the prosperity of Australia and
New Zealand is exposed. The officers serving on the station would in case of
actual war be far too busy with their own work to do much to help them in
arranging for the security of their enormous trade.
Bridge’s critique of the strategic consideration for the protection of trade and ports may
have had the desired affect upon the Admiralty. In late 1884, First Naval Lord of the
Admiralty, Sir Astley Cooper Key, wrote to the Australian colonial governments
encouraging them to consider a better organisation of local naval defence. His proposal
would require the colonial governments to fund ‘the provision and maintenance of the
naval force considered to be requisite for the protection of its port or ports’ and the
remuneration (wages, allowances and prospective pensions) of the officers and men,
while the British would superintend the construction and maintenance of vessels equal
to those found in the Royal Navy. If this proposal met with the approval of both
Imperial and colonial governments, Cooper Key believed would make the colonies feel
secure and ‘unite the Colonies to the motherland by bonds of friendship and mutual
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reliance.’53 The newly appointed Commander-in-Chief, Australia Station, Rear-Admiral
George Tryon brought the Cooper Key proposal to Australia in January 1885.

The Sydney Morning Herald was already considering the prospect of Australian
colonies contributing to their naval defence and the scenario where some of the ships
on the Australia Station may be drawn away because in a European conflict. ‘England
might want her last ship, her last sailor, and her last shilling to defend her own coast.
Then we shall wake up …’54 to a foreign flag on a swift cruiser in Port Jackson.
Creswell recalled that in the late 1880’s he was one ‘who had the cause of a self-reliant
colonial naval service at heart,’ he knew the horrendous opposition of which the
Admiralty was capable. It was ‘an obstinate resistance of unhallowed tradition; an
obduracy, inflexible and implacable, against which ordinary mortals beat their
knuckles in vain.’

55

The evidence of Britain’s commitment to Australian naval

defence prior to 1900 was ‘unimpressive, small wooden vessels.’56 The flagship of
the Commanders-in-Chief, Australia Station during the 1880’s, HMS Nelson, was
inadequate. It had succeeded HMS Wolverine, a twenty-two gun screw sloop built in
1859, which had been the flagship for the squadron since 1876. When Admiral Tryon
took command in January 1885, Admiral Penrose Fitzgerald referred to the Imperial
Squadron as ‘a small squadron of slow and antiquated wooden small craft, in addition to
the Nelson, a heavily armed though slow and partially protected iron cruiser.’57 The
Nelson had only recently been commissioned before coming to Australia. It had four
18-ton, eight 12 ton muzzle loading guns and six 20 pounder breech loading guns with a
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range of 4,800 yards, carried a complement of 593 and travelled at 14 knots. Except for
the Nelson all the ships were lightly armed. All the ships in the squadron used sails as
well as steam power. As Creswell would say of his warship, Protector, one-sixth the
size of Nelson ‘we could except in heavy weather, out-steam and always (by some two
or three thousand yards) out-range (the Nelson).58

Tryon proposed that the colonies contribute to the Australia Station by funding the
construction of protected cruisers, which would continue as a cost to the colonies in
peace-time but in war such costs would be met entirely by the Admiralty. ‘It seems to
me,’ Tryon said in March 1885, ‘that if our local defences are in a satisfactory
condition, a heavy squadron would have no mission in these waters.’ The proposed
auxiliary squadron provided, crewed and maintained by the Royal Navy would consist
of six cruiser catchers (designed, constructed and armed with the approval of the
colonial governments) and eight sea-going torpedo boats of 750 tons for coastal
surveillance. While placed under the command of the Commander-in-chief, Australia
Station, ‘at no time will these vessels be removed without the waters of Australasia
without the sanction of the Governments of the Colonies.’59 The Admiralty agreed to
Tryon formally proceeding to negotiate this local maritime defence proposal with the
colonies. The ubiquitous reticence over financing by some colonial governments stalled
negotiations and Tryon was unable to conclude an agreement before his Australia
Station appointment ended in February 1887.

Britain recognised the need to protect the maritime trade in Australasian waters. The
colonies, Sir Henry Holland, addressing the Colonial Conference in London in April
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1887 said that the basis of defence of the Australasian colonies was distance and the
capability of an opponent’s navy. With the assumed enemy being European the Imperial
fleet could blockade an enemy’s port or intercept and destroy an expeditionary force
before it reached Australasian waters. Fighting capability had developed from sail to a
steam-powered navy providing not only for more rapid movement. Taken together with
an assured coal supply and ‘the development of the telegraph cable systems of the world
has further facilitated rapid unexpected measures of aggression.’60 These strategic
virtues seemed to imply for South Australian Colonial Premier, Sir John Downer, a
Conference participant, that ‘while it was reasonable for the colonies to maintain their
own defences, the presence of the navy was for “defending the commerce of the
colonies, and the commerce of the colonies and the commerce of England was very
much the same thing.”’61 The sole cost of maintaining a naval defence should not be
borne by the Australian colonies it was argued. To Downer it should be considered in a
broader strategic context: ‘it becomes a question of Empire, and the object to be
protected is the trade and safety of the Empire’, then Britain should bear a reasonable
proportion of the cost. The colonial governments were essentially agreeing to the
Cooper Key-Tryon proposals.

In the end, the colonial representatives, including Chief Secretary of Victoria, Alfred
Deakin, agreed to financially contribute £126,000 per annum for this protection.
According to the 1887 naval agreement there would be an auxiliary squadron of five
fast cruisers and two torpedo boats to protect maritime trade, certain ports and coaling
stations. It was an agreement that Britain would soon regret for, critically, while the
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auxiliary squadron would be provided, equipped, crewed and maintained by joint
funding, with the vessels having the same status as any other Royal Navy ship, and be
under ‘the sole control and orders’ of the Commander-in-Chief, Australia Station, the
British government had agreed that the vessels could move beyond the limits of the
Australia Station ‘only with the consent of the Colonial Governments.’ 62 Added to this,
the individual local naval forces were solely under the command and control of each
colony. Around this time there was a shift in the sentiment of British governments: the
benign attitude to local naval forces exhibited by Bridge, Tryon and this agreement was
giving way to a strategic policy that to command the seas there needed to be a
concentration of the Imperial naval forces to destroy an enemy’s fleet in order to gain
and exercise control of the seas.

Until the last decade of the nineteenth century, Britain had unquestioned primacy in the
world’s oceans but Pax Britannica had left it indolent. ‘The Pax was primarily a peace
of the sea …’63 and, while no power challenged Britain, national transformations
heralded change. The unification of Germany in 1871, the industrialisation and
westernisation of Japan, the national economic impact of the Trans-Siberian railway on
Russia, the emergence of the United States with its trans-continental rail and telegraphy
communications and diversified industrial infrastructure, the decay and fracturing of
China, eventually, even the dominion status of Canada (1867) and New Zealand (1907)
and the federation of Australia (1901) signalled the approach of new political, economic
and defence strategies, policies and alliances, new economic markets and the migration
of peoples across regions, continents and the world. By the late 1880’s British naval
supremacy seemed challenged by other European naval powers, especially France and
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Russia with implications for British foreign policy, protection of its seaborne commerce
and sources of trade and resources, and the security, generally, of sea communication.
The views of the ‘blue water’ school of navalists started to take hold in British
government and Admiralty circles. By the Naval Defence Act of 1889, Britain adopted
a two power standard, that is, the British fleet should be equal to the combination of the
next two strongest European naval powers, while the Admiralty adopted a doctrine of
centralisation and concentration of its naval forces. There was no place for fragmented
colonial navies; the imperial ideology would be: ‘Sons, be welded each and all/ into one
imperial whole, / …,/ One life, one flag, one fleet, one throne!’64

Writing in 1894, Commander Charles Robinson, R.N, more sharply defined the British
navalist view:
All that our Empire is it became by the exercise of Sea Power … It can be
maintained only by possession of the power by which it was made. Sweep away
the merchant marine and the Navy which safeguards it and our possessions will
drop like fruit from a blasted tree. They will fall into the lap of the maritime
power by which we are undone. Without a sufficient fleet to keep open our
communications, none of our colonies or dependencies could secure themselves
from foreign domination.

To Australia and New Zealand, Robinson made it abundantly clear: the battle that
would save them would not be fought in southern waters, for there was no strong
maritime power in that hemisphere:

The naval battles of the future, in which the outermost limits of the Empire will
be defended, will, we assume, be fought on the great strategic routes from
Europe, or even in the English Channel. Let it never be forgotten that as soon as
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the members of the Empire are cut off from communication with its heart, they
will fall a prey to the power that intervenes.65
For the next twenty years this would be the Admiralty’s imperial naval strategy with the
warning codicil of concentration of forces. Robinson’s comments also implied that local
colonial navies were worthless.

Defence was a prime motive for the Australian colonies to federate. At the first national
Australasian Constitutional Convention held in Sydney in March-April 1891, New
South Wales’ Premier Sir Henry Parkes, president of the convention and an early Father
of Federation, proclaimed it ‘essential to preserve the security and integrity of these
colonies.’66 Parkes ‘played the race card’ to receptive delegates when he argued that the
colonies needed to federate as ‘forms of aggression will appear in these seas which are
entirely new to the world’ with the threat coming from China and other Asian nations.
Parkes was concerned that it was not bombardment of cities, nor an attack on seaborne
commerce or the ransoming of property and lives that was to be feared, but invasion of
‘some thinly-peopled portion of the country’ by an enemy which would take a
considerable cost in lives and money to eject. Meaney has noted, ‘the Father of
Federation was also in the same sense, Father of the Yellow Peril tradition in Australian
foreign policy.’67 Parkes had unanimous support for his resolution ‘that the Military and
Naval defence of Australasia shall be entrusted to Federal Forces, under one command.’
That is, there would be a separate and equal naval commander and military commander
‘amenable to the National Government of Australasia.’68

65

66

67
68

Robinson, R.N., Commander C., The British Fleet, George Bell and Sons, London, 1896. Pp. 55-56.
S M H, 25 October 1889, Sir Henry Parkes speech at Tenterfield,24 October 1889
Meaney, A History of Australian Defence and Foreign Policy 1901-1923: Volume 1, Pp.31-32
Macandie, p42

45

Parkes’ view on defence was shared by Sir Samuel Griffith, the Queensland delegate
and the Tasmanian delegate Andrew Inglis Clark, who favoured a republic and
‘believed each nation had its character and mission and that Australia could not fully
develop its potential while it was in anyway subordinate’.69 Griffith re-worked a
constitution, originally drafted by Clark, which was the basis for consideration by the
‘fathers’ of Federation over the next nine years. It should have enabled any future
Commonwealth to assert its sovereign responsibility to establish defence forces to
protect and defend Australia. ‘Griffith wanted to constitute an independent Australian
nation that would remain in the empire, but without being subordinate to Britain; the
only link to Britain would be the Crown. Britain would be an equal and an ally, and all
the people of the empire would share a common citizenship.’70 Griffith wrote into the
constitution that executive power was vested in the Crown, exercised by the monarch’s
representative, the Governor-General, who was Commander-in-Chief of the armed
forces. Britain had wanted a ‘safe’ Australian federation and:
… the Colonial Office in 1897, in attempting to modify secretly the draft
Australian Constitution, proposed a wording that would place Australian forces
under the Queen, not the Governor-General. The significance of this was that
Australian forces might, when serving in war, be controlled by British ministers,
not Australian.71
The proposal was dropped as the War Office was concerned ‘about the legal framework
of command when colonial troops served with British forces.’ The Defence Forces was
enshrined under the constitution72: to protect every State against invasion and domestic
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violence (that is, internal unrest), for the peace, order and good government and for
executing and maintaining the laws of the Commonwealth under the constitutional
Commander-in-Chief, the Governor-General. Revenue, however, took precedence over
defence as a national responsibility following Federation. The most significant transfer
of responsibilities from the new states was the custom services, the main source of
revenue for the Commonwealth to fund its core functions (parliament, Commonwealth
Departments, pay politicians and public servants) while Commonwealth activities
which required outlays such as defence would have to wait.

Whatever the aspirations for military and naval defence within the draft constitution, the
Colonies Secretary, Joseph Chamberlain, reminded premiers at the opening of the
Colonial Conference, that British military and naval forces were not for the benefit of
the United Kingdom alone. ‘They are still more maintained as a necessity of Empire, for
the maintenance and protection of Imperial trade and of Imperial interests all over the
world’ Chamberlain said. What the Admiralty wanted, according to its First Lord, G.J.
Goschen, was ‘a free hand … to be able to conduct the defence of Australia on the same
principles as those which we should follow in the defence of our English, Scots, and
Irish ports … No organised expedition could be sent either from Japan, or from the
United States, or from France without the full knowledge of the Admiralty.’ He asserted
that, ‘I cannot conceive any case, unless we lost actually our sea power, when we should
think it our duty not to defend so valuable a portion of our Empire as Australia, New
Zealand and Tasmania, for the safety of which we hold ourselves responsible, in the
same way as we hold ourselves responsible for the safety of the British Islands.
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know that Tasmania, separately, had the same guarantee as New Zealand was one thing,
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but Goschen was not one for having the Royal Navy ‘hugging the shore’. It needed to
aggressively seek out the enemy, while the colonies looked after shore defences.

The Commandant of the South Australian Naval Forces had already been contemplating
Australasia’s participation in its own naval defence. On 27 January 1897 Captain
Creswell placed his naval scheme before the government of South Australia and in June
1897 South Australia’s Premier, Charles Kingston, submitted the scheme to the
Colonial Conference in June 1897. Creswell proposed ‘that instead of a money
contribution, the Australasian colonies should furnish an equivalent in trained seamen
for the Royal Naval Reserve for service in Australasian waters and contiguous seas.’
Under Creswell’s scheme it was anticipated that 5000 men would be raised for a reserve
force: ‘Sea defence is of vital importance to island peoples; there can be no sea defence
without seamen.’ However with Australia’s small population (3.8 million people in
1901) it was this basic element which would limit Australian naval development for the
next twenty years, even when vessels were acquired. Creswell advised Kingston prior to
the Conference of a further limitation in developing the scarce available seamen: ‘If our
shipping and our sea trade is manned by foreigners who have no interest in defending us
we shall have neither seamen nor sea defence. ’74
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Adelaide, SA. C. 1896. Lieutenant Marshall Smith, Staff Engineer William Clarkson, Captain William
Rooke Creswell, Naval Commandant of the South Australian Defence Forces; Chief Gunner Edwin
Argent and Sub-Lieutenant Patrick Weir, Naval Historical Collection, Australian War Memorial,
(306824)

Creswell knew that the British taxpayer would not be happy with his proposal to cease
the subsidy while retaining the Royal Navy on the Australia Station. Audaciously, he
claimed that Britons would be soothed in the knowledge that trained Australian seamen
would supplement the squadrons of the Pacific, China and the East Indies stations.
Australia needed to foster and develop a naval defence, Creswell contended, because,
given its geographic situation and given changes in the Asia region, naval strength
would influence the country’s future. Creswell knew from his Royal Navy experience
that a strong navy was the instrument in foreign policy and security for a maritime state.
Significantly Creswell concluded his proposal with an early assessment of the danger of
a potential malevolent naval power in the North Pacific:

The rise of Japan as a naval power and her well known aspirations, the
establishment of Russia at Port Arthur, may have in the future an effect which
will be undesirable to Australasia; the New Hebrides question … may be one
much more threatening to our well-being, and one which an Australasia unable
49

to take upon herself an honourable share in the burden of resisting would be
unable to evade.
While Creswell accepted the training of Australian seamen as ‘following our national
instinct and traditions …from the sentimental and patriotic aspect there could be no plan
more certain to bind us to the Mother land than one by which our own seamen will take
their place in the fleet that “holds the command of the sea as a trust for the civilised
world”. ’75 The Admiralty would not sanction the scheme. ‘The Admiralty, perhaps not
anxious to encourage the growth of local navies, had not succeeded in training one
Australian sailor for the Royal Navy by 1900.’76

As the six separate Australian colonies were finalising their federation into a single
nation through colonial referenda, a conference of colonial naval officers met in
Melbourne on 5 August 1899 to deliberate on a naval defence for Australia. Present
were Captain Robert Muirhead Collins, retired, the Victorian Secretary for Defence,
who chaired the committee; Captain Francis Hixson, commanding the NSW Naval
Forces; Commander Walton Drake, Acting Naval Commandant of Queensland;
Commander Frederick Tickell in command of the Victorian Naval Forces and Creswell,
Naval Commandant, South Australia. The naval officers were critical of Australia’s
naval capability: it was the same as it was ten years ago and indeed might remain the
same for 20 or 50 years if provision for a naval defence of Australia was not
contemplated by the new Commonwealth. They were disillusioned by obligations not
met under the 1887 agreement by which the vessels of the British Auxiliary Squadron
would provide the means to drill and train Australian seamen. The neglect went deep:
‘This expectation has never been realised, the vessels in reserve having always been laid
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up in Sydney, and no attempt has been made to utilise them for the benefit of a local
Naval Force.’ As the naval officers noted, ‘in the event of a European combination of
such strength as to occupy the attention of the British Fleets, the continuance of a policy
which in no way advances Australian ability for sea defence might have disastrous
consequences.’77

The colonial naval officers declared what the Admiralty would already have known:
that:
France, Russia, and Japan have established naval bases and possess powerful
fleets in the north of the Pacific. Nearly every other European power has
effected a lodgement in the seas to our north.78
Obvious to the naval officers was the fact that the Pacific would be ‘the arena of
national contending forces.’ Broeze had noted that ‘the Pacific, historically, has been a
centre of maritime power and influence with ‘the shifting balances of geopolitics and
strategic calculations’79 and the exercise of ‘Australia’s Monroe Doctrine, the belief in
the manifest role for Australia in the south-west Pacific, and the conquest of a modest
Pacific empire constitute one example of such geopolitical ideology.’ The key assertion
of the naval officers was that ‘Australia having no military frontier requires for her
defence a sea or naval force.’ In consequence ‘every consideration both of defence and
our position of influence, which will be that of the ‘New Power in the Pacific’, demands
from those responsible for the organisation of Federal Defence the recognition of the
primary importance of Naval defence for Australia.’80
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The Times of London, in several caustic articles (notably on 28 September and 6
October 1899), was unimpressed: the proposal was ‘deplorably mischievous …
inadequate, inconsequent and altogether inadmissible …’ The Commander-in-chief,
Australia Station, if consulted would have told the conference of naval officers that
there is, and can be, no such thing as a “naval defence for Australia”’, The Times
thundered. ‘The only true and adequate naval defence for Australia, as for every other
possession of the Crown, is a British Fleet supreme on the seas and by virtue of its
supremacy keeping open the maritime communications of the Empire’ The editorial
vitriol rolled onto the final insult for those who, the newspaper assumed, made up
colonial naval personnel: ‘Naval warfare on the high seas is not, and never can be in
these days, an affair of amateurs, volunteers, and half-trained longshore seamen.’81

The articles did not go unchallenged. Creswell informed The Times’ readers that “there
is something special in the naval defence of Australasia, for special and distinct
provision has been made to meet it with the establishment of the Auxiliary Australian
Squadron.” For The Times to report that the Naval Force would consist of ‘amateurs,
half

trained

volunteers

and

longshoremen’

was,

to

Creswell,

disparaging,

condescending and untrue. “Neither in numbers, physique, intelligence, nor sea aptitude
is the available material one whit below that of the mother country.” 82

By the end of the nineteenth century, Creswell’s call for a local naval defence remained
unanswered in an empire assured of its greatness by the supremacy of one navy.
Navalists subscribed to the view Arthur Marder observed that:
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British sea power had been used as the servant of mankind by destroying the
slave trade and piracy by keeping order on every shore and protecting equally
traders of every nation. This was no idle boast. The British navy had made and
kept the whole sea ‘as safe as the Serpentine.’

From Malaya to Zanzibar to China, Creswell had served an Empire in which, Marder
noted, ‘the essential instrument in an imperialistic policy was the navy … it was the
instrument for securing colonies and trade.’83 The British Empire made manifest the
challenge John Evelyn set 300 years before:

A spirit of commerce, and strength at sea to protect it, are the most certain marks
of the greatness of empire … whoever commands the ocean, commands the
trade of the world, and whoever commands the trade of the world, commands
the riches of the world, and whoever is master of that, commands the world
itself84

Britain commanded all the oceans and thus Australia could expect, Creswell concluded,
only ‘raids by commerce–raiding cruisers, cruisers of a gun power capable of menacing
unprotected sea ports.’ To Creswell the solution to accommodating an Australian naval
service was long-range cruisers with a heavy armament ‘as no raiding cruiser, unless
inclined to suicide, would risk encountering.’85 For men like Robert Muirhead Collins
and Creswell, it seemed as clear as day that with no land frontier, border security rested
with a naval force. In September 1900 Collins stated that for this key Federal
responsibility the first step was to have a clear and definite defence policy. To support
this line of reasoning, Collins referred to a letter in the London Spectator of 26 May
1900 which provided the salient features to justify a naval defence with a little
prophecy:
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To hold intercourse with mankind, to share in their fortunes, to enrich
themselves by commerce, above all to be great in the world’s affairs, the
Australians must take to the sea. By the sea they will sell everything, through the
sea they will buy everything; and that fact, which they cannot alter, will in the
end – which may not be as distant as we now imagine – force upon them ships,
fleets to protect the ships, and, if we may look yet a few decades further ahead,
political ambitions. A great commerce implies fleets to protect it, fleets require
maritime stations, and both commerce and ambition point out to the Australians
the same path.
In the pre-dawn of the Commonwealth, Collins emphasised that ‘it is important to
Australia from her geographical position and her maritime future, to develop her own
local resources. This cannot be done if her naval defence is restricted to the payment of
subsidies.’86 Soon-to-be Prime Minister Edmund Barton remarked in the Sydney
Morning Herald of 31 December 1900 that taking over the various defence departments
was not a matter of urgency. The newspaper re-assured its readers on 1 January, the day
the Commonwealth of Australia was established, ‘we are guarded in our isolation by the
iron wall of a navy which is admittedly incomparable.’ A day later, on 2 January 1901,
at the Federation Banquet held in the Sydney Town Hall, New South Wales’ Premier,
Sir William Lyne, reflected on Australia’s place in the world:

The material prosperity of the new nation will not affect the people of Australia
alone; it will contribute to the strength and greatness of the British Empire, and
therefore improve the prospects of permanent peace amongst the nations of the
world. A strong and united British Empire is the best guarantee of such peace87.
Britain’s naval supremacy had delivered both a Pax Britannica and a Trafalgar
Century; it had secured the Empire. In creating a commonwealth, common defence was
regarded as the reason for Australia’s being, but with a relaxed and comfortable attitude
about British naval protection.
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Australians would retain for several generations images and perceptions of national
identity, according to Broeze, which revolved largely around inward looking and often
racist concepts of ‘continental Australia in which the sea was seen as a fence shutting
out unwanted intrusions from the surrounding region.’88
Australian

To Creswell, successive

governments had misinterpreted the sea for a hundred years. It was a

facilitator of communication (migration, trade, communications – mail, legal
documents, and newspapers). It was not a barrier – it was an easy means of access.
Australia – as for any sea nation – could only be defended from attack from the sea by
warships. Warships to defend the coast and warships which could engage an enemy far
from the coast.

“In the century that is opening,” President Theodore Roosevelt said in 1903, “the
commerce and the command of the Pacific will be factors of incalculable moment in the
world’s history.”89 Australia required a naval defence which would secure its sea
frontier. It could not do it alone. The early task for navalists, particularly Creswell, was
to shift public perception about the sea surrounding Australia so that there could be a
realistic and practical response. In his campaign Creswell would shape the formation of
a naval defence. As the new century opened Creswell was more vigorously asserting
Australia’s unique position in the Empire, though acknowledging ‘One Flag, One
Fleet’, while Britain’s attitude to a maritime Australia was entirely negative.
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Chapter II
1901-1903 Nationhood and the Sea: Destiny and Identity
In the opening years of the Commonwealth, there were three key matters which would
frame its naval destiny, identity and status within the Empire: Firstly the national
response, from government and parliament, to the constitutional provisions for
autonomous defence forces and foreign affairs; Secondly, Creswell’s call that
Australia’s future was as a maritime state; and Thirdly, the renewal of the Naval
Agreement with Britain. In addition for almost a decade from 1901, fickle support for
minority governments and the prevailing belief amongst many politicians that Britain
would protect Australia at all costs contributed to the national deliberation over a local
naval defence.

In foreign policy, early Commonwealth governments were less complacent, legally
enforcing a ‘White Australia’ policy and encouraging relations with the United States.
Under Section 51 of the Constitution, the Commonwealth parliament had the power to
make laws with regard to defence and external affairs. Miller argued that:

The first Australian government led by Edmund Barton without doubt could
have decided its own foreign policies administered through its own created
diplomatic service. It did not want to do so. It did not believe it had the need, the
right, the power, or the capacity. This was not a case of liberty reinforcing the
bonds of empire, but rather habits of empire softening the resolve of liberty.90

In regard to defence and external relations, as a member of the Empire the meaning of
‘One Flag, One Fleet’ was understood: there was one voice only in foreign policy and
one instrument in imperial security and protection, that of Britain’s.
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The Boxer Rebellion (1900) – as with the Boer War (1899-1902) and the Sudan War
(1885) – provided the Australian colonies with an opportunity to support Britain’s
foreign policy and imperial security actions, ‘reinforcing the bonds of empire’, to fight
under one flag and command. ‘The Commonwealth was born in imperial khaki,’91
according to Trainor – and also navy blue. To quell the Boxer Rebellion, the Australian
colonies responded with some 500 sailors of the New South Wales and Victorian Naval
Brigade, as well as the South Australian warship Protector, crewed by volunteers. This
act of loyalty to Britain did not even past muster: Captain Chapman Clare, the recently
appointed Commandant of the South Australian Naval Forces and Protector’s
commander, did not meet the British specification that the ship be under the command
of a Royal Navy officer. The only acceptable officer was the recently appointed
Commandant of the Queensland Naval Forces, William Creswell. Once Protector had
completed its Royal Navy service in China, it returned, firstly to Sydney on the 24
November

1900

remaining

to

participate

in

ceremonies

inaugurating

the

Commonwealth of Australia and then proceeded to Adelaide.

For Creswell there was a understandable pride in HMCS Protector’s achievements particularly as it was one third the size of the British warship, HMS Wallaroo, sent from
the Australia Station to China to assist in the suppression of the Rebellion. Wallaroo
had greater armaments and in the journey from Sydney to Hong Kong, HMS Wallaroo
took only a day less than the smaller Protector. It meant little to Rear-Admiral Sir
Lewis Beaumont, KCMG, RN, the Commander-in-Chief of the Australia Station, who
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disparagingly informed the Admiralty that ‘it only showed that she could be navigated
to China and back at economical speed by her officers and crew.’92

Captain Creswell as Commandant of the Queensland Naval Forces, 1900, from the Naval Historical
Collection, Australian War Memorial (POO.444.162)

‘It is a curious thing about Australian nationalism that Australians have so often
identified the birth of their nation as an outcome of participation in imperial wars …’
Meaney noted in The Search for Security in the Pacific, his study of Australian defence
and foreign policy., ‘It sprang out of the achievement of Australian arms in a British
cause and under British leadership, out of the pride that the soldiers, as British
Australians, felt in the part they played in the war effort.’ 93 Whether it was the turn of
the century actions of the Boxer Rebellion or the Boer War or the Great War of 191418: ‘The desire for recognition and a secure identity is a prime force in the movements
to create nations,’ Hirst has argued. ‘Australian historians who doubt the force of
national feeling in federation have looked to economics to reveal the selfish motive
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behind it. They overlook the motive that is quintessentially selfish and integral to
nationalism and status: the desire for identity and status.’94 Yet the birth of a new nation
for the new century did not co-create in the Australian people or parliament immediate
aspirations for a separate status and identity. That is, the inception of this new state did
not change its people from consciously accepting that they were ‘Australian Britons’ or
acknowledging their kinship with the people of Britain as ‘Britons of the Empire’,
regardless of their place of birth. At Federation the destiny that seemed inevitable - to
be one nation - had been reached, and, as if collectively catching their breath,
Australians settled into national unity and local and individual freedom. The Australian
flag flew for the first time from the Exhibition Building in Melbourne on 3 September
1901. The English flag was ‘ours’ while the Australian flag was not officially
recognised until gazetted in 1903, following approval from King-Emperor, Edward VII.
It was more than symbolic that the flag displayed the Southern Cross and
Commonwealth Star beneath a Union Jack? In Australia, for the remainder of the
century, it would fly in tandem with the Union Jack long after the duality of citizenship
had become a memory.

On Friday 1 March 1901 the new Commonwealth proclaimed its constitutional
responsibility for defence and, in particular, transferred the ships and personnel of the
former colonial navies to the Commonwealth Naval Forces. These naval assets
consisted of the monitor, Cerberus (built 1870), the cruiser, Protector (built 1884), the
torpedo boats Childers (1884), Lonsdale(1883), Nepean (1883), Mosquito (1884) and
Countess of Hopetoun(1891), the gunboats Gayundah (1884) and Paluma (1884) and
some auxiliaries with 240 permanent and 1348 voluntary naval brigade personnel. In
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reality nothing changed. The vessels remained in their home ports under the command
of their State commandants.

Writing to the Governor of South Australia, Lord Hallam Tennyson 95, from the Navy
Office of the Queensland Defence Force, Creswell wished, ‘but it is a dream, we could
design our own ships.’ Creswell confided to Tennyson the necessity to send the naval
engineer and former shipmate, William Clarkson, to England to oversee their design,
planning and building ‘but there is no such luck. Destroyers would be most useful but
the Admiralty will insist upon telling us everything and assume we were all born or
imported from Mars the day before.’ Most tellingly, he lamented the state of the Royal
Navy:
They can’t even build their own ships; their programme is years and a dozen
battleships behind. We could go straight to assisting and get what we wanted.
The Federal Govt. must insist on Naval establishments on principles that will
make the Navy I see take root and from this country a small plant – a creeper
now, and oak someday
Creswell’s, vision was not confined to acquiring ships: people, skills and the capability
of local naval engineering were also needed. He wanted Australian Government
Scholarships to fund twenty places per year with the British Navy as Australian Naval
Cadets. They would serve for five to ten years with a possible early return to Australia
as commissioned lieutenants: ‘We want officers oh! so badly and unless something is
done, shall always want them.’ Creswell felt he was now not alone in his quest. ‘It is a
lifting thought to know that you take such an interest in our Naval matters.’ Creswell
confided to Tennyson. ‘I have stayed Robinson Crusoe at it for so long.’96
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Creswell’s stance was not unrealistic nor an isolated view. Alfred Thayer Mahan in July
1902 wrote:

What Australasia needs is not her petty fraction of the Imperial navy, a squadron
assigned to her in perpetual presence, but an organisation of naval force which
constitutes a firm grasp of the universal naval situation. Thus danger is kept
remote; but if it should approach, there is insured within reaching distance an
adequate force to repel it betimes.97
When Creswell was asked to comment on Mahan’s article, he said, ‘What we want is to
be personally and actively represented in the great organisation which is to control …
the universal naval situation.’ The difficulty was that when Creswell proposed his
scheme Britain, ‘even among the experts’ seemed to think that what Creswell wanted
was an increase of ships ‘for purely local purposes to take the place of forts. This fallacy
has been shared to a large extent in Australia, where crude notions regarding naval
defence are prevalent. … It is absurd to think that the experience of 200 or 300 years of
successful naval warfare would be disregarded’98 and yet that was the accusation,
Creswell felt, was being levelled at him. For the next eight years, Creswell put before
Parliament schemes to give substance to that which was provided under the
Constitution: ‘The Parliament shall, subject to the Constitution, have power to make
laws for the peace, order and good government of the Commonwealth … [for] the naval
and military defence of the Commonwealth …’99 Creswell’s vision for local naval
defence was Mahanian and he believed in his ability to realise it.

Tennyson forwarded Creswell’s January letter to Lord Selborne, First Lord of the
Admiralty, for consideration. The response came on 2 March, stating the unwavering
97
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position which British governments maintained for at least the next decade. Ominously,
it also brought Creswell and his views to the attention of the Admiralty and there was a
message for him: abandon your arguments for a local navy. ‘The plain fact is that
Australia and its trade is protected by the British Fleet in the China Seas, where the
decisive action so far as the Eastern Seas is concerned will be fought’ Selborne wrote.
‘If that fleet is beaten, no number of Protectors will save their trade any more than the
American frigates in 1812 saved the United States from invasion and its commerce from
destruction.’ Britain mandated one navy, under one flag, with the Admiralty in control
and, from the First Lord’s position ‘Australia should aim at adding to the real strength
of the Imperial Fleet in China waters.’ Further, Australia ‘should either provide herself
or give us the means to provide ships capable of keeping the sea, and of meeting the
powerful cruisers of France and Russia, whether in China or Australian waters.
Selborne encouraged Tennyson to challenge Creswell directly by using the argument
contained in this correspondence but doubted Creswell could validly respond. To
Tennyson, Selborne provided this injunction for the Britons in the South:

You cannot too strongly impress upon all your countrymen in Australia that the
real defence of Australia and Australian trade, in a naval war, will have to take
place a long way from the coast of Australia; just as the security of England
from invasion would probably have to be decided, not in the Channel, but in the
Mediterranean, so the security of Australia is much more likely to depend on a
battle in the China Seas than anywhere on the Australian coast. It would be a
fatal mistake, the gravity of which I cannot exaggerate, to think it a wise policy
to defend Australia by ships that could not keep the sea or steam a good
speed.100

It the imperial logic underpinning the standard Admiralty response in Creswell’s
successive proposals for a local naval defence. It was inconceivable to Selborne that
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‘your countrymen’ – by heritage and ethnicity, if not birth – should have it any other
way’.101

Creswell’s lobbying for an Australian naval defence became more intense and
outspoken. By February 15, 1901 Creswell boldly asked Tennyson to suggest to the new
Defence Minister, Sir John Forrest, that ‘he should have a Naval advisor and that
worthy person should be myself’ [for] ‘We want to lay the foundations of that which
will be a great addition to the Empire’s sea strength and a real defence for Australia.’ To
drive this point home, especially to those who favoured land forces over a navy,
Creswell informed Tennyson:

The old idea that the fate of Australia might be decided in the Channel can be
amended by nearly four and a half million Britishers out here. Anybody or
rather power, who can first polish off the British fleet and then spoil for an
Australian War (a la Boer) is not within one’s power of imagination. How
specially apropos is all the above to my request to be appointed naval advisor to
Sir J.F. while taking over Naval Defences must be evident, but I will be really
grateful if (your considerations permitting) you will recommend me.102

However, it would be of limited value to be in a position to affect change if Australians
did not embrace the Creswell vision. To Creswell, Australians may be relaxed and
comfortable with ‘the idea that we are safe because there are no very strong naval bases
owned by foreign Powers in our neighbourhood. That is true, but it is a fool’s paradise,
and it must at once be dispelled.’ He argued that an enemy did not require a local base
to raid Australia’s sea commerce. A couple of cruisers could be coaled from a steamer
at sea or a protective cove along the vast island continent. It would be Selborne’s ‘grave
mistake’ not to contemplate that the vulnerability of Australia was also the vulnerability

101
102

Selborne to Tennyson, 2/3/1901 Tennyson Papers NLA 479/2/83
Creswell to Tennyson, 15/2/1901 Tennyson Papers NLA 479/5/37

63

of Britain: an enemy raider in the Pacific could deprive Britain of raw materials and
agricultural products.

Creswell promoted his call for a local naval defence and indirectly his own credentials
in a long article in the Brisbane Courier of Saturday 2 March 1901. The timing would
appear deliberate: Australia was in the midst of its first Federal election and the prime
minister-designate, Edmund Barton, was in Brisbane electioneering. Entitled ‘Federated
Australia and A Navy’, Creswell wrote of Australia’s existing naval status, as well as
that of foreign powers in the region. If its commerce was threatened, Australia’s
position far from Imperial fleet support (and its powerless state if help was not
forthcoming or there was a weakened British naval response) meant, in Creswell’s
opinion, that the solution lay with a local naval capability. To Creswell it defied logic
that the British Isles, so close to presumed continental enemies, correctly basing its
defence on seapower, would contend that Australia, an island continent ‘should have no
navy, should have received no encouragement to train her sons for service afloat …’ It
must end, Creswell argued, for ‘discouragement and aloofness have been the constant
attitude of the Imperial authorities towards naval development in every Australian
colony.’

103

Creswell’s argument was not based on having a navy for naval defence

sake. Deny commerce – export of food and raw materials – from Australia and not only
Australia suffered economically, but so would the intended recipient – Britain. Albany
in Western Australia and Thursday Island off north Queensland needed to be secured as
key naval defence positions, according to Creswell, as seaborne commerce used coastal
routes that passed through these locations for trans-oceanic trade. The significance of
Thursday Island was not to be forgotten, when eleven years later, it would feature in the
103
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strategic arrangements of a 1913 report on the naval defence of Australia. For the
present, Creswell wrote that ‘the naval defence of Australia means the protection of our
floating trade and the supply of our due quota of aid to the Empire’s sea strength.104
This was preaching a separate naval entity, but one that acknowledged the unity of
control within one Imperial fleet. By May 1901, Creswell was urging Defence Minister
Forrest, that in considering proposals from the Admiralty, the Barton government
‘should have at their disposal the latest and most complete information on all points of
Australian naval concern to guide them.’105

Creswell was keen to use any opportunity to promote a national naval force in light of
the dominance of the land forces in the national thinking. The Duke and Duchess of
York were touring Australia following the opening of the Commonwealth Parliament
and Creswell sought to take advantage of Tennyson’s contact with the nauticallyinclined future King George V to assist the cause: ‘I can’t help asking you to befriend
Australian Naval prospects before the Royal visitors have left us for good. Not a thing
of any kind has been done for the Navy. Everything has gone to the Army.’ The
Commandant of the Queensland Naval Forces was entitled to be concerned: The
supremacy of land forces was publicly recognised when, on 1 March 1901, Sir John
Forrest appointed a committee of State Military Commandants to review the colonial
defence acts with the view to drafting a defence bill for the new Commonwealth. Sir
George French, the New South Wales Commandant was appointed president of the
committee and Major William Throsby Bridges its secretary. For years Creswell and
Bridges would challenge each other over the local defence of Australia; for the moment,
Creswell was aggrieved at the lack of recognition for deeds of recent memory:
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Not a thing has been said or done for Aus Naval help in China. True we did
nothing really to claim anything for but it is the first time the younger sons of
the Sea power race have shown any sign of heredity. It might be marked there
was after all as much in taking the little Protector up with a good crew to China
as in looking after railway trucks in South Africa and the NSW and Victorian
Navals did good honest work.106

The Defence Bill introduced into the Commonwealth Parliament proposed that the
naval forces be controlled and administered by a Naval Officer Commanding while the
28,000 military personnel be under a General Officer Commanding. On 26 December
1901 the position of General Officer Commanding was given to Boer War veteran
Major-General Sir Edward Hutton, former Commandant of the New South Wales
Forces and prior to this the Canadian Militia. However, Defence Minister Forest,
speaking in the Second Reading debate on 9 July 1901 did not envisage the immediate
appointment of the naval commander. “But where is our fleet” interjected George Reid,
the leader of the Free Trade group in parliament. “I have said” Forest replied, “that we
may not appoint the officer yet. This Bill is not for today – it is for all time.”107
Creswell was incredulous; he had little time for Forrest: “I don’t think I ever heard such
a dull, small-brained man being a minister.” To Creswell, Forrest was “a dead weight in
the Ministerial boat but that unintelligent person is treading us in the mud, kept amused
and inflated by the attentions at his elbow of Gordon, French and co”108 These were
distinguished military men to challenge! In a letter to Tennyson from Flat Top Island
off the coast of Mackay Queensland where he was midway through training Naval
Reservists, Creswell wrote that in his view the proposed Defence Bill was for “a land
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without one inch of military frontier” drawn up by military men. “It could only suit
Switzerland and I said so.”109 Creswell’s part in a civil-naval relationship in the new
Commonwealth was getting off to an inauspicious, though aggressive start.

Meanwhile, the Prime Minister Edmund Barton sought the views of the principal British
naval officer in Australia, Rear-Admiral Sir Lewis Beaumont. Beaumont had not only
an operational role, but also one promoting ‘One Flag, One Fleet’ whilst maintaining a
surveillance of British naval sentiment. Beaumont, previously Director of Naval
Intelligence at the Admiralty, responded on 16 July, dismissing any idea of a local navy:
“It is beyond the powers of the Commonwealth at the outset to create such a force”. He
re-assured Barton of the solidarity of the Royal Navy, exemplified by the vessels on
station. Indeed, Beaumont considered that the Commonwealth “should take no part in
the creation or maintenance of Naval Reserves or State Naval Reserves”. It would be
“more costly and less efficient to have a Naval Defence Force”.110 The Rear-Admiral
argued that there were limitations in creating a local defence force with Australia’s
weak financial position and small population. In essence Beaumont was telling Barton
that it was appropriate and logical to exhibit loyalty to the Empire by paying tribute to
the overlord in the guise of the subsidy under the Naval Agreement for the Royal Navy
Squadron based in Sydney.

This was not the view of some members of the first Commonwealth parliament. George
Fuller, the Free Trade Member for the Illawarra reminded the House that:
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the necessity of the defence of Australia …having been the prime agent in
bringing about federation .… I am one who believes the time has come when we
should establish … the nucleus of an Australian navy, when all the men of that
navy should be Australian-born citizens.

The Protectionist Member of Parliament, R.A. Crouch, joined this call in the House on
24 July 1901. In his view, ‘it is not from the European nations that I think we
Australians have to expect any great difficulties, but from those great nations of the
East, China and Japan, which we are unfortunately teaching European methods of
utilising their military resources.111 This was the earliest Commonwealth parliamentary
reference not only linking defence with the threat from the North, but also the
dubiousness of giving Asia, particularly Japan, a technical capability equal to that of the
European powers. It was a connection that others would take time to grasp. For the
present the focus was on keeping the ‘Yellow Peril’ from the gate. Crouch would not
have been reassured by the Defence Minister who, a month later in Parliament, would
declare, “there is no limit to the number of foreign ships of war to be admitted to
Australian waters.”112

Generally, the parliamentary party leaders were dismissive of a local navy. Reid was
reticent, hoping “to see – not so much for the emergencies of today, but as a part of the
evolution of an Australian system of defence – our Australians exercising upon ships of
war … …” The Free Trade leader offered the suggestion that ‘there is no necessity,
perhaps, to begin the founding of a navy now, but there is no reason in the world these
ships of war, which are lying idle in our ports, should not be made the training ground
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for the future naval defence of Australia.’ Labor Leader Chris Watson did not doubt that
“a navy would be a material advantage in connection with the Defence of Australia”.
His concern was the cost of building and maintaining a fleet (estimated at £1.3 to £1.5
million for a battleship): “We cannot have anything like an Australian navy without
incurring an expenditure that we dare not face, and it is, therefore of no use to discuss a
question of this kind at the present stage.” Watson also drew attention to the idle ships
of the British Squadron based in Sydney. While he believed Australia should contribute
to their maintenance, “the vessels that are here under the auxiliary squadron agreement
are fast becoming obsolete, and that even the guns with which they are armed are not of
sufficiently new design to be effective on active service.”113

The Defence Minister’s focus, however, was on the value for money of the ex-colonial,
now Commonwealth Forces. In writing to Tennyson from the Defence Department in
Melbourne on the 26 August, 1901 Forrest said, “The difficulty of the way of Military
and Naval Defence seems to be expense. One can hardly believe that we are spending
seven hundred thousand pounds a year already or can have so little to show for it.”
Prime Minister Barton was more direct when he told parliament on 9 August:

It is quite out of the question for the Commonwealth to engage the building of a
sufficient navy to protect her shores … It would probably cost £4,000,000 for
the construction and the equipment alone for the defence of these shores at all
times and in all emergencies’ with another £1,000,000 in repairs and
maintenance.114

William Morris Hughes, Labor Member for West Sydney, shared the sentiment of pronavy parliamentarians. Entering the Defence Bill debate on 31 July, Hughes advised the
House that the present value of the Auxiliary Squadron was £702,564 and “it was
113
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notorious that, with the exception of the flagship HMS Royal Arthur, the vessels of the
squadron are obsolete.”

Hughes argued that in the last ten years of the Naval

Agreement the Commonwealth had contributed £1,260,000 and ‘had a business rather
than a sentimental one, we should now have been in a position to own these vessels and
… man them.’ Worst than dependence on obsolete ships was the realisation that if the
British homeland was under threat, the squadron would be withdrawn. Hughes wanted
the ‘tribute’ paid to Britain scrapped. Hughes was aware of Creswell’s arguments and
he added his own powerful argument, occupying over six pages of the parliamentary
record containing the key features of Creswell’s advocacy, in castigating a Bill that did
not acknowledge the Commonwealth as an island continent or a maritime nation: ‘one
would imagine that one was living in the mountain recesses of Switzerland.’ Australia
needed a navy to keep enemy warships from the coast and, if invaded, a trained national
militia to respond. Divorced of imperial ideology or good intentions, Hughes was quite
clear: ‘This is a Defence Bill which upon being analysed and laid bare does nothing to
provide for that which is the very essence and corner stone of a Defence Bill, namely
our defence in our time of need.’115 Hughes and pro-local navy parliamentarians
recognised the connection Creswell had made already between nationhood and the sea;
the sea had always defined Australia represented by ‘a tyranny of distance’, invasion
fears, colonial attempts to annex Pacific islands, immigration, external trade of wheat
and sheep products and inter-colonial coastal commerce and transport.

In all of the Second Reading debate, there was one voice missing: the Deputy Prime
Minister and Attorney General, Alfred Deakin. At this first opportunity to place, at
least, his vision – if not the provision for an Australian navy – on the parliamentary
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record, Deakin was silent. The only entry in the parliamentary record was on 30 August
1901, when Deakin, in a procedural motion, postponed discussion on the Defence Bill.
The Protectionist government and its silent Attorney-General sought to defend Australia
with legislation to deny entry of a specific threat.

On 12 September 1901 Deakin, brought before the House of Representatives what he
considered Australia’s most significant Bill: “We here find ourselves touching the
profoundest instinct of individual or nation – the instinct of self-preservation – for it is
nothing less than the national manhood, the national character, and the national future
that are at stake.” More significant than the Defence Bill was a piece of legislation,
widely favoured by Australians at the time, which would enshrine the one, universal
attribute which offered both status and identity for the nation: the Immigration
Restriction Bill. ‘Cost what it may’ Deakin intoned:

We are compelled at the very earliest hour of our national existence at the very
first opportunity where united action becomes possible to make it positively
clear that, however limited we may be, for a time by self-imposed restrictions
upon settlement - however much we may sacrifice in the way of immediate
monetary gain - … in the interests of the future generations who are to enter into
and possess the country of which we at present only hold the borders.116

If only such a sense of purpose had been applied to the true defence of Australia: its
own navy! In reviewing the record of the Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates with
regard to this bill, one can see that race purity, unity and identity overrode national
defence. The Labor Party supported the Protectionist government because the bill
‘legalised’ the ‘White Australia’ racism and responded to the Labor Party’s platform of
immigration restriction and protection of white workers. Labor would look inward,
concentrating on domestic issues, until the Anglo-Japanese Alliance (1902) and the
116
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Russo-Japanese War (1904-05), before realising that to protect the nation and culture
Labor needed to agitate for an Australian navy. For now, Labor, through Deakin, was
focussed on keeping out the one widely accepted – at the time - threat to Australia:
Asian and coloured migration. For Deakin this was the Monroe Doctrine for Australia:

We may have in the future some developments, which may call for the
application of the Monroe Doctrine in the Pacific. But far more important than
that, and a far more significant declaration at the present time, is this for a White
Australia. It is the Monroe Doctrine of the Commonwealth of Australia. It is no
mere electioneering manifesto but part of the first principles upon which the
Commonwealth is to be administered and guided.117
The ‘White Australia’ policy was the bi-partisan bastion of national identity, security
and protection. Divergence with Labor occurred where the Barton and Deakin
governments regarded the Imperial Fleet as Australia’s principal protector. For Barton
cost dictated whether, initially, Australia could afford vessels and then, later, for Deakin
it became a tension between what could be afforded, how to manage the Imperial
relationship and how to appease Labor and its defence platform whilst relying on Labor
support to stay in power.

Labor leader Watson appreciated the call for a Monroe Doctrine but, in his opinion,
Australia lacked the capacity to assert such authority. ‘We here in Australia are not such
a power as America then was’ Watson said in parliament. ‘We are a mere handful of
people with an immense territory within the confines of the continent to administer and
develop.’118 The argument that possession of British New Guinea would prevent foreign
powers encroaching on Australia, Watson contended, fell apart in the face of the
Germans and Dutch in New Guinea and the French in the New Hebrides and New
Caledonia. ‘I ask the Government whether they themselves have considered what
117
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provision will be required for the necessary defences of these outlying positions.’ 119 If
US President Theodore Roosevelt had been asked whether he would have some
sympathy with the ‘White Australia’ policy, he would caution diplomacy and for
Australia to have the armed capacity to back up its words. Roosevelt speaking in
September 1901 noted an old proverb, ‘speak softly and carry a big stick – you will go
far.’120 As a nation, Roosevelt said, ‘it is both foolish and undignified to indulge in
undue self-glorification, and, above all, in loosed tongue denunciation of other peoples.’
Generally Australians, particularly parliamentarians and sections of the press, did not
speak in moderation about Asians and Pacific Islanders. Worse still, Australians were
unarmed when they spoke loudly and deliberately of white supremacy. However,
Roosevelt made a corollary, acknowledging, ‘we have got to remember that our first
duty is to our own people’121 and Deakin certainly agreed with this.

Captain Creswell recognised the point as well. From the Naval Staff Office in Brisbane
on 28 September 1901, he unfurled his battle flag in the arena of Australian defence,
issuing a report that could easily be described as his seapower manifesto for Australia,
his own maritime doctrine. “Our future must be that of a maritime state. It is a truism
that the defence of the frontier of a state should be in the hands of its frontiersmen. In
Australia our seamen are our frontiersmen.”122 The Best Method of Employing
Australian Seamen in the Defence of Commerce and Ports Report of 1901 was a clear,
visionary but practical proposal for a naval defence for Australia. Creswell wrote that:
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Australia should take an active and personal share in her own defence, and
especially in that which is her main protection, is so directly in accord with the
first principles of defence and our soundest policy as a portion of the Empire,
that only reasons of an insuperable kind, such as national incapacity, could
compel any other course.

Colonies Secretary, Joseph Chamberlain, the prime imperial federationist, would
express a similar sentiment in 1902: to relieve the ‘weary Titan’ the dominions needed
to take a share in their own defence.

Creswell recognised that for the new Commonwealth to establish a navy the cost would
be prohibitive. ‘Money cannot conjure a navy into existence’ Creswell wrote in his
Report. Moreover, it would not be in an infant navy’s interest or possible. What was
needed was a scheme ‘within our means, and of gradual development on sound lines, to
advance by progressive steps’ complemented by progressive reductions in the subsidy
paid to the British Government under the Naval Agreement. It was so logical to
Creswell: ‘The life of the Empire depends on the fleet; any strengthening of the fleet
adds to the security of the Empire.’ As a first step, Creswell suggested one modern ship
specifically designed to suit local conditions: ‘The federal ship of war to carry a full
complement of officers and instructors but only a sufficient permanent crew for
navigating, caretaking of armament, etc.’123 This cruiser would have the latest
armaments - with discipline, routine and training to Royal Navy specifications - and
would be completed by 1903 by Creswell’s estimation. This would be followed by a
second to be completed in 1905, a third to be completed in 1907 and a fourth cruiser to
complete the requirement in 1909 with a total capital cost of £1,200,000. Under
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Creswell’s plan, the Commander-in-Chief, Australia Station would inspect ships and
men at any time and during war, the federal ship and all trained Australian seamen
would be placed under his orders and at his disposal. With a ‘nucleus crew’ on board,
the warship would embark naval personnel in visiting ports of each state for regular atsea training. Thus ‘the ships of the Australian Naval Force will be manned by reduced
crews, and raised to war strength from our Naval Reserve.’124 This idea was not new –
not in 1901, nor 1903 when Jacky Fisher proposed it to the First Lord of the Admiralty
as part of his re-organisation of the Home Fleet. Creswell in his Report referred to the
current arrangement with the Home fleets whereby the Channel Fleet was fully manned
while the First Reserve Fleet had reduced crewing. These Creswell proposals for
crewing and command would sound curiously familiar six years later in December 1907
when Alfred Deakin made his defence policy statement.

Creswell’s proposals were not revolutionary or unilateral. ‘From the beginning’ Frances
McGuire argued:

Creswell insisted that Australia must adopt an evolutionary course in naval
affairs; that she must free herself from the subservience attached to the mere
money payment for services received from the Royal Navy; that she must work
towards increasing independence, but independence acquired gradually and
earned by correct training and hard experience. The opening passages of the
1902 Report reveal a man far in advance of his contemporaries both in
assessment of our naval requirements and in appreciation of national and social
changes which they implied.125
Creswell encapsulated his argument in a quotation from the Edinburgh Review: ‘For a
maritime state unfurnished with a navy, the sea, so far from being a safe frontier, is
rather a highway for her enemies; with a navy, it surpasses all other frontiers in
124
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strength.’126 It was a simple Mahanian principle: ‘the first and most obvious light in
which the sea presents itself from the political and social point of view is that of a great
highway.’127 It would be at the core of Creswell’s advocacy and it would take most of
the decade for Australia’s leaders to grasp, politically, economically and strategically,
the significance of a naval defence. In political terms, a navy would increase Australia’s
standing for membership in the councils of the Empire. In strategic naval terms ‘if …
seapower is about the ability to use the sea and to deny such use to an enemy, then
plainly seapower must generate strategic leverage towards the outcome of a conflict.’128
It was an instrument of warfare: ‘if navies’ Mahan noted ‘exist for the protection of
commerce, it inevitably follows that in war they must aim at depriving their enemy of
that great resource.’129 Economically, an Australian owned, crewed and built navy
would, in time, contribute to the commercial diversification of an established and new
industrial base and infrastructure (from local utilisation of raw materials – food
agricultural products, wool, iron ore, coal – to secondary industries such as food
processing, clothing and footwear, dockyards, steelmaking and fabrication) for there
were ships to be built, repaired and fuelled and sailors to be clothed and fed.

Creswell concluded his report with his famous statement: ‘The spectacle of some
5,000,000 Anglo-Australians, with an army splendidly equipped, unable to prevent the
burning of a cargo of wool in sight of Sydney Heads, is only the ordinary consequences
of a policy of naval impotence.’130 Over the next decade Creswell argued that British
supremacy over the world’s oceans was no longer total. Moreover, the sea was not a
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natural barrier to a nation with a naval capacity to attack and, should the distance from
danger be traversed by this enemy, a well equipped Australian army would meet the
enemy, if it knew at all from where the enemy may attack, from behind harbour forts
and the tactical limitations of land. In 1906 Admiral Sir Jacky Fisher declared more
dramatically the consequences for his own country

the vulnerability of a trade

dependent British Isles: ‘If the navy is not supreme, no army, however large, is of the
slightest use. It’s not invasion we have to fear if our navy is beaten. It’s starvation!’131

Creswell’s scheme and public activity in advocating for a local naval defence prompted
a report to the Admiralty on 14 November 1901 by the Commander-in-Chief Australia
Station. Rear-Admiral Beaumont advised that the State Commanders of the local naval
forces opposed a financial contribution for the maintenance of the Royal Navy
Squadron, instead ‘urging their claim to be organised into a united and efficiently
trained force second only to the Royal Navy, in the belief they are, so to speak, fighting
for their lives.132 The position of Beaumont and the Admiralty was assured with
Barton’s Defence Minister Forrest, who recalled 13 years later, that ‘in the early days of
Federation, I was not an advocate for a local navy, but favoured an Imperial Navy.’133
With the Barton government considering naval defence as no more than naval brigades
at ports with training at sea as required, Australia’s first Defence Bill lapsed, due to the
priority of other legislation. To Barton, a naval force for Australia “can only be acquired
and maintained by arrangement with the Imperial Government, and I believe that if this
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course was adopted it would also follow that the greatest amount of good would be
maintained at the smallest cost.”134

Publicity of The Best Method Report in newspapers and in speeches by pro-navy
parliamentarians (for example, Sir John Quick and WM Hughes) positioned Creswell as
the leading navalist in the arena. Melbourne’s The Age said that Creswell had ‘a wise
policy … a practical scheme’135, while the Sydney Morning Herald asserted that it was
‘worked out on practical lines by a practical man.’136 The Adelaide Register noted that
‘Captain Creswell has proposed a practical scheme for gradually establishing a Naval
force worthy of federation.’137 Melbourne’s The Age of 1 May 1902 agreed: ‘the right
policy for the Commonwealth, therefore, is to promote the establishment of an
Australian navy, manned by Australian seamen’138 developed gradually, moderately in
line with financial capability. However, the seed of Creswell’s advocacy would remain
on stony ground for the foreseeable future, though he was buoyed by some British
supporters: Admiral Penrose Kennedy ‘was in frequent correspondence with Captain
Creswell during the controversy about the starting of the Australian Navy. We pulled
together.’139 The Right Honourable Sir John C.R. Colomb, KCMG, a former Royal
Marine and British parliamentarian, wrote to Creswell on 15 June 1902 that his
advocacy deserved success: “Your long and persistent efforts to lead Australasia – the
statesmen out there – to see with clearer eyes where and in what direction salvation in
war will lie have had all my sympathy.”140 To the British public, Colomb had made his
position clear a year earlier: ‘The hope of British survival in the Pacific is not in
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mounted infantry or bushman scouts … it lies in means of local production and
maintenance of battle power in that ocean.’ Local and European powers were
developing their interests in the Pacific and:

our island resources in the north-east corner of one hemisphere cannot
indefinitely compete on equal terms for maritime control of the other. The mere
fact of having to drag across the globe almost every single thing necessary for
the repair and equipment of British ships is a heavy handicap in war with a
nation or nations having the necessary sustaining power, so to speak, on the
spot.141

The solution the British government had to counter any threat in the Pacific in 1902
would prevent naval development in Australia.

The ‘old’ Imperial Powers were reducing their fleets in the Pacific. Britain’s reduction
of its fleet in the Far East and Spain’s resounding defeat by the United States Asiatic
Squadron in the Philippines brought the first stirrings of new imperial powers, the
United States and Japan. Australia and New Zealand regarded the rise of Japan as
potentially more a threat to them than any European or western hemisphere incursions
into the Pacific. Both countries were dismayed at Britain’s signing of the AngloJapanese Alliance on 11 February 1902 considering that they would be virtually
defenceless on the edge of Asia. Britain, as usual, did not consult Australia on foreign
policy decisions; the Anglo Japanese Alliance was presented as a fait complete after it
was signed. While New Zealand remained convinced that the remaining ships of the
Royal Navy would still be strong enough to protect them, should the need arise, the
Wellington Post (New Zealand) editorialised that the Anglo-Japanese Alliance ‘had
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been received in New Zealand with not a little suspicion and uneasiness.’ The paper
suggested that if Britain had no ‘White Colonies’ in the Pacific the alliance might be
admirable, but the Mother Country could not expect it to be so regarded by ‘free
colonists who see their country exposed to the risk of being turned from white to yellow
by her (Britain’s) entanglement with an Oriental power.’142 Sydney’s Bulletin was
equally direct: ‘The Australian people had no voice, directly or indirectly, in the making
of the Japanese treaty, and they are not morally bound by a treaty in which they had no
voice.’143

The Anglo-Japanese Alliance meant that Britain did not need to deplete its
Mediterranean or Home fleets to maintain superiority in the Far East. By the Alliance,
‘both parties pledged themselves to remain neutral if the other found itself at war with
one power, but to come in with their ally should a second Power join the enemy. … For
Britain there was the assurance that the Russian and Japanese fleets, the two most
powerful in the area, would not be combined against her.’144 The treaty recognised
Japan’s special interest in Korea and it ‘further provided that if other powers attacked
one of the signatories the other would come to its aid.’145 Importantly if only one power
were to attack one of the signatories there would be no action from the other, but if two
were to attack then both Britain and Japan would retaliate. For Japan, the alliance was
immediately beneficial, effectively giving it Great Power status from 1902. For Britain
too, the treaty had considerable benefits. Sir Julian Corbett noted that, the alliance
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would ‘give Britain respite from having to defend everything everywhere’.146 There
were some misgivings about the treaty within the British Cabinet: Prime Minister
Arthur Balfour wrote ‘the momentous step has been taken and, if the Japanese accept
our proposals, we may find ourselves fighting for our existence in every part of the
globe against Russia and France.’147 Balfour was concerned that in the event of an
emergency, Britain’s responsibilities would be global but Japan’s would be regional and
that the treaty was, consequently, not equal between the two.

This treaty brought with it greater opportunity for the Imperial Japanese Navy to
continue to modernise: it was able to purchase British built ships and take advantage of
British naval expertise. However, the rise of Japanese naval power undermined
England’s strategic dominance, and hence political dominance in the Far East
(Australia’s near north). Through one of the ironies of history it was the British who
contributed to this situation. ‘British shipyards in the 1880’s and 1890’s built one
warship after another’ for the Imperial Japanese Navy and Royal Navy officers were
loaned to educate the Japanese ‘in naval science and administration’148, while Japanese
officers served on British warships. Japan learnt from such experiences that Europe
alone could design modern battleships, for which there was no equivalent in the Far
East. If Britain ruled the waves, then Imperial Japan wanted to learn from the best. It
could be argued that if the British had not built these ships someone else would have;
yet this was more than a commercial arrangement. Britain wanted to counter the rise of
Russian imperialism in the Far East and the threat to British interests in India and the
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Persian Gulf. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance recognised Japanese interests in North Asia
and Britain anticipated that this would divert Russia sufficiently to concentrate on its
interests in Asia.

A Colonial Conference was to be held in London during July and August 1902 to
coincide with the coronation of Edward VII. On the agenda was the re-negotiation of
the naval agreement between Britain and certain of its now self-governing colonies, for
which Defence Minister Forrest prepared a paper on naval defence. For Forrest there
was a key principle for the naval defence of Australia and the Empire: ‘If the British
nation is at war, so are we; if it gains victories or suffers disasters so do we’. In his
view Australians should ‘fully realise that we belong to a nation which for centuries has
been mistress of the sea’149 and he endorsed a ‘one fleet for the Empire’ for Australia.
Rear-Admiral Beaumont of the Australia Station had done his job for his superiors in
Britain: Forrest was considering the possibility of disbanding the local State naval
forces. Beaumont informed the First Lord of the Admiralty ‘of one thing I am glad – he
is sure now that Captain Creswell’s scheme will not do for them.’150 Forrest asked the
General Officer Commanding the Commonwealth Military Forces, Major-General
Edward Hutton, to critique his paper. Hutton was not going to alter the Minister’s stance
on naval defence: if there were limited funds in the treasury for defence it may as well
be committed totally to the army.

Deakin’s biographer, John La Nauze, has argued that at this time Deakin ‘had no
responsibility for questions of defence except as a member of cabinet.’151 Such an
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evaluation could be applied more generally to Deakin’s ministerial career! As prime
minister one would expect a greater executive assertion, but as deputy prime minister
and attorney-general, La Nauze seems to conveniently side-step either Deakin’s
influence in cabinet or Deakin’s desire to push the local navy issue. Interestingly, La
Nauze preceded this ‘concession’ by noting that on his return as leader of the Victorian
delegation to the 1887 Colonial Conference, Deakin had recommended the freshly
negotiated Naval Agreement be adopted by Parliament, recalling years later ‘that he
looked forward to the day when Australia could provide her own naval defence; but
brave words could not build a fleet. The first necessity was federation.’ The necessity
of federation having been achieved, Deakin seemed to be devoid of ‘brave words’ when
it came to naval defence. The cabinet, La Nauze wrote, urged Barton to press for a
scheme similar to that proposed by Kingston in 1897 ‘a proposal which came from …
Captain Creswell’152 that is, in the new Naval Agreement let Australian seamen be
substituted for subsidy.

The Prime Minister’s perspective on the navy was not well defined when he left for the
conference. ‘He did not on naval questions, anymore than on military, follow any clear
principle – whether imperial or national, strategic or political’153 for, as Bolton pointed
out, Barton ‘was not unsympathetic to the concept of a separate Australian navy, but he
was all too well aware of the financial constraints of such a policy.’154 Barton was not
short of advice and the Governor-General of the Commonwealth, the Earl of Hopetoun,
gave his before Barton’s departure. His remarks were indicative of someone extremely
well briefed for one supposedly representing the Crown not British politics:
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There were so many viewpoints to consider … For instance, the naval expert,
with his knowledge of the subject and his careful study of history, may advocate
a certain course which in itself may be, probably is, the only really sound course
to follow, whereas we here in Australia may allow our local sentiment to stand
between us and what is really essential to our safety.

This initial rebuke was slight; but in a clear reference to Creswell, Hopetoun was
slapping down any thought of ‘local sentiment’ for a navy. Condescendingly,
paternalistically, Hopetoun apprised Barton of the Australian character and capability,
chiding Creswell’s frontiersmen:
Your people do not take readily to the sea ... … you have no great fishing
population such as we find in the British Colonies of North America. My own
belief is that it will take an immense amount of work, much expense, and some
disappointment before you can turn out in this country a highly skilled and
highly disciplined production like the British bluejackets.
The governor-general’s letter made it very clear that the local naval advocate in his The
Best Method Report was too slick, too smooth, in the claim, which would be repeated
over the next decade, that Australia could afford its own maritime defence: ‘Those who
talk as glibly about a fleet of second-class cruisers for the Commonwealth hardly
appreciate or wilfully ignore the huge cost of such an undertaking.’155 Constitutionally
the representative of the Crown in Australia, Hopetoun confirmed that he was, in effect,
an agent of the British government. The work of the Commander-in-Chief and the
Governor-General was done in this exercise. Barton would align with imperial naval
strategy: a concentration of naval forces based on ‘One Flag, One Fleet’.

Certain capital city newspapers thought Barton was denying the inevitable in his
attitude to a local navy. The Adelaide Register thought he displayed a ‘feeble attitude’
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which ‘… was neutralised by the gratuitous vapourings of Sir John Forrest.’ Its
editorial, favouring Creswell’s position, predicted that, ‘in the end, however, no
influence can prevent the ultimate creation of an Australian Navy, or an Australian
branch of the Imperial Navy… … and the authorities in the old world should allow for
it as an imperative requirement for the new nation in the Southern Seas.’ 156 The
Brisbane Courier of 7 July 1902 called into question the preparedness of Australian
representatives for the discussions, who did not appear well briefed. There appeared to
be a failure to take ‘advantage of Captain Creswell’s experience and knowledge.’ The
Brisbane Courier utilising Creswell’s sentiments, felt the Colonial Conference afforded
the opportunity, ‘of dealing with the reorganisation of the whole system of naval
defence to meet the new conditions which have made the Pacific the probable scene of
the naval battles of the near future.’157 This sentiment appeared to lie behind the
question in the Senate on 8 July of Senator David Charleston of South Australia, a
former marine engineer and trade unionist:

Is it the intent of the Government to take measures to constitute an Australian
Navy and to train seamen for defence purposes, and for strengthening the
mercantile marine of the Commonwealth in place of the existing policy of
paying a subsidy in connexion with the Auxiliary Naval Squadron? 158

The government response was negative, advising that the matters raised would be the
subject of discussion at the Colonial Conference.

The 1902 Colonial Conference was presided over by Colonial Secretary, Joseph
Chamberlain. From the outset his objective was to strengthen the bonds between Britain
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and ‘the great nations across the seas.’ There were three principal approaches to
achieving this: through political relations, through commercial union and through
imperial defence. Since the previous conference in 1897, Australia had federated, a
federated South Africa was close and, in Chamberlain’s opinion, the political federation
of the Empire was possible but he thought this was for the colonies to decide. The
Dominion of Canada promptly asserted its independence: Prime Minister Sir Wilfred
Laurier already declaring ‘If you want our aid call us to your councils.’159 Chamberlain
acknowledged this declaration’s authorship though, either mischievously or naively,
claimed it for imperial federalism:

Gentlemen, we do want your aid. We do want your assistance in the
administration of the Empire, which is yours as well as ours. The weary Titan
staggers under too vast orb of his fate … … If you are prepared at any time to
take any share, any proportionate share, in the burdens of the Empire; we are
prepared to meet you with any proposal for giving to you a corresponding voice
in the policy of the Empire160
Chamberlain’s idea was that questions of imperial interest would be brought before a
‘Council of the Empire.’ It was no less paternalistic when ‘floated’ in 1897 – except
now ‘the children’ were being asked to participate in keeping ‘house’ – and if there
were any bright ideas, the ‘adults’ (Britain) would be only too pleased to discuss and
consider them. Theodore Roosevelt had noted twelve months earlier the reality of
empires. ‘All the great colonising powers, England, France, Spain, Portugal, Holland
and Russia managed their colonies primarily in the interest of the home country,’
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Roosevelt said on 2 August 1901. ‘… in no case were the colonists treated as citizens of
equal rights in a common country.’161

When discussion came to naval defence, Chamberlain turned the conference over to
First Lord of the Admiralty Selborne. Sharing the burden of Empire did not mean
localizing the Empire’s maritime defence: there had been, there was and there would be
‘One Flag, One Fleet’. Selborne made it very clear that ‘the sea is all one, and the
British Navy therefore must be all one.’ Singularly tasked, the enemy would be sought
out and destroyed; if this was done, Selborne said, ‘the whole Empire will be
simultaneously defended in its territory, its trade and its interests’. He advised that
colonial leaders were not to think in terms of a local maritime defence with ‘its
allotment of ships for the purpose of the separate protection of an individual spot, the
only possible result would be an enemy who had discarded this heresy and combined
his fleets will attack in detail and destroy those separated British squadrons which,
united could have defied defeat.’162

The Admiralty presented a memorandum on imperial defence to the conference
emphasising the immense importance of fleet concentration. In this concentration of
naval forces ‘the primary object of the British Navy is not to defend anything, but to
attack fleets of the enemy, and, by defeating them, to afford protection to the British
Dominions, shipping and commerce. This is the ultimate aim.’163 The Admiralty paper
offered an interesting assertion about a situation where the Royal Navy failed – this was
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a scenario for which Creswell would offer the creation of a local navy as a solution. To
the Admiralty:

it is immaterial where the great battle is fought, but wherever it may take place
the result will be felt throughout the world, because the victor will afterwards be
in a position to spread his force with a view to capturing or destroying any
detached forces of the enemy, and generally to gather the fruits of victory, in the
shape of such outlying positions as the New Hebrides, Fiji, Singapore, Samoa,
Cuba, Jamaica, Martinique, the Philippines, Malta or Aden, which may be in
possession of the enemy, his shipping and commerce, or even to prosecute such
overseas campaigns as those in the Peninsula or South Africa.164
To Creswell ‘our condition in such a contingency would be one of absolute
helplessness’165 and thus a local maritime defence with the progressive provision of
modern warships suited to local conditions was now needed. In the Admiralty’s view:

the immense importance of the principle of concentration and the facility with
which ships and squadrons can be moved from one part of the world to another –
it is more easy to move a fleet from Spithead to the Cape or Halifax than it is to
move a large army, with its equipment, from Cape Town to Pretoria- points to
the necessity of a single navy under one control, by which alone concentrated
action between the several ports can be assured.

No mention was made as to the ability to perform the voyage from Spithead to Sydney!
In conclusion the memorandum proclaimed this maxim: ‘The strength and composition
of the British Navy, or of any squadron, depends, therefore, upon the strength and
composition of the hostile forces, which it is liable to meet.’166

When it came to defence, Chamberlain was keen for the colonies - particularly the ‘rich
and powerful’ – to consider an imperial federation, when it came to defence: ‘I think it
is inconsistent with their position – inconsistent with their dignity as nations – that they
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should leave the mother country to bear the whole, or almost the whole, of the
expense.’167 Selborne had already ‘telegraphed’ his intentions at the conference in a
letter to Lord Tennyson on 2 July1902. ‘I shall endeavour to extract as much money
from them as I can, which after all will bear a very small proportion of what they ought
to pay.’ However, money was not at the core of his theme at the conference. Firstly he
wanted it emphatically understood that in time of war there was one fleet and one
command:

We should no longer be tied by that heretical stipulation about not moving the
ships in time of war from Australian waters without the leave of the
Government. There is no difficulty about giving them assurances in time of
peace, but anything more strategically unjustifiable than not to leave the
Admiralty free to send the ships in time of war to meet the enemy’s ships
wherever they are to be found I cannot imagine.

Secondly, Selborne genuinely wanted Australians to be involved in the maritime
activity of the Empire – but as part of one navy, a view Tennyson shared. Selborne
wrote:

I want to attract Australians to the sea, to make them more of a maritime
population; and therefore not only am I anxious to see a genuine branch of the
Royal Naval Reserve established in Australia, but I want to see one or more
ships of the Squadron permanently manned by Australians, and by Australians
only, paid at local rates of pay.168
Writing in The Times, Rear-Admiral Lord Charles Beresford declared that ‘a separate
navy for Australia would be a mistake. One of the main features in the strength of the
Navy and the Empire is a united Fleet … For the proper defence of the Empire the Navy
must be a whole, and under one single direction.’169 Barton had been sufficiently
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‘softened up’ in Australia to renew in London the Naval Defence Agreement of 1887,
along with New Zealand, by making payment to the British government to maintain an
enlarged British squadron in Australia. Years later in retirement Sir Wilfred Laurier
reflecting on the two Australian prime ministers (Barton and Deakin) he had known at
colonial conferences found that ‘Barton was the ablest but lethargic.’170

Barton returned to Australia on 16 October 1902171 and on the following evening
addressed a public meeting at the Sydney Town Hall ‘to give an account of the overseas
mission and to begin the process of selling the naval agreement to the Australian public.
He recommended it as “a reasonable Imperialism”, avoiding “reckless engagements” in
overseas quarrels, but combining unity of naval defence with a respect for Australian
autonomy.’172 Barton told the Sydney audience, ‘We cannot leave ourselves without a
share of the protection of the navy; and if we want that protection, can we leave
ourselves meanly relying on others to give it to us and not bear a share of the cost
ourselves? (Cheers.) We have duties to perform and restrictions to bind us.’173

Barton was adhering to the Selborne position at the conference. Addressing a public
meeting in Melbourne Town Hall on 28 November Barton stated that he had found the
Conference ‘had been one of great pith and moment’. Barton told his audience that ‘The
Commonwealth … could not establish its own navy owing to its constitutional and
financial obligations, and consequently the only course to follow was to continue the
170
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present subsidy system or to pay nothing which would be poltroonery.’ 174 Owing to its
constitutional obligation, under Section 51, Australia could establish its own navy. The
sad truth was that every time any Australian ministers attended an Imperial, Colonial or
Defence Conference in the first decade of this new century they were beguiled by the
pith and moment’ of the British government, the Admiralty and influential British
imperialists.

Alfred Deakin, Attorney-General and the most senior minister in Barton’s cabinet,
though unhappy with the Naval Agreement, dismissed the advocacy of the local naval
professionals. Writing on 26 May 1903, disguised as the Special Correspondent for the
London Morning Post,175 the article appeared on 5 August, Deakin felt that the whole
question of defence was unsatisfactory, “for the local experts we have do not command
the ear of the public and exhibit little confidence in each other. The issues of high naval
strategy or the modern requirements for effective action on a great scale are naturally
beyond ‘the Man in the street’”176

‘The local experts we have … exhibit little

confidence in each other’: a baffling statement when one recalls that the 1899
conference of colonial navy commandants had presented a united position on the
development of a local navy. Deakin appeared to ignore or dismiss Creswell’s 1901
report, which had been tabled in parliament in early 1902 and inferred that Creswell did
not have much ‘traction’ with the public on naval defence. Would he not have read the
reaction of the press at the time or did he choose to ignore the positive publicity?
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Melbourne’s The Age regarded Creswell’s report as ‘a wise policy’ while the Sydney
Morning Herald on the same day in a leader said Creswell’s report was ‘a scheme that
certainly should not be pigeonholed and forgotten.’ If Deakin was in any doubt about
naval defence or ignorant of what the Barton government could do, then the leader in
the Adelaide Register’s 13 March 1902 edition had made it plain and unambiguous 12
months previously. ‘For the Commonwealth to request an outside body to perform any
act of defence, which the people are able to do for themselves, is to enfeeble the
national character and lower Australian prestige.’ The Register was caustic:

To continue the paralysing cash subsidy, to hire ships and men to do work which
we can perform more efficiently and economically by our own ships and men, to
neglect the rich qualities of the first line of defence represented in our capital
seamen – for the Federal Ministry to do these things would be for it to follow a
stupid and unbusinesslike policy unacceptable to the people of Australia.177
As to Deakin’s dismissive assertions that the issues of high naval strategy or the modern
requirements may be beyond the ‘Man in the street’, Creswell, fully aware of the
potential of the advances in technology had, through his 1901 Report, newspaper
articles and his own naval activities been attempting to inform the public of these
advances. From February to April 1903, at Creswell’s instigation, the Queensland Naval
Forces conducted experiments with wireless telegraphy during the annual naval exercise
of the QNF ships with Creswell captaining the Gayundah in company with the Paluma.
Radio equipment was installed in a shed in the churchyard of St Mary’s Kangaroo Point
Brisbane with a 130 feet high mast alongside. Onboard the Gayundah in Moreton Bay
was a 110 feet long bamboo foretopmast carrying the aerials. This put into practice what
he had seen and heard during a lecture and demonstration on the new Marconi wireless
telegraph at the Brisbane Technical College in 1902. The Creswell exercise produced
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the first message between an Australia naval vessel at sea and a land station on 9 April
1903.

All this went unacknowledged by Deakin. More interest was taken in the visit to
Australia in May and June 1903 of a squadron of the Imperial Japanese Navy, The
Argus reporting that one of the warships, the Hasidate, was equipped with wireless
telegraphy.178 The squadron of 600 officers and men visited Perth, Adelaide, Melbourne
and Sydney to cement Japan’s alliance relationship with British dominions in the
Pacific. The squadron was met by huge crowds at each city visited and at Melbourne,
where the Hasidate was opened for inspection, Prime Minister Barton and Defence
Minister Forrest came aboard for a tour. The Argus would report that Hasidate’s gun
could hurl an 800 pound projectile ten miles. Three months’ later Barton in a letter to
the General Officer Commanding the Military Forces, Major-General Sir Edward
Hutton, he accepted that Japan, as Britain’s ally, counter-balanced Russian imperialism
in the Pacific on Britain’s behalf, noting “in the present position of affairs Japan as a
power is of even more interest to all who revolt from the idea of submitting to Russian
arrogance.”179

In the debate on the new Naval Agreement in Parliament on 7 July 1903 Prime Minister
Barton invoked patriotism and a loyalty to the Empire. Barton would not be looking to
local naval expertise in considering a naval defence of Australia. It was an indirect
rebuff to Creswell, who acted as a reference for a number of politicians opposed to the
Agreement, Barton told the House ‘I do not suppose that there is an expert here who
178
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would pretend to offer an opinion of equal value to that of the Admiralty experts. We
might possibly find some equal authority in the world, but it would have to be an expert
opinion of a foreign power.’180 It is to be wondered if Barton presumed that Britain or a
foreign power would provide advice in Australia’s interests. British naval strategic
concerns were not for an Australian navy. As The Times of London reported:

The Australian share in the Navy was most moderate, and was much cheaper
than an Australian navy. He appreciated the spirit animating those who
advocated an Australian navy, but the Government was unable to adopt such a
proposal, as it was opposed to the principle of unity of control and was also
prohibitive in cost. Unity of control was essential to the protection of trade
routes and to the prevention of the transportation of hostile military forces in the
event of an attack on outlying portions of the Empire. The agreement afforded
scope for the training of Australian sailors, who would be useful in the case of
the creation of an Australian navy. It was a necessary Act for the consolidation
of the Empire, and consequently for Australia’s own protection.181

Barton’s call seemed peculiar for a ‘Father of Federation’ when he claimed “we must
look at the great question of naval defence from the point of view of citizens of the
Empire.” Indeed Australians, he said, fulfilling Ruskin’s challenge, “whatever their age
may be ... are Englishmen, or Britons, of the Empire.”182 This was an Australian
imperialist speaking: Maintain the British fleet in Australian ports as part of one
Imperial naval defence policy. In Barton’s view, Australia could not afford to establish
and maintain a navy.

In an ironic twist, Barton claimed that Creswell supported the Naval Agreement, being
‘one of the first, when he met me in Brisbane on my return from England, to
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congratulate me upon it.’183 When challenged in parliament about this, Barton was
dismissive: Creswell had the right to challenge the veracity of what Barton said in
parliament, but Barton did not think those in public service should participate in
determination of government policy. Creswell swiftly telegraphed Barton advising that
he must have been misunderstood: he did not endorse the Naval Agreement.184 It was a
curious incident: Did Barton need the endorsement of the leading naval professional?
Or was he indicating that Creswell was accepting the government’s policy? Why make
any reference to Creswell at all, when Barton knew Creswell’s public statements called
for a local naval defence? Civil-naval relations had yet to be established, but the
likelihood of a workable liaison between Creswell and Commonwealth governments did
not bode well.

To some Federal politicians there was no dignity and no self-respect in being dependent
on Britain for protection. Federation to them, implied name, identity, rights and equality
as a nation amongst nations. The Member for Corio, RA Crouch claimed in the House
of Representatives:
The Prime Minister said ‘an Englishman in Australia has equal power with an
Englishman in England, unfortunately he has not. The Australian is limited to
local self-government; the Englishman controls the whole Empire; his voice and
his hand are felt to the ends of the earth.

Crouch went on to explain why he would not vote for the Naval Subsidy Bill:

I am not an elector of the British Empire; I have nothing to say in its control, and
shall have nothing to say in the control of the naval subsidy if this Parliament
votes it. It is because of those considerations that I am against this proposal... it
is only Australia that we have to legislate for. It is not the Empire. We have to
do our duty for Australia.185
183
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From the parliamentary record, Deputy Prime Minister Deakin was a notable absentee
in the entire debate.

The Governor of Victoria, Sir George Clark had already anticipated that the Naval
Agreement would be unacceptable amongst some parliamentarians. Clark, who once
was and would again be Secretary of the Committee of Imperial Defence, noted on the
25th April, 1903 that:

the whole spirit of the Agreement is absolutely opposed to the plan of local
defence upon which Australia has hitherto spent much money with no valid
return in the shape of efficient protection. The Admiralty has practically said to
Australia: give up your local craft which are of no use, and join us in helping to
maintain and to man sea-going and sea-keeping ships.186

The argument was convincing: most of the vessels which had transferred to the
Commonwealth from the colonial navies at Federation were obsolete or only suitable
for harbour or coastal work. Cunneen noted that “to many, a straight out subsidy to the
Royal Navy smacked of vassalage and guaranteed no local protection. For a time the
passage of the new naval agreement through the Commonwealth remained in doubt.”187

William Higgs, Labor Senator for Queensland, wanted to know why the
Commonwealth paid £200,000 for Australia to be ‘simply a naval base for the British
Fleet.’ For Higgs ‘our share of the responsibilities of defending the Empire is best met,
in my judgement, by our defending ourselves and our own shores.’188
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He captured the essence of those who advocated a national navy when he told the
Senate:
We do not want a navy, in the sense of wanting a fleet for aggression, a navy to
patrol the seas, or to go to the North Pacific, or to the Indian Ocean, or the China
Seas, but we want a Navy to defend our own shores and our own ports. We
require our coastal and our harbour defences, and we want a navy manned by
Australians and under Australian control.

He then placed on the parliamentary record the resolution carried at the Australian
Labor Political Conference in Sydney in December 1902:

That this conference opposes the proposal for an increased subsidy to the
Imperial Government for the maintenance of an Imperial squadron, and
considers that any money available for Naval defence should be used in the
formation of a navy that would be owned and controlled by the
Commonwealth.189

Whatever the stance of politicians regarding a local naval defence, the habits of empire
would soften the resolve of sovereignty. Henry Bourne Higgins declared in the House
that should Britain be attacked, he expected that Australia would ‘spend every man and
every shilling’190 to defend the Mother Country.

On 8 July 1903 the Labor caucus endorsed the party’s opposition to the naval subsidy191
and on 14 July Labor Party Leader Watson, told the House that “unfortunately it
appears we have in power a government which is distinctly opposed to the idea of an
Australian Navy.”192 Labor member Billy Hughes argued on 21 July that a local naval
force was the first line of national defence to protect Australian shipping, while the
Naval Agreement was like paying money for nothing. ‘It is the absolute and positive
189
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duty of each integral self governing part (of the Empire) to provide for its own defence
…’he told the House. ‘It is the business of Australians to defend Australia, whether it
costs much money or little.193 In this he was supported by the Sydney Morning Herald,
which offered that ‘freedom and not fetters must be the guarantee of safety … An
Australian Navy is thus a natural demand of the situation, and it will still be an integral
part of the Imperial navy.’194 To George Reid, Leader of the Free Trade party, the idea
of an Australian navy was ‘utterly ridiculous in itself and that any attempt to carry it out
would be fraught with failure.’195 Watson, on behalf of the Labor Party moved
unsuccessfully in the House on 22 July that the bill be postponed for six months but it
passed and was given assent on 28 July 1903.

British journalist Richard Jebb noted that the Bill was barely ratified and that many who
voted for it believed in the creation of an Australian navy. ‘In voting, nevertheless, for
the alternative of a meagre subsidy, they followed the perverse guidance of their
respective leaders.’ Jebb sensed that a naval defence policy for Australia could be
adopted as many in parliament, particularly within the Labor Party, felt ‘it is unworthy
of the new Australian nation to depend upon the mother country to a greater extent than
is imposed by financial exigencies’.196 In his view this new policy would result in two
distinct naval forces: a local squadron for coastal defence and an ocean-going squadron
within the Imperial Navy for offensive action against organised attack. Australians
would crew and train in the local squadron, which in time would replace the British
squadron. To Jebb this was a practical solution and the prescription suggested by the
Committee of Naval Officers in 1899 and the Creswell Report of 1901. Ultimately, in
193
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Jebb’s view, ‘it is the policy of alliance, opposing the policy of supremacy.’197

The first Defence Act which was passed in October 1903 (and proclaimed on 1 March
1904) was largely an administrative measure. It provided for a Board of Advice for the
defence minister, with membership nominated by the Governor-General. It also
provided for an army of citizen soldiers for whom there would be no compulsory
overseas military service in war time. The Act resulted in Creswell being appointed
Naval Officer Commanding in February 1904.

By late 1903, the Naval Agreement seemed to postpone any consideration of a local
navy until later in the decade. Australia’s continued dependence on Britain epitomised
its subordinate status as a self-governing colony. Britain had defined for itself the
enormous responsibility of defending the Empire and guaranteeing permanent peace
around the world. It was a responsibility which exposed its vulnerability to mastery of
the seas. The rise of Germany as a significant seapower and its aggressive foreign
policy would cause Britain to re-organise its navy, strengthen its fleets in Europe and
deplete its overseas stations of capital ships. Over the next eight years Britain’s naval
strategy and foreign policy arrangements, and events in Europe and North Asia, would
make Australians feel increasingly apprehensive, isolated, unprovided and unprepared.
Britain’s hold on the Pacific would grow weaker, in Australian eyes, with the
ascendancy of a dubious ally. For the ‘weary Titan’ ‘between 1895 and 1905 clear-cut
naval supremacy slipped from Britain’s grasp, and with it went the nation’s unique role
as the independent, detached arbiter of world affairs.’198 Creswell noted that until 1909,
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Britain ‘neither desired nor would tolerate a family of infant navies overseas and
resolutely set its face against providing a nursery for brats.’ A local, autonomous navy
could not be endured within imperial defence and foreign policy. Creswell recognized
that for Britain ‘Colonial control would have spelt dual control, and dual control of the
sea forces of the Empire was not to be thought of, for it seemed bound to lead straight to
disaster. Fortunately this lion in our path was removed long before the outbreak of
World War I, and the conflict between divided and undivided control reconciled.’199
Creswell had an abiding sense of duty to Australia along with a vision of a naval
defence, which would give not only protection but status and identity to the nation.
Little did he know that this vision would be his life’s work.
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Chapter III
1904-1906 Naval Defence Denied: ‘All unprovided and unprepared, the Outpost of
the White!’

Over the next decade the personalities and the forces which produced the change from
imperial naval protection to independent national naval defence would take centre stage.
These forces were imperial as well as national and Creswell was required to engage
both. British government policy expressed through a Colonial Conference, the
Admiralty, the Committee of Imperial Defence (CID) and the Commander-in-chief,
Australia Station would all feature prominently. Locally, on the naval forces side,
Creswell would continue to dominate; while on the political side, Deakin would be the
significant personality, influencing the pace of naval development, though, at times, he
would share the national arena with other political leaders and the emerging political
force, the Labor Party.

Ultimately, the solution for a naval defence would be a political one and the
circumstances in which this took place needs to be understood. Deakin assumed the
prime ministership in September 1903 with the departure of Barton to the High Court.
Deakin soon realised that he would need to cultivate the Labor Party and, in negotiating
to stay in office, acknowledge the Labor platform including, a proposal with which he
had some sympathy. When Labor, the Free Traders and the Protectionists were returned
in equal numbers at general election after general election from 1903 to 1908, unstable
governments resulted, though Deakin and Labor shared the honours on who should
govern. This ‘alliance between Protectionists and the Labor Party enabled foundation
legislation for the Commonwealth and lasted with one short interval until November
101

1908.’200 Generally, governments lasted while parliament did not sit (thus avoiding
exposure to no-confidence votes, as occurred with Deakin from December 1903 to April
1904 and later the Fisher government from December 1908 to May 1909). The brief
months of parliamentary sittings were used by the opposition, particularly the influential
and accomplished political alliance maker and breaker, Deakin, to extend and withdraw
support.

Deakin was a skilled orator who won the confidence of his fellow parliamentarians – at
least prior to 1909 – through ‘his curious power of attracting affection, his response,
perceptive and personal, to other men as individuals, so that they saw him,’ according to
his great admirer, La Nauze, as ‘a well-wisher and a friend to whom one might turn in
need.’201 Deakin appeared to emulate what Margaret MacMillan perceived in a Deakin
contemporary President Woodrow Wilson, who ‘wanted power and he wanted to do
great works. What brought the two sides together was his ability, self-deception
perhaps, to frame his decisions so that they became not merely, but morally right.’202
With his London Morning Post pieces, Deakin, disguised as the ‘Special
Correspondent’, attempted to enhance his public image as a reasonable man: in one of
his articles, which appeared on 29 December 1905, he referred to his ‘excessively
affable and invariably conciliatory demeanour.’203 He was a man also of a particular,
peculiar religious belief, identifying himself as an instrument of destiny. Words to a
great extent allowed him to rationalise things, to feel sure about what he was doing –
and he did write prodigiously. The Morning Post provided a forum where he would not
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be contradicted:204 disguised, he could lay out the rationale for his policies and actions
without being compromised by Labor, by Free Traders or heckled by both. Nor would
he be expected to deliver. Faith and a sense of destiny gave Deakin a serenity in public
life that he publicised as ‘affability’ in the Morning Post and most parliamentarians
tended to acknowledge that. He has been credited with the establishment of the great
civil infrastructures of the Commonwealth to assert national protection, rights and
responsibilities. His parliamentary record on national defence in these initial years of
the Commonwealth was slight, when strong pro-navy leadership was needed.

Speaking during the elections of November 1903, Labor Leader Chris Watson said that
the Party opposed the Naval Agreement as there was no guarantee that the subsidy paid
to Britain would be spent on the naval defence of Australia. ‘The time had arisen when
a purely Australian navy should be established for Australian defence, and if returned to
the House he and his party would assist in the enactment of such a measure.’ Watson
was reported in the Sydney Morning Herald in terms evocative of Creswell’s own
advocacy of an Australian navy when he proclaimed that:

We must undertake some responsibility for the defence of the Empire in general.
No greater disaster could occur in this country than a sudden attack while their
fleet was absent, say in China waters, and steps should therefore be taken to
ensure the Australian Navy being permanently and solely available for the
protection of Australian shores and commerce.205

Deakin, writing as the Special Australian Correspondent duly acknowledged in the
London Morning Post on 22 December 1903 that Watson ‘declares for an Australian
Navy and for a liberal expenditure on arms and ammunition as affording the best means
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of local defence.’206 Deakin noted that over the previous three years many of Labor’s
parliamentary successes were due to Watson’s ‘tact and judgment’. By his ‘absolute
independence’ Watson promised neither Deakin nor Reid allegiance, adhering to his
party’s platform and skilfully exploited Labor’s strategic position to extract support for
Labor achieving its policies, including a navy. At the second general election in
December 1903 the Protectionist lost seats to Labor, possibly reflecting as Deakin
implied, the clarity and independence of the Labor Party’s platform. The Protectionists
led by Deakin became more Victorian in representation, more liberal in policy stance
and more nationalist (as opposed to imperialist) in outlook.

Deakin first referred to the unstable situation in Parliament in February 1904, when he
spoke at an Australian Natives’ Association dinner, likening parliament to a game of
cricket with the size of the membership of the parliamentary political parties
resembling, as Deakin phrased it, ‘three elevens’ (three cricket teams). Their innings (in
government) would be short with one team depending on another in order to be in office
or be ‘bowled out’. Support in return for concessions was the tactical approach adopted
by the Federal Parliamentary Labor Party from its first caucus meeting in May 1901. 207
By March 1904, Deakin had to acknowledge in the Morning Post, that the ‘the real
source of the Labor triumphs lies deeper still [than its continuous activity] in the fact
that its platform is the Labor creed.’ Indeed, ‘Labor triumphs because it knows its own
mind, knows what it wants, and will make sacrifices to get it.’208

In April 1904, Deakin resigned, dissatisfied with Opposition amendments to his
conciliation and arbitration bill, and asked the Governor-General to call for the Labor
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Opposition Leader, Watson, to form a government. Deakin was not pleased at being
rebuffed by Labor and the Free Traders, a snub to which he alluded in the Morning
Post.209 He wanted Labor installed so it would appreciate the realities of government;
his Morning Post article was sensationalist: promoting a Labor ministry as ominous and
alarming and complaining about the electors ‘dereliction of duty’ at the last general
election in not voting for non-Labor candidates.

The Governor-General commissioned Watson on 23 April 1904 to form the first Federal
Labor ministry and, consequently, the world’s first national, social democratic
government. Labor wanted to implement its naval policy and Prime Minister Watson
was confident in the local naval officers to deliver: ‘three very competent officers,
namely Captain Creswell, Captain Tickell and Captain Colquhoun … it was thought,
would have some knowledge of local conditions,’ The new Defence Minister, Senator
Anderson Dawson, added that ‘Captain Creswell is our naval expert, and if we have a
naval expert, we must, to a large extent, follow his advice.’210 No time was wasted in
initiating contact with the Admiralty to purchase three torpedo boat destroyers.211
Regrettably Defence Minister Dawson’s time in the portfolio was dominated by
arguments with Sir Edward Hutton, the General Officer Commanding the Military
Forces. Relations worsened to the extent that Dawson proposed abolishing Hutton’s
position replacing him with a Military Board and an Inspector General for training and
discipline. Dawson also proposed a Naval Board with a Director of Naval Forces, and a
Council of Defence chaired by the Prime Minister with the Minister of Defence,
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Treasurer and the military and naval chiefs as members. Unfortunately political events
outran Labor’s legislative agenda.

Despite the best of intentions and initial support from Deakin’s Protectionists, the
minority Labor government was powerless and did not remain long in office. In a House
where it had only twenty-four members Labor faced twice this number in the combined
opposition of Protectionists and Free Traders. On 12 August 1904, when Labor
introduced its own conciliation and arbitration Bill giving preference to unionists,
successful Opposition amendments effectively acted as a vote of no confidence. A Free
Trade-Protectionist government under George Reid took office. Though Deakin had
conspired with Reid for Labor’s downfall, he declined a cabinet post.

It was during 1904 that Deakin became Victorian president of the Imperial Federation
League. The League dreaded ‘the formation of an Australian navy, with the implications
of that for possible unauthorised conflict with foreign powers and the encouragement of
independence and the break-up of the empire.’212 The self described ‘imperial
federationist’, a nomenclature Deakin would still claim in 1912, entered a League which
was vague in its objectives and had already folded in Britain in 1893. The League’s
sentiment for ‘unity of control’ within one Imperial navy would continue for another
fifty years. For Deakin, the bonds of ‘Home’ were strong and, as Dr James Curran has
said, ‘Alfred Deakin, in his 1905 Imperial Federation address, articulated the kindred
nature of the relationship between Australians and Britons and the mystic ties of
Empire: “The same ties of blood, sympathy, and tradition which make us one
Commonwealth here make the British of to-day one people everywhere.” Whilst Deakin
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used the word ‘nation’ seven times in this address, only once did it refer to Australia.
He mostly implied a British ‘nation’ – which included Australians.’213 For the
supporters of an Australian navy, the British answer was always going to be negative
until the Admiralty changed its opinion – or had it changed for them.

It would be another four years of frustration for the Australian navalists until a
reforming First Sea Lord found he could meet Britain’s interests by meeting Australia’s.
John Arbuthnot Fisher dominated the naval history of the first decade of the twentieth
century influencing the attitudes and developments of British and other naval powers
(especially Germany) and forestalled the development of an Australian navy to a time
more of his choosing. Fisher’s appointment on 21 October 1904 as the First Sea Lord of
the Admiralty heralded his second fundamental reform to the British Navy. Fisher
advised the First Lord of the Admiralty, Lord Selborne, that this reform, which he did
not want altered, was devoid of sentiment, and while pleasing the British taxpayer
would not please those who chose to resist change in the navy. On 6 December
Selborne informed the cabinet that the modern navy had been changed, not only by
materiel, but also by strategic position around the world because of the growth of
foreign navies (from the United States in the west to Japan in the East, as well as
Russia, Italy, France, Austria-Hungary and Germany). In response, there was a need for
world-wide re-organisation of the British Navy. Instead of the scattering amongst
numerous stations, Fisher’s reforms called for the concentration of fleets with older
ships scrapped, some overseas naval stations closed and in place specific fleets for five
strategic keys of the world: Singapore, the Cape of Good Hope, Alexandria, the Straits
213
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of Gibraltar and the Straits of Dover. Fisher proposed to achieve this by initially
reducing the Mediterranean Fleet from twelve to eight battleships, while
correspondingly increasing the Home Fleet from eight to twelve. In the second stage of
Fisher’s plan the Home Fleet became the Channel Fleet (with new warships from
shipbuilding yards), the Channel Fleet became the Atlantic Fleet, while the Reserve
Fleet would consist of ships whose nucleus crews would be two-fifths the regular
complement – specialists and officers, who would be onboard these vessels in three
home ports – and come from the scrapped obsolete vessels. This was a scheme that
would take time to deploy and though there was a clear message for Germany –
increasing the pace of a naval arms race – for the world too, there was a message: the
Trafalgar Century was coming to a close. The first of the British maritime legions were
being called home.

The dynamics of Britain’s changing strategic naval intentions and Fisher’s reforms
could not be adequately addressed by the Commonwealth’s Naval Officer Commanding
from his office in Brisbane. Creswell could not provide immediate expert opinion,
counsel and advice to the Commonwealth Government and the Defence Department in
Melbourne or have ‘face-to-face’ interaction with land forces chiefs: being in Brisbane
provided a certain ‘tyranny of distance’. Yet even the local internal transfer of Creswell
from Brisbane to the seat of federal government in Melbourne underscored the
impotency of defence arrangements in Australia. The Prime Minister, George Reid, on
behalf of the Minister of Defence, wrote to the Governor-General on 15 September
1904, requesting that the Governor-General ‘inform the Commander-in-Chief on the
Australian Station that it has been necessary to arrange for the transfer of Captain
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Creswell from Queensland to Victoria as Naval Commandant.’214 Creswell re-located
from Brisbane to Melbourne, effective from 20 September and George Macandie, his
clerk in the Queensland Naval Forces Office, transferred with him. It was to be an
association that lasted until Creswell’s retirement, while Macandie would serve on until
May 1946 as Secretary of the Naval Board (1914 to 1946) and as Secretary of the Navy
Department (1919 to 1921). Hyslop referred to Macandie as ‘an enabler’215, while
Macandie, after fifty years of service ‘witnessing and sharing in the development of the
Royal Australian Navy’, acknowledged ‘the outstanding part played’216 by Creswell.

It did not take long for the Naval Officer Commanding to signal his presence in the
(temporary) national capital. In the Senate on Wednesday 19 October 1904, Labor
Senator Higgs asked the Free Trade-Protectionist Attorney General, Senator Sir Josiah
Symon a series of questions criticising Creswell: ‘Was Captain Creswell correctly
reported in the Melbourne Argus of the 6th October,’ commenting on Russian Warships
off Thursday Island? ‘What authority has Captain Creswell for suggesting that it is
Russia’s general policy to interfere with British trade?’ ‘Will the Minister of Defence
draw his attention to the order concerning neutrality?’217 (The British Government
requested that the Australian Government should be neutral with regard to the RussoJapanese war.) Symon could not believe Senator Higgs was serious and would not
answer his questions. Higgs pressed on: “Does not the Attorney General consider that
the action of the Commandant of the Naval Forces of the Commonwealth, in expressing
the opinion that the presence of Russian vessels may be part of the general Russian
214
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policy of interference with British trade, is a contravention of the neutrality which it has
been laid down should be adopted by Australia in the present trouble between Russia
and Japan.” The Attorney-General did “not think that an expression of opinion of the
kind referred to is any violation of neutrality.”218 After all Lieutenant-Commander
William Jarvie Colquhoun of the CNF was given leave to be The Times Special Naval
Correspondent in Tokyo to report on the Russo Japanese War.

In December 1904 the Reid-McLean Government passed a Defence Act, reflecting most
of Labor’s proposals of earlier that year, implementing a system of Administrative
Boards for the defence forces. These were three-member Boards and, in the case of the
Navy, comprised the Minister of Defence as President, the Director of Naval Forces and
Mr JA Thompson as the Finance Member. For the future Rear-Admiral Henry James
Feakes, CBE, RAN, who entered the Commonwealth Naval Force as a sub-lieutenant in
1906, ‘The personal gifts required in the new Australian naval director demanded, in
addition to those usual in naval officers, a winning way in handling and converting not
only an ill-informed public, but also difficult and often prejudiced political masters.
Creswell was the obvious choice.’219

To co-ordinate the Army and Navy Boards there was a Council of Defence, a move
intended to ensure civilian control over the defence forces and civilian responsibility for
defence policy. The professional service officers would now have a consultative role
only. The membership of the Council of Defence consisted of the president, James
Whiteside McCay, Minister for Defence and Sir George Turner, Federal Treasurer, as
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the civilian members and Major-General Finn, Inspector General of the Commonwealth
Military Forces, Captain W.R. Creswell, Director of Naval Forces, and Colonel W.T.
Bridges, Chief of Intelligence, as the defence services appointees. Samuel Pethebridge,
the Chief Clerk of the Defence Department, served as secretary (as he also did for the
Army Board).

The Council met for the first time on 12 May 1905 with McCay, a militia lieutenantcolonel from Victoria, circulating a minute giving priority to land defence over
maritime defence, ‘in view of the fact that the Imperial Navy, under even the most
unfavourable circumstances, is likely to give us more protection than we can provide for
ourselves on the water for many years to come, … Naval developments should await the
completion of land protection.

In McCay’s opinion there was no justification in

creating a fleet for maritime defence: Australia, though an integral part of the Empire,
was remote from naval powers of the world, had a small widely scattered population
and what revenue it had was limited for land defence purposes. In this his military
confreres on the Defence Council agreed.

Creswell drew on British Imperial policy, the writings of Sir George Clarke and Captain
Alfred Mahan (July 1902 National Review article), as well as McCay’s own submission
in laying before the Council of Defence meeting of 12 May a memorandum that ‘the
most certain deterrent to any [invading] Land operation is the existence of a defending
Sea Force adequate to its work.’220 Creswell was not advocating an independent navy
here. He accepted ‘Australia as an integral portion of the sea power of the Empire. Sea
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war differs from land war. … The sea is one campaigning field, and every portion of the
forces on one side must operate to carry out one scheme and be under one control.’221

In his biography of William Bridges, Chris Coulthard-Clark reported that at the May
meeting ‘Bridges had remained silent except for occasional snipes at Creswell’s
remarks’ and posing four questions to Creswell:

(1) how much was to be transferred from the military vote to finance his
scheme; (2) was an Australian Navy to supplement the Royal navy, or did it
have some other purpose; (3) who was to command, the British Naval
Commander-in-Chief or the Australian government; and (4) what was to be the
principle of its deployment in war, dispersion or concentration to defend certain
points?222
Creswell was not to disappoint Bridges in his written response on 1 July: ‘The money
expended on the Field Force’, he replied audaciously, ‘should be on a Naval Force and,
assuming this to be £500,000, I would transfer that sum to the Naval vote.’ 223 To
Bridges second question, Creswell was equally direct: the Australian Naval Force
existed for the defence of Australia and, referring to Japan’s relationship within the
Anglo-Japanese Alliance, Creswell said just as Japan would supplement the Royal Navy
in war, so would Australia. However, in time of war the Australian Navy, with the
approval of the Australian government, would be under the command of the British
Commander-in-Chief. In Australian waters, the Australian Naval Force would be tasked
according to the strength and movement of the enemy with regard to the Australian
warships’ capability and access to coal supplies. Coulthard-Clark called Creswell’s 1
July response to Bridges ‘Creswell’s confused statements’.224 Bridges and his
221
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biographer appeared ignorant or unappreciative of the clarity of Creswell’s responses
reiterating the key messages from his 1901 Report, published articles and his public
comments promoting an Australian naval defence.

The contempt had not abated two years later, when Creswell challenged in his annual
report to parliament the split responsibility with the army of customs inspection of
visiting vessels. To consolidate local naval responsibilities, Creswell argued that the
Commonwealth Naval Forces assume complete management and control of the
examination service. Bridges was livid accusing Creswell of being ‘opposed to the
public interest’, subversive of discipline’ and inaccurate and misleading in the
Report.225 In June 1908, then Defence Minister Ewing found in favour of Creswell and,
following a delay by the United States’ Fleet visit, the CNF took up responsibility for
the Examination Service in mid-September 1908.

Bridges was as fierce a champion of Australian land forces as Creswell was in his
advocacy for a naval defence. Bridges utterly opposed the creation of a navy until the
land defence of Australia was complete. In retrospect, Bridges’ opposition was ironic:
nine years later the Royal Australian Navy would initiate the operational and logistical
management of the sea transport of Australia army contingents to the Great War.
Creswell’s rebuttal of his opponent’s contentious questions focussed on a defensive
force: a sea force that was an integral portion of the Royal Navy. It could be argued that
for Bridges, the defence of the nation started at the Australian shoreline, for Creswell at
the enemy’s (shoreline).
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Treasurer Sir George Turner, a member of the Defence Council, was not convinced of
the McCay-Bridge position. In summary he wanted to know what type and number of
naval capability should be provided and what would it cost. On 7 June 1905 Creswell
responded on what would be the size and cost of a Creswell-proposed Australian navy.
It would be a 32 vessel force consisting of 3 cruiser-destroyers, 16 torpedo destroyers,
five 1st Class torpedo boats and eight 2nd Class torpedo boats with a nucleus
complement of 624 crew in peace time and a complement 1720 in war. It was more
than the acquisition of vessels that Creswell was seeking; what he was proposing was a
naval defence of Australia replete with self-sufficiency in the construction and repair of
warships. Vessels would be built in Australia with the advantages of ‘enhanced selfdependence, saving in navigation expenses of voyage from England, economy of local
expenditure by employment of local labour.’226 It came to nothing.

To the Commander-in-Chief of the Australia Station, Vice-Admiral Sir Arthur
Fanshawe, local navy schemes were without merit: there was enough of a financial
burden in providing the protection of the British Navy. He claimed in The Argus that:

… if Australians and New Zealanders could thoroughly appreciate the principles
of a sound naval policy they would realise that their existence as free and
independent nations depended upon the navy alone, and would not be content to
go on allowing their kinsfolk in the old country to bear almost the entire cost of
their protection.227

Fanshawe was unrelenting in his opposition, asserting in June that the British navy
would have to lose ‘the mastery of the Pacific’ for Australia to be invaded. It was
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beyond Australia’s capacity to defend itself, Fanshawe emphasized: ‘the cost of
maintaining such a flotilla in Australian ports would be prohibitive’. It was asserted by
Fanshawe and successive Commanders-in-Chief and local imperialists opposed to an
Australian navy, which proclaimed that “Australia and New Zealand’s sole defence for
many years rests upon the capacity of the Royal Navy to maintain command of the
Eastern seas.” Creswell tried to bring some sense to Fanshawe’s scenario: if a large
enemy force had been despatched across thousands of miles to invade Australia, then
not only Imperial seapower in the Pacific would have already been annihilated, it would
have presumably meant ‘the defeat and collapse of sea supremacy and the Empire.’228
Creswell conjectured that the defeat of such a seapower as Britain could possibly mean
a weakened enemy approaching Australian shores, where – if his scheme was
implemented – a 32 vessel Australia navy waited to engage it.

Britain’s course of action, devised by First Sea Lord Fisher, was to deplete its overseas
fleets. Vessels of fighting value were withdrawn from overseas stations to Home and
Mediterranean stations from 1905 onwards with Japan supplementing some of the
protection for Britain’s Far East and Pacific colonies to balance the presence of the
sizeable German East Asia Squadron. Melbourne’s Argus229 reported that on 2 June, a
few days after the battle of Tsushima, the battleships HMS Ocean and HMS Centurion
on the China station were ordered ‘home’ by the Admiralty without waiting for the
arrival of their replacements, HMS Goliath and HMS Canopus. Britain was confident
Russia would no longer be a threat in the East and confident, particularly as a result of
its recent action, that Japan would be a capable ally to check localised German naval
threats. British naval capability was also downgraded on the Australia Station: HMS
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Euryalus, a modern armoured cruiser was replaced by the older, almost obsolete P Class
HMS Powerful recently brought out of reserve to be the flagship on the Australia
Station. Powerful was inefficient and ‘outdated as a fighting unit.’230 British redeployment provided a clear message for Australia: it was being ‘abandoned’ and over
the next three years Deakin and Andrew Fisher would seek answers, while Creswell
continued to advocate local measures for naval defence. Britain would eventually come
to realise (or concede) in 1909 that dominion participation in a ‘One Fleet’ would be
beneficial for war with an aggressor; but even then, for Britain, it was about adding to
the strength to her own ‘legions’ rather than protecting the Pacific.

Creswell was the one constant authority on naval matters throughout the ever changing
Australian political landscape. His schemes for acquiring a naval defence, reports and
sundry written advice to governments reveal a well developed understanding of
strategy, as well as knowledge and a comprehension of regional strengths and
weaknesses, the capacities of foreign fleets and the latest thinking of naval theorists.
The rotation of governments and, consequently, defence ministers, resulted in the
constant necessity of maintaining a profile for naval affairs in public and candid, often
repeated, advice to his political masters. Thus, it would not be unreasonable for the
Director of Commonwealth Naval Forces to be asked by newspapers for his views of
the naval battle that had been fought between Russia and Japan in the Straits of
Tsushima during 27-28 May 1905. The Australian press had been reporting the RussoJapanese war, which broke out in 1904: land engagements in China and the progress of
the Russian Baltic Fleet of eleven battleships, eight cruisers and nine destroyers
steaming over 18,000 miles to East Asia to link up with Russia’s Third Pacific
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Squadron to engage the enemy, only to be sunk/destroyed/defeated. It was a great
opportunity for Creswell to promote his naval doctrine and preview the value of his
scheme outlined to Treasurer Turner on 7 June and to Defence Minister Playford in
October.

Captain Creswell observing the Commonwealth Naval Forces manoeuvres, Easter 1905 aboard the
torpedo boat Countess of Hopetoun (Royal Australian Navy)

At the time of the Battle of Tsushima, Creswell was observing naval exercises aboard
the Protector. By 31 May he was able to provide his views to Melbourne’s The Argus
and The Age newspapers, ‘based on the rough outline … in the cabled reports’,231
though ‘he was restricted in his comments, however, by the limitations of his official
position.’ To The Age Creswell declared that the battle was unparalleled since the Battle
of the Nile with the Russians displaying ‘… the poorest tactical ability and limited
manoeuvring power …’232 The great advantage from the beginning, Creswell told The
Argus, was that while the Russians ‘crawled out from home, encountering every sort of
obstacle … no coaling facilities and with distracting international troubles’, the
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Japanese were getting their ships and guns fit for battle. ‘Their closeness to their base
allowed them to bring into play all their torpedo craft.’233 Creswell marvelled how
Admiral Heihachiro Togo, the Japanese commander, ‘played a splendid waiting game’.

The triumph of torpedo boats and destroyers in this sea battle provided good support for
Creswell in arguing for his particular naval scheme. More than that, it was the
‘wonderful object lesson’, Creswell declared, of ‘the well-established law that sea
power is the determining factor in contests between nations – particularly so with an
island country.’ To a political as well as a public audience, Creswell could not be
clearer: a local naval defence was required. Creswell had little sympathy for the Russian
fleet ‘manned, not by seamen, but by the annual crop of conscripts … [for] the battle
has been settled by the question as to who is in the ships…’ Creswell never doubted that
Japan would defeat Russia: ‘We shall hear no more of Russian scares in Australia for
many years.’ There were ‘some lessons for Australia … to be drawn from the war’,234
however these were matters of policy.

If these were separate newspaper interviews, his remarks to both were similar – except
for one reference. The Argus report concluded with Creswell reportedly saying:

The fact of the matter is that the Russian Government is seething with
corruption, and the very first place where this would be felt is on a warship …
the fight has gone to the trained and efficient man under honest administration
and intelligent handling.235

Russian national honour was offended by these remarks of Creswell according to the
Russian Consul-General, N. Oustinoff, who wrote to the Governor-General, Lord
233
234
235

The Argus, Thursday, 1 June 1905
The Age, Thursday, 1 June 1905
The Argus, Thursday, 1 June 1905

118

Northcote on 8 June ‘compelled to protest strongly to Your Excellency against the
unqualified liberty of language which the Commander of the Naval Forces has allowed
himself to use with respect to the Imperial Russian Government.’236 What followed was
instructive for those who thought Australia a sovereign nation and for Creswell to
practice circumspection. Lord Northcote forwarded the Consul-General’s protest to the
Prime Minister, George Reid. On 30 June, Reid replied to the Governor-General
inviting Lord Northcote to provide the Consul-General with copies of letters written by
Creswell and the editor of the Argus, S. Cunningham, which would satisfactorily
explain that not only was no offence intended, but Creswell had not made the remarks.
This did not allay the anger of the Consul-General who wanted an immediate apology
from the government.

Finally, on 13 July, the Governor-General’s private secretary informed the Russian
Consul-General that ‘the regulations of His Majesty’s Government do not permit him to
receive, in his official capacity from Foreign Consular officers, complaints of the nature
of that contained in your letter to His Excellency of the 8th of June last.’ The episode
highlighted the new Commonwealth’s limited status as a nation: Australia was a
subservient, dependent, self-governing member of the British Empire, incapable of
making decisions on foreign relations. The Consul-General thought the GovernorGeneral was head of state, when, in fact, the Governor-General was an agent of His
Britannic Majesty’s government and a representative of the British monarch. As The
Argus of 8 February 1904 noted the Governor-General was nothing more than ‘the head
of a diplomatic mission.’237
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This may have been ‘a near run thing’ for Creswell. In future he would need to be more
circumspect regarding his public comments: in correspondence with his political and
journalist contacts, he would encourage use of his comments without acknowledgement.
Creswell would nonetheless continue his campaign for an Australian naval defence. He
would still use influential men such as Jebb and Fabian Ware - but the reprimand must
have been such that he could not be exposed as the promoter, underlining the need for
nondisclosure. In a letter to Ware in 1906, Creswell remarked ‘if there is anything in
this screed of use pray use it but in no way must my name appear or be suggested, this
of course you will at once understand’238 Two years later in a letter to Jebb continuing
his advocacy for a local naval force, Creswell was still cautioning “If anything I have
written is worth publishing, use it, but of course not over my name. Of course I am
debarred from writing to the press.”239

At a political level, Deakin maintained his own strategy on achieving a local naval
capability. In an article in the Herald of 12 June 1905, Deakin fielded a number of what
seemed to be pre-arranged questions to which he gave prepared answers about the
defence of Australia. Deakin, a month before his return to government, bemoaned the
inadequacies of the local naval force and the small amount of naval defence spending
compared with military defence. Nations – particularly the United States, Germany and
Japan – had emerged as new sea powers, while Australia, lulled by the Trafalgar
Century, had, according to Deakin ‘a feebler sense of our obligations’. Deakin appeared
to convey a sense of urgency that there was the threat from nations, which had naval
stations within striking distance of Australia. His interview was intended for two
238
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audiences: the public and the Labor Party. Deakin would need Labor’s support to
become Prime Minister again. He would need to work his affability and feign an
alignment with the Labor parliamentary party. Deakin saw the need for a navy when
‘we can afford it;’ at the appropriate juncture; in the fullness of time. It was a question
of finance, it was a question of the naval agreement ‘but as this agreement is not open
for reconsideration until 1911,’ Deakin said in the Herald interview, ‘and does not
terminate until 1913, it is hardly advisable to discuss it further at this stage.’240 It was an
indication that his interview may have been aimed at a third audience: British
imperialists. Going against ‘Home’ appeared just too difficult.

Deakin became prime minister again on 4 July 1905 and by 22 August, Creswell was
briefing Deakin that ‘the present local vessels are either hopelessly obsolete or rapidly
becoming so. To train in a modern ship for service in an obsolete one cannot be
recommended.’ In his two page statement, Creswell advised Deakin that there was a
solution to Australia’s naval inadequacy – a unique opportunity - and was incensed that
the Admiralty has not suggested it: Australia could take up some of the warships that
Britain was casting aside. Creswell was astounded:

that an offer of these ships was not made to Australia is the strongest prima facie
evidence that Imperial policy is directly opposed to any Australian naval
development. No other interpretation is possible to the preference of breaking up
good ships or selling them for a few pounds. Such being the case, it was plainly
useless to put forward any request. 241

Even more annoying, the First Sea Lord, Sir John Fisher, was adopting for the Reserve
Fleet ‘the “nucleus crew” principle of maintenance proposed by me in my Report to
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Parliament.’ Creswell’s solution was for Australia to have ten to twelve of these ships as
a Reserve squadron for Imperial service ‘half in commission (by Australia) with nucleus
crews, half ready for commission (by Royal Navy) if required’ with the subsidy being
applied to the maintenance of the squadron. It was to no avail. Deakin scrawled across
the remarks by the Director of the Naval Forces, “I would suggest the following answer:
The matter is being enquired into by the Minister.”242

Ignoring Creswell’s submission, Deakin proposed his own version of naval defence
when he petitioned the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Lord Elgin, on 28 August in
a long letter (a bête noir for Elgin who would punish such writers with delayed
responses), that ‘what is really required is that any defences, if they are to be
appreciated as Australian, must be distinctively of that character … No Commonwealth
patriotism is aroused while we merely supply funds that disappear in the general
expenditure of the Admiralty.’ Deakin proposed substituting the £200,000 paid annually
under the Naval Agreement with ‘a rapid and regular service of first class steamers’
between Australia and England engaged in a mail service in peace and as armed
merchant vessels in war. Lord Elgin responded dismissively ten months later on 7 June
1906 that ‘the suggestion … does not commend itself to Admiralty’. The Admiralty felt
that ‘it was not only of extremely limited efficacy, but costly in its operation.’243

Politically, there was little direction and less vision for local naval defence. The
Defence Minister was president and chairman of the Navy Board but ‘from 1905 to
1910 there was an average of fourteen meetings a year … the minister attended less than
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half of the meetings.’244 Bowed but not broken, Creswell wrote in his 1905 annual
report to parliament that, ‘there has been no scheme or design of an Australian policy
decided upon and the naval Forces remain today in a condition of arrested reduction and
uncertainty.’245 Hayne noted, in considering the impact of the Battle of Tsushima on
Australian defence and foreign policy, that before 1905 the Australian government
seemed incapable of arriving at any clear view on the:

strategic rationale for defence. Apart from the fact that most leaders were
preoccupied with the consolidation of Federation, an internal issue, there was no
clear perception of any immediate threat to Australian security. Inasmuch as it
had a view the Commonwealth government accepted the British rationale, which
argued that any danger to Australia would eventuate as a result of British
involvement in world affairs.

Creswell and supporters of a local navy in the Commonwealth Parliament and amongst
the press called for a distinctive defence policy, but ‘the government on the whole
continued to rely on the effectiveness of the British government for its defence needs
and to adhere to the principles of the Blue Water School, where a concentrated mobile
force was seen as the most efficacious.246 The Australian poet Henry Lawson seemed to
reflect the position mid-decade when he wrote that Australia was ‘all unprovided and
unprepared, the Outpost of the White!’247

The Anglo-Japanese Alliance was renewed for a further five years in 1905 and was to
continue in this form until the Washington Naval Arms Limitation Conference in 192122. Xenophobic Australia had increasing concern for the growing power of Japan,
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despite the re-assurances of the Colonial Office. The poet Lawson again seemed to echo
the xenophobia: ‘Who shall aid and protect us when the blood-streaked dawn we
meet?’248 To Lawson the political thinking was not perceptive enough: something
substantial and deliberate needed to be done now, for Australia was ‘in the South and
alone.’ The Anglo-Japanese Alliance convinced the pro-navy Commonwealth
parliamentarians that Britain had little regard for Australia’s interests: the British Fleet
in Australian waters was worthless and would be better off scuttled (and this is what
the British First Sea Lord intended to do); and although substantial British units would
be needed to defend a vast coast against a strengthening Asian sea power, it had already
bested a large European fleet. First Sea Lord Fisher had no intention of providing such a
force, nor encouraging a local navy. To Fisher submarines were the answer and he had
discussions with Starr Jameson, Prime Minister of Cape Colony, about a plan for Britain
to build five vessels, annually allocated to the five principal South African ports. Seeing
the Cape do this, Fisher reasoned, all the other colonies (particularly Australia and
Canada) ‘would give up the insane, silly idea of Colonies having battleships and
armoured cruisers of their own! …

NO LOCAL NAVY CAN EVER BE

EFFICIENT!’249

The criticism by the Commander-in-Chief Australia Station, Vice-Admiral Fanshawe,
of local naval defence was enough for Creswell to write to Defence Minister Playford
on 22 September 1905 to complain about the old and severely run down local naval
forces. There had been no new ships for twenty years and, tellingly, there was a
comparable run down in personnel with only three lieutenants on the Permanent List –
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and only two of them on active service! He was exasperated with the lack of
understanding of the principles of maritime defence and a lack of navalist representation
in parliament to promote the service, to resist reductions and pledge to maintain local
forces. ‘This Service is practically on the verge of collapse’250 a frustrated Creswell
reported.

Creswell was cognisant of the growing predatory manoeuvrings of foreign powers in
Asia and the Pacific, the prevailing maritime theories, the views of significant men in
the Empire and whom he had to influence in the Australian arena. His reports and
schemes not only detailed what vessel requirements would be suitable for Australian
conditions but also Australia’s position in the region, international relations, the
alignment of naval powers and the strategy a local naval force could employ – within
one Imperial Fleet – to meet any threat of invasion. His advocacy to date had not
brought a substantial, sustaining public response, yet ‘it is not the noblest call that gets
answered, but the answerable call.’251 A new opportunity was presented in September
1905 when the Australian National Defence League was formed in Sydney with the
purpose of promoting the protection of the Australian nation and race by promoting
Australian defence forces. It had a broad-base membership of business and professional
men, soldiers and clergymen with an executive who included Chris Watson (Labor
Party) and Sir William McMillan (MHR for Wentworth, NSW, Free Trade Party) as
vice-presidents and Billy Hughes as an honorary secretary. Through the Defence
League and its quarterly journal, The Call, compulsory naval and military training and a
system of national defence, including Creswell’s campaign, could be given wider
promotion.
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Prime Minister Deakin needed to respond to this pressure: his tenure in office was due
to the parliamentary support of Labor, and the Australian ‘naval question’ was a genie
out of the bottle. La Nauze wrote that as Prime Minister, Deakin ‘had to consider
problems which lay beyond the competence, and perhaps beyond the horizon, of the
devoted sailor’, Creswell. The first problem was intra-imperial diplomacy: Deakin
realized, according to La Nauze, that for Australia ‘any steps towards the creation of her
own naval force should be taken, not with the consent (for formally that was
unnecessary) but with the goodwill and helpful co-operation of the Admiralty.’252 The
second problem was technical: to whom should he look for advice on the type of naval
vessels? Whose advice should he accept? Creswell was a strong advocate but if England
did not like his opinions…? La Nauze’s proposition was that Deakin took a cautious
approach in promoting a discussion with Britain about a navy; though it may have also
displayed Deakin’s timidity. Deakin would not do anything unorthodox that might
jeopardise his standing in the eyes of the British statesmen and admirals. His approach
centred on lobbying Britain for a solution. In so doing he worked within the context and
requirements of the Admiralty. Deakin had first ignored and then dismissed the
involvement of the government’s own naval adviser in seeking British advice. If this
would be the advice he chose to accept, Australia would be placing Britain’s interests
above self-interest.

Deakin’s Defence Minister, Thomas Playford, supported the absolute necessity ‘to
establish the nucleus of an Australian navy.’253 Playford based this need on three
objectives, which reflected Creswell’s own longstanding advice to governments;
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namely to meet the possibility of invasion, to provide defence against raids on coastal
shipping and harbours and, finally, to guard against attacks by fast cruisers on sea
commerce. However, the Colonial Defence Committee (CDC), from which selfgoverning dominions could seek assistance or advice for their defence plans or schemes,
did accept Australia’s concept of defence. In early October 1905 CDC dismissed the
need for a navy to protect against invasion and commerce raiding as well as a need for a
Commonwealth’s land forces’ scheme. The impact on the naval defence of Australia
from the CDC standpoint would, according to Creswell, ‘involve the abolition of all
Naval organization’, requiring no more effort on the part of Australia than paying the
Naval Agreement subsidy and leaving responsibility for naval defence to the Imperial
fleet. ‘The views of the Colonial Defence Committee, if concurred in, would preclude
the need to frame any Naval estimates whatever.’ Nor did Creswell want to be reduced
to being an appendage of the military with a port examination service – of itself it
would not ‘justify the maintenance of any Naval Forces.’254 Colonel Bridges, the
Commonwealth’s Chief of Army Intelligence, was convinced that a military officer
needed to get to England to determine an Australian defence scheme.

Unimpressed with the CDC response, Playford posed Creswell some questions
regarding the formation of a navy and the place of submarines in the navy and
Australian defence. Having proposed a 32-vessel navy to Treasurer Turner in June
1905, Creswell now proposed on 10 October an Australian navy of three cruiser
destroyers, sixteen torpedo boat destroyers and fifteen torpedo boats at a cost of
£1,768,000 (plus an annual upkeep of £532,000). ‘This will provide a defence not
designed as a force for action against fleets or squadrons, which is the province of the
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Imperial fleet,’ Creswell argued, ‘but as a line necessary to us within the defence line of
the Imperial fleet – a purely defensive line, that will give security to our naval bases,
populous centres, principal ports and commerce.’ The key contribution to BritishAustralian co-operation in the naval defence of Australia Creswell now suggested was
intelligence: ‘the sea screens the enemy. We have no eyes – no intelligence of his
movements. He may attack any of the populous centres or ports.’ Australia could
provide the means to penetrate that screen: fast destroyers could gather intelligence on
an enemy fleet’s movements and may ‘influence the movements of an enemy in a
manner very much to our advantage.’ Creswell considered intelligence as vital to a
nation with an entirely sea frontier. Neither a British Squadron nor an independent local
navy could be everywhere; it needed to counter the advantage the sea can provide an
enemy.

In determining the appropriate configuration of a local navy, Creswell did not
recommend submarines for several reasons; while they had a certain advantage of
‘invisibility they were still experimental craft’. In a separate report to Playford on 15
November,255 Creswell questioned the stability of submarines: their design and
construction had not progressed to the stage where there was a recognisable ‘fit’ with
other naval forces nor for Creswell was it clear what would be the complement of such a
vessel. It was the earliest warning by Creswell to Deakin about submarines, of which
the Prime Minister was to become so enamoured.

The call for a national defence scheme by service chiefs, some parliamentarians, the
Australian National Defence League and some sections of the Press agitated Deakin
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sufficiently for him to cable Sir George Sydenham Clarke, Secretary of the Committee
of Imperial Defence requesting that the Committee consider the defence of Australia in
its entirety. The Committee of Imperial Defence (CID) was instituted in March 1903, of
which the Colonial Defence Committee was a sub-committee. Deakin wrote to Clarke
on 3 October that the Naval Agreement subsidy was out of favour but may be made so
if directed towards an obvious contribution to Australian naval development: ‘visibly
and concretely Australian in origin but Imperial in end and value.256 On 10 October
Clarke replied, agreeing to Deakin’s request.

In the first of his annual reports to parliament, on 1 January 1906, Creswell’s position
on the defence of Australia was quite clear: he asserted the importance of British sea
supremacy, whilst attacking the disproportionate expenditure, resources and reliance
placed on land forces to defend commerce and the sea frontier should such supremacy
be lost. Creswell bristled that such approaches ‘scarcely come within the compass of
sanity’. With coastal overseas trade valued at £145,000.000 Australia’s maritime
defence could only be considered, in Creswell’s view, as contributing towards British
sea supremacy. Those who feared that he was preaching a separate navy were wrong.
He believed ‘that concentration of Naval Force upon an enemy is a first principle of sea
war is well known’, including again the 1902 National Review article by Mahan, whom
Creswell considered ‘the greatest of Naval writers’, to support his argument.

He

acknowledged that ‘Australia is only assailable by sea, and its safety depends on the
Naval supremacy of the Empire. … Every portion of the sea forces of the Empire must
act in the most complete co-operation attainable and subject to a single control in war,
its purpose being the achieving and maintenance of complete sea supremacy.’ Mahan’s
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article added support to Creswell’s contention ‘that any measure taken in Australia to
defend that interest would relieve the main sea forces of the Empire.’257

Commodore Ray Griggs, RAN, remarked at the 2007 Creswell Oration, that Creswell
was ambitious in his first annual report to parliament. ‘In that document he provided an
excellent articulation of what his proposed force could achieve and reinforced the
economic effects of not having a viable navy.’258 The proposal promoted a selfsufficient navy with economic benefits to Australia with local construction reducing
from seven to five years the roll out of the 32 ships. The vessels would be built in
Australia ‘by recognised firms’ with the ‘building plant being taken over by the
Government, on the completion of the contract, for repair and maintenance of the
flotillas, and for future new construction in which by that time Australian engineers,
shipwrights and mechanics will have experience.’ To Creswell his proposal was not
substituting British naval protection, but rather supplementing, as a maritime nation
within the Empire, the Royal Navy’s local responsibility for Imperial defence. Creswell
took into account that Australia could neither afford nor crew capital warships when
calling for a local navy appropriate to the sea environment (physical coastal geography,
sea and weather conditions). He also appreciated the need to overcome a weakness in
local sea defence: developing professional skills in his officers and seamen. ‘The
solution of the Imperial Defence problem of the future would seem to be in the
development to the limit of Naval capacity of every portion of an Empire that has been
won by sea power’259 and to encourage Parliament to act Creswell reported: ‘Australia
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is, of all British possessions, the one most favourably conditioned to give effect to it.’260
Creswell would have agreed with Deakin’s assertions to Sir George Clarke in January
1906 that the Royal Navy was Australia’s first line of defence, Deakin hesitated at
committing to establishing a navy: ‘It would be costly – extravagantly costly for
4,000,000 people to tax themselves with any navy that would give them the security
even allowing for the reduced risks of war if we were only involved in quarrels of our
own making in this quarter of the globe.’261 Deakin may not have been satisfied with the
Naval Agreement subsidy, however he told Clarke he had always supported it and
would continue to do so until something better was formulated. To Creswell there was a
better way.

Creswell’s nemesis of the Australian naval interest, Colonel William Bridges departed
for England on 9 January 1906, having lobbied since June 1905 for a military officer to
be despatched to the War Office to discuss an Australian defence scheme. He would
then go onto Switzerland to observe the 1906 Swiss army manoeuvres; the Swiss being
seen as a model for the Commonwealth Military Forces. Deakin tasked Bridges to assist
the Committee of Imperial Defence by providing information on maps and plans
relevant to a defence scheme but, under instructions from Deakin, not to provide
opinions.

Initially Deakin did not commission Creswell to undertake a similar visit to England.
Deakin may well have been daunted by Creswell, who was widely regarded as the
principal navalist and advocate within Australia, with particular support coming from a
range of Commonwealth parliamentarians and newspapers. If Creswell was
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‘unrestricted’ in England, he could gain influence or hinder the cause with British
politicians or senior Royal Navy officers to create an expectation of, or to sponsor, a
local naval programme which Deakin may be forced to finance and manage. The
Creswell approach did not comply with Deakin’s imperial federationist thinking and
Creswell’s championship of a local navy was hindering Deakin’s maritime goals,
correctly assuming that the creation of a navy was a matter for government not service
personnel. Deakin did not think Creswell’s knowledge or expertise current and he tried
to dissuade Defence Minister Playford, from promoting Creswell’s visit to London:
You obviously adopt your Director’s views as to the necessity for his seeing the
Committee of Defence in order to supply them with explanations. Personally I
do not think they care a straw for either his explanations or those of Bridges.
Neither of those officers can be in anyway authorised to speak for the
government. … The despatch of Creswell would be a new departure of our
own. It is one which I thoroughly approve as I think our naval officers must now
be lacking in personal acquaintance with recent advances in naval defence. The
Committee know that we disclaim all responsibility for any opinions they may
express, given in answer to questions, which may possibly be put to them. … the
views they express will be theirs only and not ours.262

Deakin was not merely asserting that the government must determine defence policy:
when it came to external affairs and the navy, only Deakin would allow himself to
speak for Australia. Deakin considered an Australian navy as part of his external affairs
policy: it would give him greater leverage with London for a place in imperial forums
on regional affairs and a navy was a shield for defending the ‘White Australia’ policy.
To Deakin, a navy would enable a more autonomous Australia to provide independent
counsel within the Empire. With reluctant consent and with barely enough time to reach
London before the CID met, Deakin sent Creswell to England, not in an official
capacity, nor with the purpose of preparing for an Australian navy. Creswell’s
determination to promote a local navy at any opportunity concerned Deakin; throughout
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the Naval Director’s visit, Sir George Clarke kept Deakin informed of Creswell’s
activities.

Officially, Playford’s instructions to Creswell were ‘on arrival in England place
yourself in communications, through the Colonial Office, with the Admiralty and the
Secretary of the Imperial Defence Committee.’263 Creswell was to garner information
about torpedo boat destroyers and submarines, home coast defence, the design,
construction and engineering of vessels, the training of officers and sailors and the
concept of ‘nucleus crews’ and inspect shipbuilding yards with the view to building
vessels in Australia. Given the subsequent events, one could speculate why The
Instructions of the Minister for Defence to Captain WR Creswell were not put before
Parliament at Creswell’s departure for England or during his visit. The Instructions were
eventually tabled on 26 September 1906. One likely reason: Deakin was trying to
placate the press, parliamentarians and the public once the adverse findings in the
August CID report were known. Deakin could demonstrate publicly that he had sent
Creswell on a fact finding mission, while privately opposing it.

On 14 February, Clarke privately told Deakin that as regards Creswell ‘I know his
views well & his latest memo on the naval question … I do not think, therefore, that his
presence here would be of any assistance to us… ’264 Incredibly, Creswell, who had
devised the scheme was not required to elaborate or defend his proposition for a naval
defence of Australia, but Colonel Bridges, an opponent of a local navy, was allowed to
meet with the Committee. As the Committee prepared advice for Australia, Deakin was
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being kept informed of its progress and the activities of Australia’s service chiefs.
Clarke had yet to meet Creswell but:

I have suggested to Sir John [Fisher, First Sea Lord] that it might be wise to hint
to Captain Creswell as to the inadvisability of him getting into print here. It is
undesirable that he should float a propaganda on this side, which might be
echoed as your side. The views of our newspapers here are mostly worthless in
such matters but things might be viewed in Australia as supporting Creswell’s
views.265
Deakin did not counter Clarke’s manipulation of Creswell: he was conspiring with
Clarke to ‘neutralise’ Creswell.

On 25 March, soon after his arrival in England, Creswell called upon the Secretary for
the Colonies, Lord Elgin, and then the First Lord of the Admiralty, Lord Tweedmouth,
with whom Creswell left his letter of instructions as requested. Creswell had thought
that Tweedmouth intended to make the necessary arrangements for his inspection visits
to shipyards and naval facilities, but this was not to be the case. By 12 April Clarke was
reporting to Deakin that “I have seen Creswell who has, as you say, plenty of go about
him. It is unfortunate that he should become the prophet of a section of the Australian
public and press.”266. The British position turned on the need to ‘manage’ Creswell’s
presence in England.

The Lords of the Admiralty left London on their own tour of inspection with no
arrangements made for Creswell’s visits to shipbuilding yards. As Creswell ‘had
received no further instructions from them, my time in England being so short, I
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decided to start independently’.267

With the assistance of the Agent-General for

Victoria Creswell travelled the length of England visiting Thorneycrofts in London and
Southampton; Yarrow, Samuel White and Company at Cowes on the Isle of Wight;
Armstrong Whitworth’s Elswick Works at Newcastle-upon-Tyne; Palmers Shipbuilding
at Jarrow-on-Tyne; Vickers and Maxim , Barrow-in-Furness; Cammell Laird and Co at
Birkenhead and the Thames Ironworks, Shipbuilding and Engineering. Creswell,
unaccredited to the Committee of Imperial Defence when it considered the naval
defence of Australia, was regarded as a foreign naval attaché when visiting the
shipyards. He became aware of this from ‘associates’ of his own early Royal Navy days
in high command at Devonport and Portsmouth, Feakes noted that officially Creswell
was considered a disaffected person.’268

With still no arrangements in place by the end of April, Creswell went to the Admiralty
to be told ‘that the delay had been accidental:’269 the letter of instructions had been
mislaid (and was only found a few days before Creswell’s departure from England). For
a visit, known in advance and also the subject of correspondence between the Australian
prime minister and the Secretary of CID, the misplacing of an instrument of courtesy
would not seem to be in the best traditions of the British civil service; however, to
dismiss any sinister intentions would be naive. Common sense dictated that if
Australia’s naval chief was in the country, he should have been brought into the CID
discussions; but it was politics and Admiralty condescension not reason and equality of
esteem that operated.
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Creswell called separately on Captain Charles Ottley, Director of Naval Intelligence, on
30 April and then Sir John Fisher to put his proposals. From Creswell’s meeting with
Captain Ottley, visits were finally arranged to Portsmouth to see torpedo destroyers in
commission with nucleus crews and the latest type of submarines and then the training
establishments (gunnery, torpedo and signalling schools). Creswell reported that the
submarines’ ‘defence value is still a question keenly debated, high authorities differing
as to their vulnerability to counter attack …their war value must remain largely
indeterminate, to be solved only by war.’270

Not once in Creswell’s Report was the Dreadnought, which was launched on 10
February 1906, mentioned. Construction had commenced in October 1905 and the
result, according to Peter Padfield was ‘an awesome demonstration of naval and
industrial power.’271 A dreadnought-type ship seemed financially not possible for
Australia. Costs aside, Creswell’s focus was a torpedo boat destroyer scheme: more
practical to protect ports and trade and patrol the long Australian coastline with requisite
infrastructure to develop skilful, efficient seamen. Two or three dreadnoughts – in the
extremely unlikely event they had been offered – whilst more powerful, would be too
few to be of benefit in a widespread attack on Australia. The distances to patrol would
be too vast to be effective, while a fleet of smaller ships would offer a more useful
second line of defence should the Royal Navy lose supremacy in northern or southern
hemispheres.
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Creswell’s six weeks’ tour strengthened his long-held view that Australia needed a
navy. He had been re-assured by British naval authorities that ‘no heavy squadron of
enemy cruisers will be permitted to assail or even approach our coasts.’ Yet Creswell
also reported that he was also ‘warned that no fleet, however powerful, can guarantee
against some losses in war.’ It was, as he had always stated since 1901, ‘the meanest
extemporised cruiser with a few guns is completely master of the situation, and can
capture, destroy or dislocate commerce.’ In the 1906 Report of his visit Creswell
acknowledged the primacy of the Royal Navy – ‘our main defence’, but the British
Squadron in Australia was itself ‘12,000 miles from all those building establishments,
arsenals, construction works, as well as training establishments and schools that supply
it with a trained personnel and material.’272 What if the British Navy withdrew to meet a
threat or took up station elsewhere? Creswell emphasised the need and the priority for
naval infrastructure and the gradual creation of naval power in Australia. There was a
need to initiate a construction scheme to include four ocean destroyers, sixteen ‘River’
Class destroyers and four first class torpedo boats. His report to the Commonwealth
parliament had a clear message for Deakin and his government: carpe diem. The
British, however, had a different view.

The Report of the Committee of Imperial Defence upon a General Scheme of Defence
for Australia, issued in May and printed by the Parliament on 15 August 1906,
infuriated Creswell. His memorandum273 to Defence Minister Playford, in October 1905
regarding the defence of Australia, the formation of an Australian navy and the
advisability of submarines were, in the Committee’s view, ‘based upon an imperfect
conception of the requirements of naval strategy at the present day, and of the proper
272
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application of naval force.’274 The type of destroyers Creswell had suggested, the CID
Report claimed, could not be effective in the protection of maritime commerce. Indeed
‘there is therefore no strategic justification … for the creation at great expense of a local
force of destroyers … at present no such strategic necessity exists or threatens.’275

The Australian press responded with patriotic outrage: ‘the British power is not
immortal,’ thundered the Bulletin, ‘nor is the British navy guaranteed to be for ever
invincible. It is not treason to contemplate the possibility that, even when Britain has
lost command of the seas, Australia should aspire to keep its shores sacred from an
enemy.’276 Indeed, as the Melbourne Argus told its readers ‘the patriotic Australian will
only be swayed by one consideration … what is the best thing for Australia … we all
say that Australia must be defended as adequately as our resources will allow.’277 The
Sydney Morning Herald defended Creswell’s proposal by recalling the success of the
Imperial Japanese Navy with torpedo-boat destroyers at the Battle of Tsushima: ‘We
should prepare in time of peace for a state of war by establishing for the defence of our
own ports a flotilla of torpedo boat-destroyers and torpedo boats. In no better way can
harbour defence be guaranteed and it is certainly more economical than the building of a
few battleships.’278

Nevertheless, on 25 August 1906, Sir George Clarke informed Deakin that the
Admiralty could not take into consideration the ‘broad strategic principles’ of Creswell
as the Admiralty ‘could not justify the great expense involved in the creation of an
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Australian navy on strategic grounds’. Nor could Creswell’s specific proposals be
considered. Clarke wrote that they would be ‘cut to shreds.’279 ‘Cut to shreds’ they
were by one Captain Charles Ottley the Director of British Naval Intelligence since
1905. Ottley wrote the Admiralty’s memorandum, dated 1 May 1906, and submitted it
to the CID, which was then largely included in Ottley’s writing of the final Report. In
the Admiralty memorandum Ottley vouched for the soundness of his own position
relying on his experiences twenty years before, as Torpedo Lieutenant of the flagship of
the then Commander-in-Chief, Australia Station, Rear-Admiral Sir George Tryon: ‘The
ships were inefficient because officers and men though zealous were untrained.’ Ottley
also referred to support for his position quoting a letter written by a Mr Kelly ‘one of
the ablest Australian MPs’ published in 1 March edition of Pall Mall in which Kelly
wrote, ‘that Australians who advocate it are either ignorant of the real merits of the
question, or (like Captain Creswell) must uphold the local navy because, should it be
abolished, they will thereby lose their means of livelihood.’280 WH Kelly, a future
Liberal (Fusion) Whip, opposed an Australian navy and had on 7 September 1905
moved a resolution in the House of Representatives ‘that all Australian naval
appropriation be spent on the imperial navy and that the Australian contribution to the
Royal Navy be doubled. This was a vain effort to head off the expected move to
establish an Australian flotilla.’281

In summarising, Ottley referred to the ‘sentimental desire’ of the local naval officers
and men for a navy; a desire Ottley rather contemptuously suggested was shared by the
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Irish in Australia and elements of the Labor Party! To Ottley, ‘Japan is a potential
menace in the distant future’282 – an opponent against whom, Ottley said, Australia had
no hope of winning given its population and military, naval and associated industrial
strength. Frankly, in Ottley’s view, Australia would be out of step with this desire for a
local navy: it would be wiser to adhere to the existing Naval Agreement and when
required seek the advice of the British Government. The matter, therefore, was settled:
Sir John Fisher minuted the Ottley memorandum on 8 May with ‘I think the DNI
expresses the view we should adopt.’283

Heavily criticised in the wording of the Report and manipulated during his visit to
England by the British Admiralty and Deakin, Creswell could have been chastened or
possibly sulked; but this was not the Creswell way. He had a clear, passionate vision of
the naval defence for Australia. He fought. Creswell brought together the Naval
Commandants of the Australian States (Captain Chapman Clare of South Australia,
Captain Frederick Tickell of Queensland, Commander FHC Brownlow from New South
Wales), as well as Commander William Colquhoun and Engineer Commander William
Clarkson from Victoria and, together, they issued a rebuttal to the Committee of
Imperial Defence Report on 12 September 1906 in a memorandum to the Defence
Minister. While the inclusion of the heads of the State commands may be taken for
granted, the addition of Colquhoun, who had trained in England with Tickell and was a
decorated Boer War veteran and Clarkson, the naval engineering expert, enhanced the
calibre of the report. They were indignant: it was ‘unfortunate that the Director’s 1905
annual report had not been submitted to the CID’; it was a ‘matter for regret that the
282
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Naval Director … was not asked to appear before the Committee’; but to say that an
attack on the Australian coast by four enemy cruisers was of ‘secondary importance’
really highlighted the difference for the Committee of Naval Officers between Imperial
responsibilities and the right of Australians to defend themselves.

In August 1906 Creswell had proposed three ocean cruisers, sixteen destroyers (River
Class, launched in 1904 and considered the first ‘true’ destroyers) and five 1st class
torpedo boats. In September, the Committee of Naval Officers adjusted Creswell’s 24vessel proposal, no doubt taking into account what Creswell had learnt from his
England visit, enlarging the size of the ocean cruisers from 800 to 1300 tons, adding
another ocean cruiser of 800 tons and reducing the torpedo boats from five to four. This
recommendation was predicated on the ‘defence of trade routes, principal and minor
ports; defence against landing parties; defence of cables and communications and their
rapid concentration and mutual support is easily attainable. What made this proposal
significant was that ‘these vessels should be fitted with Wireless apparatus to enable
them at all times to communicate with stations established on shore, and also with each
other. This will aid rapid concentration.’ The Committee of Naval Officers unanimously
declared that:
in view of Australia’s geographical situation and our distance from the Empire’s
base, and having regard to our conditions, general, strategic, and other, we are of
opinion that a naval force raised and trained in Australia, and provision for the
manufacture of all war material, are of first importance to our present security,
and vital to our future.284

This report served to rebuke the CID, while proposing a five year plan, a farsighted
strategic proposal by experienced naval officers who were competent in determining
284
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requirements for local conditions. These senior naval officers told the Defence Minister
that these measures would ‘afford the largest degree of self-dependence as an outlying
portion of the Empire.’

The Report was to be debated in parliament and Creswell informed Fabian Ware, the
editor of the London Morning Post, by letter on 26 September that he was pleased with
the support from the newspaper. It provided a ‘platform’ to address the British public,
and no doubt the British authorities, on the naval issue in Australia. Creswell told Ware
that he was also somewhat surprised by the support from Sir John Forrest adding ‘if
there is anything in this screed of use pray use it but in no way must my name appear or
be suggested this of course you will at once understand.” Creswell’s elation did not
temper his anger for a report that displayed ‘the lack of brain quality that is so plain
throughout the whole memorandum’, reserving anger against Captain Charles Ottley (a
Fisher protégé) the Report author:
A very angry little Naval Officer …replies in the Memorandum in a snappy
scolding irritated tone, a most improper one to make to us … This angry little
snap is solemnly endorsed and paraded – we are not … Fancy a person of the
rank and standing of a Junior Post Captain laying down the law … 285

Creswell angrily informed Ware, ‘Of course the fault is that a poor narrow little naval
man spoke or rather wrote and his views came out neat and unwatered by the wisdom of
the Elders of the Council.’286 Britain had been humouring Australia in Australia’s desire
for its own navy, though Britain would have preferred if Australia had no navy at all! If
anything, according to the CID Report, Australia should stick by the 1903 Agreement!
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It was yet another opportunity, to misquote Edmund Barton’s summation of the 1902
Imperial Conference, for Britain to take the pith out of Australians!

Successive Commonwealth governments had contributed to emasculating the local
naval forces. As at 1 March 1901 the Commonwealth Naval Forces (CNF) consisted of
240 permanent personnel and 1,348 naval militia at a total estimated cost of £70,837.
By 30 June 1905 the actual strength was 171 permanent personnel and 870 naval militia
at a total estimated cost for the financial year 1905-06 of £47,609.287 It had changed
little by 30 June 1906: 171 permanent personnel, 907 naval militia and a total estimated
cost of £53,376 for the 1906-07 financial year.288 It could be argued that the estimates
followed a depleting navy. The simple, plain fact was Deakin to date had neglected the
existing naval forces: little was done to encourage a local navy by way of manpower,
ships, or the ‘yeast’ to its development, money.

Deakin now tried to regain the high ground in considering a coastal defence capacity for
an Australian naval unit. What if Australia could help the Imperial Fleet by protecting
the continent’s coast and harbours so that not only Australian, but also British shipping,
would be afforded some protection? Deakin referred to the Committee of Naval Officers
recommendations, when speaking on the Naval Estimates in the House of
Representatives on 26 September, though emphasising that the ‘whole security of
Australia’ depended on the ‘supremacy of the British navy’:

By providing safe harbours of retirement, and protection for our commerce in
the immediate neighbour of our coast, we shall do something towards the
discharge of our general obligation. We shall be doing something but not all. As
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I have stated already, the British navy on the high seas extends to us a protective
power, which no effort of ours could hope to rival. It is of inestimable value to
the people and to the future of this country. Under its shelter we have grown, are
growing, and, I trust, will continue to grow, loyal and self-dependent, never
forgetting to recognise our responsibility, or, so far as our means permit, to
discharge it both to Australia and to the Flag.289

In content his speech differed little from three years ago. Deakin’s words appeared to
advocate a greater British naval presence in Australia continuing along the lines of the
1903 Naval Agreement. This was the stance Ottley and Sir George Clarke wanted and it
was one with which Deakin, with an Imperial Federationist intonation, seemed to be
aligning himself. Supported in government by a Labor opposition, which advocated the
establishment of an Australian crewed and owned navy, Deakin’s words and actions
appear baffling. In the Australian parliament, he would seem to have the means, motive,
and the opportunity to affect change but did not do so. Deakin’s hesitant approach was
remarkably deferential to the British, not wanting to offend and increasingly preferring
British naval expertise rather than his local advisors. Deakin’s approach was
chameleon-like. On 6 October 1906 Deakin writing in the London Morning Post,
appeared to support Creswell:

the Committee unsparingly condemned the particular proposals submitted by
Captain Creswell to his Minister on the ground that they would cost far more
than they were worth, and that if ever protection by ships of the kind he outlined
became necessary ‘it would devolve upon the Admiralty to provide them as part
of their general responsibility for the strategical contribution of the naval forces
of the Empire.290

Eight months before Deakin had written that ‘our naval officers lacked personal
acquaintance with recent advances in naval defence.’ Now ‘Correspondent’ Deakin
sounded almost Creswellian when he wrote that:
289
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Australian sentiment will not be appeased by contributions of men and money to
a [British] fleet which is presently to start for Singapore, may remain some time
at Calcutta, and then sail towards South America, without any Australian
representative having even a title to be heard by its commanders as to its route.
The Naval Commander-in-Chief on this station owes no allegiance to any of our
Governments, is not an Australian, has practically no Australian officers or men,
and no Australian knowledge or sympathy. His duties keep him in touch even
with us. The Defence of the Empire, of course, includes that of Australia. We
pay 200,000 pounds annually towards it while Canada pays nothing. Yet we get
far less naval protection than the Dominion.291

The debate continued when Captain Ottley followed up his Admiralty Memorandum
and CID Report with a Minute on Australian Defence Policy, having received a copy of
the Committee of Naval Officers report. He appeared to have had some sympathy for
the local naval officers to be asked to make recommendations on the report by CID on a
General Scheme of Defence for Australia: it would be tantamount, according to Ottley,
to the ‘cutting their own throats’:

For a body of officers of the local Australian Navy to have recommended the
abolition of the force from which they draw their livelihood, would have argued
almost superhuman altruism on their part. So far as I can ascertain, the
Australian Government has never held out any hope to these officers that (if the
local Australian Navy is abolished) they will receive any sort of retiring
allowance, pension or any pecuniary acknowledgement whatever of the fact that
their occupation would thereby be gone. Surely, therefore, the inference is clear
that when the Australian Government called upon the Commandant of the local
Australian Navy to report upon the CID’s recommendation that the Navy should
cease to exist, it was putting to Captain Creswell an unfair dilemma.292

It is intriguing that Ottley acknowledged but failed to comprehend that the local officers
wanted an Australian owned and crewed navy under ‘One Flag, One Fleet’. The British
Admiralty appeared to have difficulty looking beyond the man and his proposal. The
British commitment in the Pacific in 1906 would not sustain the maritime defence of
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Australia. Being dependent on Britain for the defence of Australia without cost,
according to the Commonwealth parliamentarian Bruce Smith, was a ‘cheap immunity
from aggression.’293

Britain’s naval strategy of concentration in European waters and depletion of outlying
naval stations - coupled with a foreign policy that included an alliance with Japan - left
Australians feeling isolated, vulnerable and insecure. The British Colonial Office was
concerned about Australia’s ‘White Australia’ Policy, but it remained uncomfortably
reticent to do anything about it. H.B. Cox, the Colonial Office’s Legal Assistant UnderSecretary, advised Elgin in May 1906 that any attempt to amend Australia’s
immigration laws ‘would be impossible if we wish to keep Australia in the Empire.’294
To do so, Cox later wrote, would bring direct opposition from Australia and sympathy
from Canada and South Africa for the antipodean nations. Britain did not question a
‘White Australia’ Policy per se: ‘All we ask,’ wrote Cox in a minute to Elgin in June
1906, ‘is that the methods adopted shall be such as not to injure the feelings of civilised
Asiatic races such as the Japanese, and such as not to involve us in diplomatic
difficulties.’295

Deakin went to the election in December 1906, The Call ‘expressed strong
disappointment that in spite of having indicated sympathy with the aims of the
Australian Defence League, Deakin campaigned ‘ with absolutely nothing in the way of
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a sane defence policy”.’296 Yet, even with the smallest political group of the three
‘elevens’ in Parliament (fifteen members in the House and five in the Senate), Deakin
would again be prime minister with Labor support. What is it that would change
Deakin’s January 1906 declaration to Sir George Clarke that the British Fleet must
remain Australia’s first line of defence and its only efficient defence against serious
attack or invasion – in effect, disavowing an Australian navy? To be in power, Deakin
needed the support of Labor and to achieve this he needed to accommodate Labor’s
platform in legislative undertakings and policies including an Australian navy.
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Chapter IV

1907-1908 Australia’s Search for Security: A False Dawn but a Rising Sun

The provision of a naval defence for Australia still remained unaddressed at the start of
1907. Politically, Prime Minister Deakin continued his bold speeches at home while
showing deference to Britain abroad in two ways. Firstly, Deakin continued to engage
the British government to encourage their consent to an Australian navy, hoping that
Admiralty expertise in design and construction and the training of Australians as
officers to command the vessels and sailors to crew them would follow. He hoped the
current naval agreement could be adjusted or dispensed with altogether. The second
way was related to the first: warship technology was evolving rapidly and, Deakin
believed, the expertise required to advise the government on the type of ships to be
purchased did not reside in Australia. Deakin seemed to be drawing the conclusion there
was one, who he had not wanted to send to London in 1906 to advise the CID on the
formation of an Australian navy, the same one who was criticised by the CID for his
naval schemes and plans and thus the one whose plans seemed to be out of alignment
with the Admiralty’s vision for an Empire-wide navy and therefore out of place for
Australia. Creswell had been deliberately disregarded by the Admiralty in 1906 and by
the end of 1907 he was also ignored by Deakin.

Captain Creswell was undaunted in his campaign to establish a national naval defence.
In his Report by the Director of the Naval Forces on the Naval Defence of the
Commonwealth of Australia for 1906 issued from the Department of Defence,
Melbourne on 1 January 1907, Creswell lectured parliamentarians, and particularly the
148

Deakin government, that ‘Defence was the main incentive to Federation. On its
achievement, the Land forces were organised as one Federal Force … On the other
hand, the responsibility for all sea defence beyond the range of fortress artillery was
relinquished.’ Yet again, the Director of Naval Forces reminded his readers that ‘under
such an arrangement, the Commonwealth has no power of action afloat, and is
incapable of effort to resist attack in the only way in which it can be met with advantage
– on the seas surrounding our coasts.’ Creswell stated:

It leaves the country without any means whatever of affording a measure of
protection to interests at once the most valuable and vital to our daily business –
a floating trade worth £ 170,000,000 per annum. To restrict our sea defences to
the protection of ports by fortress artillery would be no defence of trade … that
their defence should be a recognised Commonwealth responsibility is the direct
fulfilment of the main impelling causes of Australian Federation.
He acknowledged unequivocally that ‘Imperial Naval strategy is designed to achieve
commanding advantage for the Empire in war – a victorious issue with the least sum of
loss to the nation.’297 However, Creswell was equally unequivocal in affirming that
Australia, a sovereign nation, had constitutionally provided for a national navy.

The Report was a very emphatic statement by Creswell displaying a certain courage and
tenacity to confront the government and that his condemnation of the 1906 Committee
of Imperial Defence report had not abated. In campaigning for an Australian naval
defence, Creswell’s parliamentary report provided an early indication that he was
considering more than the protection of ports and the coast: he was an early advocate of
the ‘Fleet Unit’ concept than Jacky Fisher, who would later define the nomenclature and
its composition. ‘The Imperial Fleet can give much, but not complete protection, to do
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so would weaken its strategy and effectiveness’ Creswell questioned, ‘Why should not
Australia add that which the Fleet cannot give? The interests threatened are of vital
concern to our daily life and business’. He was unequivocal ‘They affect us
immediately, and cannot be left open to attack. The solution is therefore an Australian
Force supplied by Australia for specially Australian duty, and to act in intimate cooperation with the Imperial Fleet.

Creswell included in the report’s appendix an extract from the parliamentary debates of
26 September 1906 in which Deakin had cautiously alluded to the building of ships if
the Government was not limited by finance and other demands. Deakin had said he
would follow the advice of the Committee of Naval Officers and order four torpedo
boats and in three years order eight coastal destroyers of the Teviot Class. This enabled
Creswell to report to Parliament that, ‘a clearer definition of Commonwealth Naval
Defence responsibility has now been arrived at, and announced by the Government but
the means are still lacking to carry it out’.298 It was to be a false dawn in the formation
of an Australian Navy when Deakin failed to act on the Committee’s recommendation.
Creswell was realistic: still prepared to be disillusioned by the promises of
governments, fearless in his advocacy, repeating the arguments year in and year out;
laying before each of the ‘elevens’ in their turn the proposal for national naval defence.

Creswell reinforced his condemnation of the Commonwealth governments lack of
effort by noting the position of Japan:

Only thirty odd years ago Japan, with no knowledge of Western service or
methods, no knowledge of modern manufactures, or of modern iron and
298
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steelworks, of shipbuilding, or of making guns, ammunitions or any modern
materiel, began her defence policy – poorly equipped indeed – but selfdependence was at the base of her schemes, and a few months ago Japan fought
and won the greatest sea battle since Trafalgar, and a few weeks ago she
launched the world’s greatest battleship.

The stark fact was thirty years ago Japan was behind Australia; as at 1 January 1907,
‘Australia is in the same condition as in 1870.’

Creswell’s 1906 Report was not simply a recitation of government inaction and false
promises. He proposed that the scheme recommended by the Committee of Naval
Officers be progressed by sending two CNF officers to England: Commander William
Jarvie Colquhoun, and Engineer-Commander William Clarkson. Creswell intended for
Colquhoun to be attached to a torpedo boat flotilla to gain experience in ‘methods of
service, drills exercises, manoeuvres, the sea qualities of various types and designs,
working with nucleus crews complement’299 to fully comprehend the capability of the
vessels. Clarkson would inspect shipbuilding yards, boilers, engines, and observe the
trials of torpedo boat destroyers ‘for the British and any other Navy.’ Clarkson
responsible to the Commonwealth government, to examine and pass the detailed plans
and specifications for the vessels for tendering. Clarkson would superintend their
construction, be at their sea trials and, then, put all this knowledge to the advantage of
construction in Australia. To successfully undertake this construction task in Australia,
Creswell called for specially skilled supervisors – whether by Australians sent to be
trained in Britain or skilled Britons sent to Australia or a combination of both.

Creswell reiterated this proposal in a memorandum to Defence Minister Ewing on 1
March 1907, recommending Clarkson and Colquhoun be sent to England as special
299
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commissioners for the assignments outlined in his report to parliament. Colquhoun
would be the executive officer, while Clarkson would investigate the latest naval
architecture and engineering developments. The minister accepted the recommendations
and repeated them in his instructions to the two officers on 20 March. Their commission
not only included visiting England but also visiting Japan to study the Imperial Japanese
Navy’s methods of construction, administration and training as well as inspections of
naval activities in Canada and the United States. Their commission was to have a
significant impact on naval and military defence for Australia.

The pair arrived in Japan on 26 April, met the hero of Tsushima, the Chief of Naval
Staff, Admiral Togo, and were warmly invited to visit naval shipbuilding and
dockyards.300 Clarkson and Colquhoun inspected the naval and engineering colleges,
battleships, cruisers and Japanese designed torpedo boat destroyers, workshops that
manufactured torpedoes and guns, steelworks and the rolling and shaping of armoured
plate; in all, a national fully integrated naval engineering infrastructure. They observed a
growing shipbuilding and maritime power in Japan – a power which had harnessed the
technology from Britain – but was strategically dependent on foreign oil supplies, raw
materials and food, for which Manchuria and Korea were nearby sources. Clarkson and
Colquhoun left Japan on 20 May for Britain. In Britain Professor JH Biles, the
eminently qualified warship designer, was engaged as a consultant, and the pair toured
shipyards and constructors. Clarkson and Colquhoun returned to Melbourne in March
1908. Clarkson was to be despatched overseas within months to progress the
establishment of a small arms factory in Australia, while Colquhoun took up the
300
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appointment, which had awaited his return, as Commandant of the Commonwealth
Naval Forces in Queensland. Tragically, Colquhoun was to die aboard the gunboat
Gayundah in August 1908.

A new opportunity to advance the campaign for a local naval defence arose when
Britain summoned the self-governing colonies to a Colonial Conference in London in
April-May 1907. A preliminary agenda was issued in January, to which the Deakin
government added its own items on preferential trade, mercantile commerce and
emigration. There was also a resolution for an imperial council with a permanent
secretariat in continuous operation executing the resolutions of conferences. Deakin also
proposed that the colonies/dominions have representation on the Imperial Council of
Defence and that the naval agreement of 1902 re-considered. There was no specific call
for a local navy.301 As Deakin made clear through the Morning Post ‘the unity [of the
navy] ought to accompany that of the Empire and could only be completely achieved
when we have established a unity of Imperial political control.’302

Creswell’s Report on the Naval Defence for 1906 to parliament in January 1907 was
written with the Colonial Conference of 1907 in mind. It was a reminder of promises
not kept and the opportunity a colonial conference would offer to promote the cause of a
local navy. The Commander-in-Chief, Australia Station, Vice-Admiral Sir Wilmot
Fawkes, would have none of this. Fawkes told Deakin on 18 February, that the
supremacy of the Empire depended on the Royal Navy’s battle fleets. Concentrate the
battle fleets and the enemy was obliged to do the same. In Fawkes Eurocentric view ‘the
301
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nearer our cruisers are to the enemy’s cruisers’ by the concentration of forces would
prevent any enemy getting through the Suez Canal or around Cape of Good Hope.
Besides, the Eastern Fleet - with its China, Australian and East Indies Squadrons in
sufficient strength - could easily deal with an enemy in Australian waters. Creswell
advocated the establishment of an Australian navy to complement this ‘Blue Water’
naval strategy, freeing the Royal Navy from protecting the coasts. Fawkes totally
opposed this: The Admiralty ‘is entrusted the maritime supremacy of the Empire – to
apportion the ships in peace so that they may be in the best position possible at the
commencement of a war.’ Fawkes now proposed that the contribution under the Naval
Agreement cease and that this payment instead be made for British-provided small
vessels with Australians and New Zealanders serving in the British Fleet. In a flagrant
attempt to cajole Deakin into not proceeding with the Naval Officers’ Scheme, Fawkes
wrote:
… if the Commonwealth Government, in building destroyers and torpedo boats,
prevent, however unwittingly, the Admiralty from filling up the ships, they
should release them from an obligation if their action prevents them from
carrying it out.303
Creswell responded dismissing the Admiral’s views believing that at their core Fawkes
was seeking total control of naval forces in Australia.304

Creswell met Fawkes’ challenge with his 6 March 1907 briefing paper, Considerations
Affecting the Naval Defence of the Commonwealth, given to Deakin on the Prime
Minister’s departure for the Colonial Conference. It needed to be a strong and emphatic
statement, as Creswell would not be accompanying Deakin to London, detailing the
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current status of national security, future conditions and dangers (including the tilting of
the balance of British supremacy of the seas), the aspirations of Germany and Japan,
and the need for self-sufficiency in naval defence. It displayed the depths and benefits
of Creswell’s thinking and observations of world and regional affairs over the past
twenty years. Paramount in this defence briefing was the vital importance of protecting
coastal trade routes: a tenet in Creswell’s argument since his 1901 Report. In the past,
Australia was protected by ‘distance from sources of attack’; but the world was
changing and there were a number of assertions Creswell invited the Prime Minister to
consider. Creswell informed the Prime Minister that the supremacy of the British Navy
could not be assumed given the growth of foreign navies (particularly those of Japan,
Germany, the United States, Russia, France and Italy). In the Pacific, while the United
States was not a danger to Britain, ‘it is not inconceivable that Japan might be.’ Britain
had secured its position in Europe and - with a string of coaling stations, forts, naval
facilities and geo-political arrangements along the route to Australia - it could prevent,
contain or engage an enemy, protecting Australia from attack by a European power –
but, not if the attack came from a power based in Asia. The response time was too great
to protect possessions or dominions in the Southern Hemisphere. In 1897 Creswell had
recognised that ‘the rise of Japan as a naval power and her well-known aspirations …
may have in the future an effect which will be undesirable to Australasia.’ 305 It now
crystallised as a possible threat and became part of Creswell’s argument for a naval
defence for Australia. Germany based in China (with commercial interests and a
significant naval squadron) had possessions that stretched across the western Pacific to
New Guinea and no Monroe Doctrine, Creswell told Deakin, would protect Australia as
it did the Western Hemisphere. For Germany, the land, the climate and the commerce of
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Australia was tempting, while ‘Japan’s need of an outlet is as great as Germany’s –
perhaps greater.’ Creswell emphatically called for an immediate naval policy of selfsufficiency: a coastal defence force with vessels built locally and crews trained locally.
This force, with initial help from Britain, would be built up sufficient to prevent the
landing or restrict the operations of an invader. As Creswell had written in his opening
remarks to Deakin, ‘with Australia, immunity from attack is in direct proportion to the
strength and efficiency of Naval Defence.’306

Prime Minister Deakin arrived in London for the Conference on 8 April without his
naval advisor. He stayed in England for six weeks, where he would argue the case for
imperial trade protection and for dominion representation in the councils of the Empire.
As head of the Australian government, Deakin wanted to deal on equal terms with the
British prime minister and not through the Colonial Office. He therefore proposed an
Imperial council comprised of colonial prime ministers to discuss common interests in
imperial matters, while ‘a small, highly qualified and extra-departmental secretariat’307
would prepare papers for the Council and execute its decisions. Deakin also wanted
colonial representation on the Committee of Imperial Defence and a review of the 1903
Naval Agreement.

In and outside the Conference Deakin engaged in negotiations to procure a navy, but it
was part of a much greater tilt at achieving imperial federation. The proposals were out
of context in 1907. ‘Imperial Federation’ had run its course in Britain and, in January
1906, the country had elected a Liberal Government under Henry Campbell-
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Bannerman, which was free trade rather than protectionist in economic outlook. As a
government, the Liberals were starting to demur on the use of the title ‘empire’.
Campbell-Bannerman would refer to the British Empire as the ‘British Commonwealth’
or the ‘Commonwealth of free nations.’ In opening the Colonial Conference, the British
Prime Minister, alluded to ‘commonwealth’ rather than ‘imperial federation’ in stating:

We found ourselves upon freedom – freedom and independence. That is the
essence of the British Imperial connection; freedom of action on the part of the
individual state, and freedom in their relations with each other, and with the
Mother Country.

Accepting the remark at face value, how would the British government react to selfgoverning colonies engaging in diplomacy or having the temerity to establish their own
navy? Within a year Campbell-Bannerman was dead, replaced by Asquith, who, at the
imperial conference of 1911, accepted dominions as masters in their own house but
‘with loyalty to a common head, co-operation, spontaneous and unforced ...’308
Whatever opportunity there was in 1907, Deakin did not avail himself of it.

Deakin misjudged the sentiment of the British Government with his proposals for
imperial trade preference and an imperial council. Implacably opposed were Lord Elgin,
Under Secretary of the Colonies, and his spokesman in the House of Commons,
Winston Churchill. Churchill told Leo Amery that in regard to the Colonial Conference,
‘the colonial Prime Ministers should be given a good time and sent away well
banqueted, but empty handed’.309 ‘Affable Alfred’, was known by some members of the
308
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British Government as a ‘windbag’. The Colonies Secretary, Lord Elgin, told
Australia’s Governor-General that Deakin’s ‘extraordinary eloquence sometimes led to
points being obscured in exuberance.’ Elgin preferred conciseness and sometimes
would delay a reply to lengthy correspondence: ‘Deakin was his favourite victim for
this treatment. Correspondence which had become futile by being too long drawn out
must be allowed to cool.’ Elgin’s cabinet colleague, the Secretary of State for India,
found that ‘our robust young Colonials are apt to be frightful bores … and to hear
Deakin yarn away by the hour, I believe you would be heartily glad to see their backs
…’310 Given his prolific correspondence with influential Britons – politicians, exgovernors-general and journalists – one would have thought Deakin would be more
astute. Freudenberg has argued that Deakin’s, ‘political misjudgement was the more
surprising in that this archetypal Australian liberal … was so adroit and sensitive a
politician at home, the master manipulator of the game.’311 Deakin was working within
an unfriendly, if not hostile, environment in Britain. Assailed on many fronts for his
stance on imperial preference, imperial federation and removal of dominions from
Colonial Office oversight, Deakin’s resulting physical and mental exhaustion can be
understood. What is difficult to understand is his inability to discern and assess the
mood and requirements of the British government and Conference participants and to
adapt accordingly.

The Admiralty’s position on Deakin’s navy proposals was also negative. There was
concern over the finance, discipline and international status of the proposed navy, and,
more particularly, control of Deakin’s naval force. This would be the subject of
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considerable in-house correspondence by the Admiralty’s Directors of Naval
Intelligence and as early as 29 April 1907, the First Sea Lord was minuting:
I agree with DNI in the absolute impossibility of agreeing to Mr Deakin’s
proposals. The simple thing is to tell Mr Deakin there is no objection to abrogate
the present agreement and that Australia will have our best advice in arranging
for any colonial naval force they like to adopt.312

It would be August 1908, sixteen months later before Britain formally replied to
Deakin’s proposals. On the fifth day of the Conference, 23 April, Lord Tweedmouth,
First Lord of the Admiralty, addressed the dominion representatives with the usual
imperious pith: ‘You should put your trust in us now.’ Britain had:
the charge of the strategic questions … involved in Naval defence, to hold
command of the naval forces of the country, and to arrange the distribution of
ships in the best possible manner to resist attacks and to defend the Empire at
large, whether it be our own islands or the dominions beyond the seas

He understood the desire of Australia and South Africa to have a navy of their own but,
perhaps, the ‘smaller craft’? ‘Small flotillas…will be admirable means of coastal
defence’, for ‘You will be able by the use of them to avoid practically all danger from
any sudden raid which might be made by a cruising squadron.’ Having a supply of coal,
coaling facilities and naval stores and docking facilities locally would also be helpful to
the Imperial Fleet. The most important weapon Australia could acquire for a local navy,
in Tweedmouth’s view, were submarines. He advised Deakin that even the French
‘think that the submarine is really the weapon of the future’313 Sir George Clarke did
not. He cautioned Deakin in mid-May that ‘I earnestly hope you will not work at
submarines, and that for the present nothing but destroyers capable of going out to sea
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will be thought of.’314 It had been barely twelve months since Clarke and the CID had
rejected Creswell’s destroyer scheme.

The Lords of the Admiralty pursued Deakin engaging in amicable co-operative
discussions. Tweedmouth told Deakin: “We are quite ready to agree to your proposal
that the subsidy should be dropped and to do what we can to help you towards the
establishment of a local defence force.”

Where there may be difficulty with the

Imperial government was over dual control of the navy. The Admiralty would
reluctantly concede a coastal defence force but not compromise on ‘One Flag, One
Fleet’. In essence, Tweedmouth told Deakin, ‘You or we must take the whole
responsibility of control.’ The Tweedmouth offer proposed an operations and command
arrangement, which Australia eventually accepted four years later:

I do not see why you should not run the whole show during peace time
providing for any sudden attack or raid but when the time of actual war arrives
and it is necessary to send out a war fleet then I think so long a that fleet is in
Australian waters your local navy should be under the Imperial commanders in
chief at his disposal for any operation in Australian waters.315
The journalist Leo Amery would later reflect on the dominion’s response to form
local navies:

Lord Tweedmouth for the Admiralty accepted the principle of Dominion
navies, though still only as a second best and subject to a general Admiralty
control. But there was very little practical response so far as the Dominion
governments were concerned.316

Deakin did not grasp this great opportunity: it could have been the defining moment for
Australian naval development.
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During the conference, First Sea Lord, Jacky Fisher invited Deakin to ‘please walk
straight into my room on Monday & don’t be kept waiting as they guard me like
Buddha! I will wait till 8pm.’317 Later, Deakin thought his meetings with Jacky Fisher at
the Admiralty went well, but the Admiralty had only ‘gracefully yielded to the
argument for an Australian force so that they might persuade the layman Deakin to
provide marginal frills to the Royal Navy’s squadron, in place of the self contained
coastal force which they regarded as an Australian aberration to be discouraged.’ 318 For
Deakin, any vessel for local defence would be regarded as Imperial – in Australian
waters or part of a British Squadron. It would be little more than that provided in the
Australasian Defence Act of 1865 or the Naval subsidy agreements. It would not matter:
the Committee of Imperial Defence ‘refused in the name of purity of strategic doctrine
to countenance anything substantial in the way of local or localised naval forces.’319

In Australia, meanwhile, advocates of a local navy were ready to respond to
Tweedmouth’s challenge to Deakin. Charles Adam Jeffries writing in Lone Hand
advocated that ‘it was not only wise but indispensable’ that Australia take responsibility
for naval defence because of concern over invasion from the north, ‘in the empty and at
present defenceless north’, which could be populated by the invader’s people. Jeffries
left little doubt about whom he was writing. He did not see an Australian army being
able to oppose the invader ‘but if it were backed by an Australian fleet which could hold
the sea and cut off the invaders’ communications and supplies, the invading force could
be isolated and ground to powder.’320 Jeffries’ faith in the capability of an Australian
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naval force of such a strength and type to defeat, contain or turn away a navy that had
once destroyed the Russian Baltic Fleet while admirable was simplistic and unlikely.
His case for how and why an Australian navy could be built was sound; all that seemed
to remain was the question of when this might occur. Echoing the calls of Creswell,
Jeffries wrote that the navy needed to be built in Australia by Australian engineers and
workers with Australian materials (iron ore, copper and hardwood) for in time of war
there would not be the reliance on supply or repair overseas. By local construction of
warships, resources would be developed, steel mills established and thousands of trades
and labouring positions created. Jeffries concluded that:

Each separate sea-washed portion of the scattered empire must be a selfcontained military and naval entity, with its own fleet, its own coast defence, its
own army supplied by its own factories …in Australia public opinion is now
practically unanimous that there shall be both an army and a navy.321

This support could also be found with the Labor Opposition keen not only for an
Australian navy, but also one that was self-sufficient with the ships built locally. In
early 1907 the caucus was being petitioned to support the local ‘construction of torpedo
boats’322

To Creswell having an Australian navy would not be merely ‘political expediency over
the demands of theoretical strategy …’ or ‘… the substitution of the principle of
Imperial Alliance for the principle of Colonial dependence’. Writing to Richard Jebb,
Creswell defined the task for all those who desired a local naval defence:

Speaking for Australia only, that the change is against the stated strategy, this is
the very thing I distinctly deny. It is on the purely Naval side of the question
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that I have been interested, and have worked simply because impelled by the
immense strategical advantage gained by the Empire and with it Australian
defence. All effort is individual effort first. To make it co-operative effort - the
bundle of sticks in place of the individual twigs - is the work of the legislator,
the administrator, and, in Naval work, “the function of the Admiralty”.323
Creswell revealed to Jebb that ‘Poor Deakin, is, I fear, very unwell, and is giving his
friends cause for serious anxiety.’ Deakin departed Britain on 20 May 1907, returning to
Australia physically and mentally unwell. Murdoch described it as ‘this shattering
experience …What sustained him was the belief that his country needed him.’324 The
representation of his Protectionists in Parliament would not support this conviction,
though he would not be the last prime minister to cling to a belief of remaining in office
so long as the party and the country needed him. For two months after his return he
suffered acute giddiness. The degeneration in memory and concentration, which had
commenced in 1905, increased.

Creswell was devastated that the efforts to establish a naval defence should falter
because Deakin was ill :
After his brilliant success in England it is hard luck indeed. Of course the Naval
business suffers very considerable delay and that is trying to one’s patience, but
after getting the stone so near the top to have it rolling down again. … Deakin’s
illness is a first class national disaster. I fear unless he has immediate and long
rest that the consequences will be serious. He looks a worn and harassed
wreck.325

Officially the shattered Deakin took a break for two months. He was convinced that
submarines should be part of the Australian navy. Creswell could not believe it and
opposed the Admiralty proposals for nine submarines and six First Class torpedo boats
to be built. Creswell had told Defence Minister Ewing in a memorandum on 2
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September 1907 that he was ‘against the adoption of the submersibles,’326- supporting
his assertion with facts and figures – from their limited range, their weakness under a
diversity of sea conditions to limitations at night, this was not a vessel, at its present
stage of development, for an Australian navy.

Deakin was worn out by his efforts to move the relationship between Britain and the
dominions and colonies to a more mature level, to the partnership envisaged by imperial
federation. Amery, felt that Deakin ‘was an ardent Australian nationalist, prepared to
state at its highest Australia’s claim to independence and to national equality with
Britain.’:

But he was no less whole heartedly an Imperialist for whom the two ideals of
nation and Empire were complementary and mutually indispensable, and who
regarded himself as completely and of right a citizen of the Empire as of
Australia or of his native Victoria.327

In the end from the Colonies Secretary came the offer of a dominions section within the
Colonial Office in answer to Deakin’s call for greater union with Britain. The Canadian
Prime Minister, Sir Wilfred Laurier, experienced in the machinations of colonial
conferences, having attended the 1897, 1902 and 1907 Conferences, was not one to be
manipulated by either Britain or Australia on an imperial council, preferring autonomy
over unity within the British Empire. In later years he reflected upon the performances
of his antipodean counter-parts at these colonial conferences. ‘The Australians for the
most part were a disappointment, distinctly inferior to the Afrikaners (Louis Botha and
Jan Smuts). Perhaps it was their remoteness, perhaps their racial unity, that gave them a
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parochial insularity, a lack of perspective in world affairs.’ Laurier found that ‘Deakin
was a very likeable man, of brilliant endowments, a splendid orator, with much fire and
force. He was open minded to new ideas; perhaps too much so, as he seemed unable to
hold any steady course.’328

In August Deakin wrote to Sir John Fisher, following up on their discussions in London.
For Deakin ‘the best defence of this country can be secured by a joint Eastern Squadron
of powerful ships operating wherever necessary.’329 He noted that both had agreed that
such a squadron would come from combining the China Station, Australia Station and
the Indian Squadron. The Naval Agreement would be cancelled with a local navy left
for the defence of harbours and ports. “You strongly urge submarines at each principal
port’ Deakin reminded the Sea Lord. Deakin concluded by affirming the ‘One Flag, One
Fleet’ concept, but emphasised what was a constant feature of Creswell’s proposals:
‘We want the most effective ships and efficient men here with ample prospects of
advancement to the latter [British Navy] when they merit it.’ He then added what might
be described as the ‘Creswell corollary’ which acknowledged loyalty to the Empire of a
maritime dominion with its own navy: ‘We also want a flexible relation as intimate as
possible between our Government and the Admiralty, which shall encourage the
development of our local defence to the fullest extent and in such a form as to
supplement to the best advantage the Imperial Navy in our hemisphere.’330 The First
Sea Lord may have been thinking about this Deakin correspondence when he wrote to
Lord Tweedmouth on 1 October 1907 that “the Colonies one and all grab all they
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possibly can out of us and give us nothing back. They are all alike!”331 By 7 November,
the Director of Naval Intelligence was minuting agreement: ‘It seems as if Mr Deakin
wants to get all that he now has without paying the Imperial Government any thing for
it, with the right of control thrown in.’332

By the end of 1907 Deakin was prepared, finally, to put before parliament his national
defence policy. What was clear was the Prime Minister was no longer listening to
Creswell. As the historian Meaney has put it ‘Deakin and Ewing had gone over
Creswell’s head in proposing the naval section of the 13 December policy speech, and
they had, without informing their Director of Naval Forces, accepted Admiralty advice
on a flotilla of submarines and torpedo boats.’333 Deakin and Ewing had also ignored
the Military Board and worked with a junior officer, Major J.G. Legge, who reported to
the Defence Minister and generally aligned with the government’s views, in proposing
the Swiss system of military training.334 Colonel Bridges, Chief of Intelligence, had
investigated the Swiss model, finding it unsuitable for Australia.

Deakin commenced his defence policy speech, as he said to the House of
Representatives, ‘to a small attendance in this last hour of our last session this year.
We now propose a new organisation for the defence of Australia … … to initiate
a departure, contemplated at the inception of Federation … to lay the foundation
of our defence upon a basis as wide as the Commonwealth, without distinction
of the States.335
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Deakin’s declaration failed to credit proposals of Colonial naval officers prior to
Federation to lay the foundation of a navy: firstly, in 1897 when SA Premier Kingston
sponsored Creswell’s proposal to the Colonial Conference of ceasing the naval subsidy
to fund 5000 Australians trained for the Royal Naval Reserve in Australian waters; and
secondly, in 1899 when the Committee of Naval Officers sought a local share of sea
defence. Creswell’s 1901 Best Methods Report reinforced the latter: ‘our future must be
that of a maritime state.’336 These proposals contemplated a national approach, but the
only result after six years had been the Reid-MacLean government’s 1905
implementation of the Watson government’s agenda of a Council of Defence, a Navy
Board and the office of Director of Naval Forces.

Little was new in the Deakin defence policy statement: it was reminiscent of Creswell’s
Best Methods Report of September 1901 and little more than a recitation of Creswell’s
January 1907 report to Parliament. Deakin acknowledged a shared sentiment with those
who had been fighting for a local navy: ‘we require a maximum of navalism’, for the
navy is the guarantor of freedom for the Empire, ‘its first line of defence.’ Yet, when
Deakin claimed a new organisation and a new approach, it was a combination of
Creswell’s past propositions and Deakin’s own imperialist federation affinity for closer
union with the British Navy through involvement of the Commander-in-Chief Australia
Station. For six years there had been a failure to associate national defence (including a
national navy) with national identity and status. Now, Deakin grasped at last the
significance of the navy: ‘we owe to naval power and the British flag our freedom in
and ownership of our political liberties and social standards.’337 The navy protected
national integrity and, for most Australians at this time, the essence of national integrity
336
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was the ‘White Australia’ policy; hence this could only be maintained because of the
‘White ensign’. As Deakin declared, ‘Withdraw that, and peril would be instant.’338
Deakin thus recognised what Billy Hughes and Chris Watson had appreciated more than
four years ago: to preserve the Australian way of life, underpinned by the ‘White
Australia’ policy, Australia had to protect its shores. 339 Deakin shared with the House
the sine qua non of British imperial security policy ‘that the control of naval defence
and foreign affairs must always go together,’ which ‘implies for the present, seeing that
we have no voice in foreign affairs, we are not obliged to take any part in Imperial naval
defence.’ The imperial federationist in Deakin still clung to the hope of a seat at an
imperial council and equal participation by the dominions with Britain in imperial
affairs for ‘it implies, also, with equal clearness, that when we do take a part in naval
defence, we shall be entitled to a share in the direction of foreign affairs.’

Deakin’s position seemed isolated – and baffling given his acceptance in September of
1906 of the Creswell/Navy Officers proposals - when he rejected a local navy as ‘a little
land-locked navy … of a small flotilla cut off by itself, its officers and men removed
from the possibilities of promotion or advancement, except by the slow and often
unsatisfactory process of seniority, and with few opportunities for them to keep abreast
of the rapid advances made in their branches of the service.’340

To the Bulletin,

Deakin’s ‘naval defence scheme is timorous and unsatisfactory. The scheme bears
strong internal evidence of being dictated, not by Australian interests, but by foreign
considerations.’341
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It is somewhat perplexing that Walter Murdoch, sympathetic Deakin historian and
family confidante, would write that Deakin:
…never allowed Parliament to lose sight of their duty, though it was not till the
end of 1907 that he was able to introduce – in a great and historic speech – a
complete national scheme. His defence policy was one of the greatest services
he rendered to Australia, it was largely owing to his courage, his insistence, and
his foresight, that the Commonwealth was as ready as she was when the hour of
her testing came in 1914.342

This was simply not true. From Federation to the end of 1907, Deakin forestalled the
creation of the navy despite the support and the advocacy of Labor parliamentarians. On
Deakin’s prime ministerial watch the cause of an Australian navy did not advance.
Despite his oratorical eloquence on 13 December and supposed qualities cited by
Murdoch, Deakin’s scheme failed to impress the Admiralty and it did not produce the
construction of one ship nor lead to the dispensation of the naval subsidy for the training
of one Australian sailor in a British ship on the Australia Station. The Deakin scheme
was another example of the inconsistent, inadequate defence policies of Commonwealth
governments since Federation which, except briefly in 1904-05, Deakin led or of which
he was the senior minister. When Parliament returned after the Christmas break, debate
was dominated by tariff, trade and customs; almost all of 1908 would go by – beyond
the visit of the Great White Fleet – before Deakin’s defence policy was translated into a
bill before the House.
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Creswell had been present in the House when Deakin made his speech on 13 December.
‘The House adjourned in silence. It was a great disappointment to the supporters of
Australia’s naval expansion schemes’, Henry Feakes had watched Creswell leave
Parliament ‘the dejection of the naval director, Captain Creswell, when leaving the
House on this occasion, remains for me an indelible memory. His labours seemed to
have been in vain. He was already two years over the Admiralty retiring age for naval
captains. Any disgruntled critic could urge his retirement. But all was not lost.’343

Later that evening Creswell wrote to Defence Minister Ewing, rendering a refrain that
had been a constant in his service in the Commonwealth Navy and for which Creswell
told the Minister he should not be misinterpreted: ‘I feel sure you will acknowledge of
your experience that the sole purpose of my official work – the single end I have in
view – is the naval defence of Australia, and its future Naval development.’344 He was
grievously disappointed to find that the government did not consult him.345 It was one of
the lowest points in civil-naval force relations of the Deakin governments. It was
disappointing for Creswell to learn – via the press – that Deakin had arrived at the
submarine proposal after long and frequent communication with the Admiralty.
Creswell could have presumed, at least as Director and the government’s naval advisor,
to be acquainted with the views of the government. Indeed, as Creswell pointed out to
the Minister, he was not alone in his opposition to submarines: from Sir George Clarke
to Commanders Colquhoun and Clarkson, who were in England at this time, ‘whose
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views have been communicated to the Government as unqualifiedly condemning these
vessels for Australia.’346

Creswell was appalled with the Prime Minister’s apparent disowning of the September
1906 proposals as ‘the plan of naval construction suggested by our local officers two
years ago, has since been reviewed, in connection with the necessary disabilities
attaching to any isolated little service of our own with its costliness and lack of stimulus
and training facilities.’347 Creswell, since September 1906, had been working on this
plan – a plan that Deakin had publicly supported - despatching Commander William
Colquhoun and Engineer Commander William Clarkson overseas - whilst discussing
with the visiting distinguished Professor Biles, in August 1907, the appropriate ship
designs for Australian maritime conditions and the building of vessels, particularly in
Australia. The gnarled hands of naval poverty had reached out from Creswell’s reports
time and again to implore the Commonwealth governments to grasp the strategic
thinking and the vision of local naval defence and to budget accordingly. Amazingly, it
is only when recounting the Deakin 1907 policy statement in his Alfred Deakin a
Biography that John La Nauze first introduced Captain Creswell, ‘the progenitor of the
Australian Navy’. La Nauze, neglecting to mention Creswell’s total opposition to the
Deakin defence policy, claimed that Deakin’s ‘practical aims coincided’ with
Creswell’s, ‘but as Prime Minister he had to consider problems which lay beyond the
competence, and perhaps beyond the horizon, of the devoted sailor.’348 La Nauze first
praised Creswell, after all ‘Deakin had no delusion that he was an authority on naval
warfare,’ and then dismisses Creswell’s competence in the diplomatic and technical
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field. ‘The Admiralty, as Deakin was to find, looked on Creswell and his plans with
suspicion and even hostility.’ La Nauze castes more doubt on Creswell by adding, ‘Or
should it be remembered that Creswell, though an honest and patriotic officer, could
after all have no direct knowledge of rapidly changing conceptions of naval strategy?’349
La Nauze effectively paves the way for Deakin to be acclaimed as founder of the navy.

La Nauze’s assessment seems very one-sided: as early as 1901 Creswell urged the
despatch of Clarkson to England to ascertain naval technical developments.350 Creswell
had investigated and trialled wireless telegraphy in 1903. His reports and advice to
governments, as well as his general correspondence, on naval schemes reveal a
professional officer with significant understanding and local knowledge of vessel type,
crew requirements, costs, and the geo-political, strategic and tactical situations within
the region and world-wide. It hardly reflects someone who lived in a vacuum. Deakin’s
advocacy skills lay in the tact, the subtlety and the discretion of negotiating with the
Commander-in-Chief, Australia Station, the Admiralty and the British Government.
Deakin had neither the competence nor the perspective to undertake the advocacy of an
Australian navy in areas for which Creswell could provide the professional advice for a
local navy, cognisant of the strategy, planning and training reflecting Australian
conditions. Charles Bean said of this time that ‘Mr Deakin was always weak in
performance. He could build a great policy, but he could never ask the electors to face
frankly the cost of it.’351
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By January 1908, criticism of Deakin’s defence policy had extended to his admirers.
‘No one at the Admiralty except Fisher and two of his jackals believes in submarines for
Australia’. Arthur Jose protested to Deakin ‘and there is grave reason to believe that
Fisher himself favours them not for their defensive qualities but because the adoption of
them puts a stop at once to any independent development of an Australian squadron.’
Jose considered Fisher an ‘anti colonial schemer’ and concern was that Deakin was
being duped by ‘the glamour of what Professor Biles called “that harlequinade” of a
naval demonstration got up expressly to fascinate you while you were at home.’ His
letter to Deakin repeated the arguments Creswell had given Defence Minister Ewing:
submarines look wonderful and may perform well in British home waters, but off
Sydney Heads or outside Port Phillip Bay the heavy roll of the open seas would be their
demise. Jose did not want to appear ‘ill-tempered and arrogant’, but he needed to tell
Deakin that Britain might not be available when Australia was in trouble and what was
planned fell short of a real Australian Squadron. Ominously, Jose warned Deakin that
pursuing ‘a substitute for a real local squadron is pretty sure to lose you the scheme and,
possibly, the Ministry.’352

Captain Creswell was certainly not going to defend the government. From his office in
the Department of Defence in Melbourne, the Director of Naval Forces issued The
Naval Defence of the Commonwealth of Australia for the Year 1907. It was a damning
document, tinged with bitter disappointment of the false dawns of a naval defence. He
recalled Deakin’s promised support of September 1906 for a navy, but little had
improved since Creswell’s 1905 Report, in which it was noted that in terms of
personnel, neglect had ‘reduced the list of permanent officers to a condition bordering
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on collapse.’ If Deakin was contemplating a ‘new organisation’, Creswell argued, there
were not sufficient officers to train and lead the force as ‘an increase in personnel was
necessary to give effect to the naval policy announced by Mr Deakin in September 1906
but was reduced by one-half’, noting that the Estimates of 1907-1908 ‘underwent
considerable reductions.’ The Estimates had not been passed at the time of Creswell’s
writing of the report and ‘its condition remains therefore as reported in 1905 – two more
years in which nothing has been done.’ Critically, this had long-term implications for
achieving the goals of an Australian navy. Australia did not enlist and train seamen in
sufficient numbers in the years before 1907/08 to crew or command the future Fleet
Unit in four years, nor have officers to command or be of flag rank in the Great War in
seven years.

Creswell’s Report deprived the Deakin Defence Policy statement of credibility.
Creswell reminded Deakin of ‘the character and type of vessels it was decided to
provide under the 1906 Government programme.’ This was why, firstly, Colquhoun and
Clarkson were despatched to England to gather information to prepare designs and
specifications to tender for vessels suitable for ocean conditions for ‘strong seas and
weather is the sine qua non qualification for vessels for Australian service. A second
condition is great radius of action to suit our great distances.’353 Secondly, to ensure the
best, up-to-date advice was received, the government continued to retain the services of
Professor Biles, a member of the Admiralty Committee on Designs. Biles had proposed
vessels suitable for these conditions – and it did not include submarines: four ocean
destroyers, sixteen destroyers and four First Class torpedo boats. Deakin preferred nine
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submarines and six First Class torpedo boats. The parliament and government needed to
be clear about the two schemes, Creswell retorted: ‘the Destroyer Scheme is for coast
Defence, including ports. The Submarine Scheme is for Port Defence, and leaves the
coast bare.’ More pointedly, the government endorsed 1906 Naval Officers’ Scheme –
defence beyond the ports – protected trade; the other, the submarines of Deakin’s
defence policy, defended ports only and trade, without protection, ceased. Creswell had
a clear, definite vision of what was required: ‘The work required of an Australian
service is purely Australian defence against raiders that may escape the British Fleet,’
Creswell reported, ‘not, as is so commonly believed, engagement with a naval power
that has already overcome the British Navy.’ 354

Creswell could have been forgiven if bitter indignation provided the tenor of his report;
or if he had been baffled by Deakin not taking up the Tweedmouth offer of a local
defence force – a small beginning but a real naval squadron - with Admiralty help. What
was bewildering to Creswell was Deakin’s failure to synthesise the desire for a navy
with Australia’s maritime environment (not only geographical conditions, but also
engineering and technical capability and availability to furnish personnel for service)
and to utilise local naval expertise to explain and promote local naval defence. If civilnaval relations had a role in the development and governance of a naval defence of
Australia, Creswell found it abysmally wanting in Deakin and his government. ‘It is
unfortunate that, in considering the present proposals suggested by the Admiralty, and
recommended to the British Prime Minister, there was no Australian Naval officer
present’- at the recent Colonial Conference not Clarkson, not Colquhoun, not Creswell
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nor even Muirhead Collins stationed in London– ‘to inform upon points the importance
of which it required local experience to appreciate.’ Commonwealth governments,
Creswell declared, generally stood condemned for their inadequacy and ineffectiveness
in promoting an Australian navy:

Every previous discussion in London on Australian Naval matters has been
characterised by the same absence of informed experience of Australian Naval
Service with Australian personnel under an Australian Government. It may only
be coincidence but it is noteworthy that every arrangement between the
Admiralty and Australian Governments hitherto has failed both in permanence
and mutual satisfaction …
With a cold targeted courtesy Creswell pointed out that, ‘The lack of that clearer
definition of Australian conditions by a professional officer I am endeavouring to make
up for in this report.’355 It was not surprising with the impending triumph of the Great
White Fleet’s visit, Creswell’s Report of January 1908 was not ordered to be printed
until 11 December 1908 - even beyond parliament’s debate on the defence bills.
Nothing was to interfere with a popular visit which could garner support for Deakin’s
naval scheme and support for his ministry.

Creswell would continue to be proactive – if not provocative – with his basic call to ‘get
ships, train men’. His venom would not dissipate. In a long letter to Richard Jebb,
London’s Morning Post correspondent, Creswell called Deakin’s defence policy:

a policy of future barrenness, utter barrenness. I am for naval efficiency first
and before anything – for spending our money to the best and most effective
naval purpose – let the lawyers, ministers and rich argue out the control question
and when they have spouted forth for a year or so and arrived at a decision it
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won’t matter two shakes what that decision is for what will be done in war will
be decided by the conditions of dangers of the moment.

As Director of Naval Forces, he was determined not to be the commander of a decrepit,
small and obsolete navy for ‘nothing can be done without Naval Force. An injurious
policy has been contrived to ensure our doing nothing and having no Naval policy –
Deakin described it as ‘recommended by the Admiralty’. I credit the ‘Post’ and its very
able

defence

writer

with

the

sharpness

to

see

through

the

Admiralty’s

recommendations.’ British journalists, such as Jebb and Were, were provided with
arguments and encouraged to write about the Australian situation by Creswell.
Commonwealth parliamentary debates were ‘peppered’ with references to Creswell
whenever the local naval issue was raised. Creswell’s lobbying was needed to counter
what was being recommended to the Admiralty and ‘Fawkes of course had a hand in
this. He, if he had his way, would practically resort to the first Agreement – already
damned and frequently.’356

Two events over the next twelve months would provide the catalyst in Australia and
focus attention in Britain on the Commonwealth’s seriousness about a naval defence,
security and its place in imperial forums to discuss, at least, regional matters. The first
catalytic event was the visit of the United States’ Atlantic Fleet357 - known as the Great
White Fleet - while the second was the unilateral ordering of ‘Fisher’s Destroyers’.
With the defeat of Russia in the Russo-Japanese War, Japan was now the dominant
power in North Asia and had unprecedented latitude arising from the Anglo-Japanese
Alliance. The threat was not immediate, but the reach and observed capability from
visits of Japanese squadrons to Australia, along with Britain’s reduced naval presence 356
357
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both of which Creswell had written about for the past eight years - made Deakin, in
particular, contemplate a closer relationship with the United States in the Pacific should
the British withdraw completely. The tensions in the United States over Japanese
immigration to California during 1907 and 1908 added another focus of commonality
for the xenophobic Australians. Should the situation deteriorate into armed conflict
between these two new imperial powers in the Pacific, Australia would have to decide
between sentiment (for the Mother Country, Japan’s ally) and self- interest (Pacific
white nations dealing with the frictions arising from migrant Asian residents and
migrating Asian populations).

Deakin decided to invite the United States Navy’s

Atlantic Fleet to visit Australia during its world cruise; an opportunity for Australians to
not only view a possible contender to fill the British naval vacuum, but also
acknowledge that this was a Pacific nation which shared Australia’s view on regional
affairs, had similar interests and took similar stances. The invitation seemed out of
character for Deakin, and it indeed caused friction between the Australian and British
governments.

Prime Minister Deakin had forwarded the invitation directly, circumventing the usual
cumbersome ‘imperial channels’, to the American Ambassador in London, asking for
his help to persuade the fleet to be sent to Australia.358 In his invitation Deakin noted
that:

No other Federation in the world possesses so many features [in common with]
the United States as does the Commonwealth of Australia … and I doubt
whether any two peoples could be found who are likely to benefit more by any
thing that tends to knit their relations more closely…. Australian ports and
portals would be wide open to your ships and men.359
358

359

Harper, N., Australia and the United States. Documents and Readings in Australian History,
Nelson (Aust.) Ltd. Melbourne 1971. p. 59
Reckner, J., Teddy Roosevelt’s Great White Fleet, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, 1988 p.76-77

178

When President Roosevelt received the letter, his Secretary of State, Elihu Root,
commented “The time will surely come, although probably after our day, when it will
be important for the United States to have all ports friendly and causes of sympathy
alive in the Pacific”. Roosevelt was aware of the long-term value of accepting the
Australian invitation when he wrote ‘some day the question of the Pacific will be a
dominant one and it will be necessary to know the sentiment of Australia and New
Zealand.’ Indignant at Deakin’s actions, the Colonial Office chided that arrangements
should have gone through proper channels: a proposal from Deakin put before the
Governor-General for transmittal to the Colonial Office in London and then onto the
British Government. The same circuitous reply would take months. The United States’
favourable response to Deakin’s invitation came while he was addressing a public
meeting on 13 March. He told the gathering: “The least we can do is give three cheers
for the United States … I venture to say that a welcome such as no fleet has ever seen
outside its own country will be given in Australia to the American Fleet.” Deakin’s
defence minister, speaking to the press the following day, shared the sentiments of the
U S President “We feel that our future in the Pacific is bound with that of the United
States.”360

Did Deakin by his invitation want to ensure the friendship of the Americans should
there be trouble in the Pacific? Atlee Hunt, Permanent Head of the Department of
External Affairs, later rejected the claim that Australia was looking to America to
replace Britain as the defender of Australia. It is possible Deakin was using the United
States as leverage to get Britain to end the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and to strengthen
360
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its naval presence in the Pacific.361 Deakin had pushed at the 1907 Imperial Conference
for self-governing colonies to share in the framing of imperial policy and failed:

He had hoped thereby to compel the British government in developing its
defence and foreign policy to take more seriously the situation of the Pacific
Dominions. The American–Japanese war scare of 1907-08 and the [later] AngloGerman Rivalry of 1909 had intensified and clarified this Australian sense of
strategic vulnerability.362

In his guise as special correspondent to the London Morning Post, Deakin declared
‘what is aimed at is the actual presence of the United States vessels in our principal
ports.’ He wrote of himself that, ‘The Prime Minister has also probably had in mind the
reflex action of such a great naval demonstration upon his defence scheme …’
Politically, Deakin expected to lose executive office at any time. This visit had the short
term goal of shoring up Deakin’s support in the electorate for his naval scheme and
‘their mere appearance will provoke a closer consideration of some of many problems
of national defence.’ For the present, Deakin would await the Admiralty’s reply to his
naval proposals ‘for a local flotilla capable of acting with the Imperial squadron upon
our coasts, …’, but for local and London consumption the imperial federationist wanted
to ‘emphasise the fact that all his projects are formulated upon the assumption that the
control of the high seas will remain with the British Navy.’363 To Leo Amery, Deakin
wrote that the visit of the United States fleet was to be welcomed ‘if we had obtained all
that we are seeking in the shape of Imperial federation. It has nothing to do with our
national development but everything to do with our racial sympathies – If we can help
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to balance the pro-German and anti-British prejudices of the U.S. we shall have done
good work for the Empire.’364

The Director of Naval Forces did not share the government’s sentiments. Creswell
opposed the visit of the United States Fleet in 1908, so Prime Minister Deakin directed
the acting Secretary of the Defence Department, Samuel Pethebridge, to take charge of
the Fleet’s reception in Australia. It may seem ironic that Creswell could be considered
as a pro-imperialist to Deakin’s independent approach. He was not: Creswell was reenforcing his argument that Australia should have its own naval defence and represent
the Royal Navy in the Pacific. Creswell was angry at Deakin’s encouragement of the
United States’ presence in the Pacific. Writing to Jebb he underlined his indignation:

The proud result is the spectacle of Australia appealing for American aid in the
Pacific - Australia looking outside the Empire for protection. Really, we should
now be in a fair way to do for ourselves, to relieve your burden, to take up the
increasing burden of an increasing two power standard - To be in a position in
Australia to threaten the German colonies (as they soon will be) Java and
Sumatra instead of ourselves by them.

If Britain wanted to withdraw from the Pacific, if it wanted to play a dangerous game at
alliance with Japan, then Creswell, while bemoaning the inadequacy of Australia’s
maritime capability, implored consideration for Australia as the Imperial naval presence
in the Pacific. ‘For years some of us’ he wrote, ‘… have preached what is admitted
today ‘Great Britain has relinquished the Pacific’ It means that a German War would
threaten Australia particularly if Holland has been absorbed and Holland’s colonies
north of us.’365 What was even worse, while denying Australia a naval capability,
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Britain was investing the Japanese with the ‘designs and secrets’ of its most advanced
warship. To Jebb, Creswell wrote:

A German-Jap alliance would be our death knell. Could there have been
anything more fatal, than for years to have built up and strengthened Japan,
given her, among other things, what no power ever gave another – the
Dreadnought designs and secrets. Australia meanwhile kept naked. … . This last
dying attempt, most of it force of habit, by John Fisher and Fawkes to keep
Australia Naked has the commendations of the ‘Post’s’ leaders!!!!

As to Deakin, Creswell was incredulous:
I suppose Deakin is so good on the main question that they won’t fight him
because he is so often on one point … Naval, where he is such a fool. However
I have not fought this question since ’93 to drop it now366

Initially Creswell’s had been a lonely unrelenting fight for a local naval defence. By
1908, a growing receptive public and Commonwealth Parliament were calling for
locally constructed ships, Australian crews and responsibility and command for an
Australian navy. The Melbourne Age, told its readers that Australia’s geographic
position demanded that it must have a navy - for the sea could bring both friend or foe
to the country’s shores:.

Australia is an island continent. Our destiny lies on the sea. No friend or enemy
can reach us save by the sea. A friend is coming to us soon along the ocean
highways; but who shall dare to say that almost as powerful an enemy may not
one day steam into our waters in ironclad might to fight us for our heritage?
Nothing is plainer than we must have a navy. We must arm, and inasmuch as the
sea while we possess no war ships puts us at the mercy of any hostile Power
possessing ships, it is our first duty to arm navally.367
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The Great White Fleet called at Sydney on 20 August 1908, then Melbourne where it
sailed into Port Philip Bay on 29 August and finally Albany in Western Australia,
arriving on 11 September to load coal before the long voyage to Manila. Captain
Frederick Tickell as Naval Commandant of Victoria was responsible for the Melbourne
programme for the US Fleet. He had only days before attended the funeral of Captain
William Colquhoun, who had replaced Tickell as Queensland Naval Commandant in
March. During the US Fleet’s visit Tickell participated in the first ship-to-ship
communications by wireless when he sent a message from one US warship to another
and received a reply.

Prime Minister Deakin spent much time and energy making arrangements to entertain
the fleet and the press devoted vast amounts of space to the reporting of the historic visit
and the planned social programme. Massive crowds flocked to see the fleet. The Age of
Melbourne reported that the arrival of the fleet in Sydney was witnessed by 400, 000
people. For its arrival in Sydney, Deakin sent the American fleet a message, so phrased
that one would suppose Deakin was greeting a maritime ‘messiah’:
Australia’s people greet the Americans who man the greatest armada that ever
sailed the Southern Seas. You fly the flag of the nation nearest to our own blood,
which shares with our mother country the armed guardianship of two oceans.
We have awaited your coming with joyous expectancy and now welcome you
gladly under sunny skies to a land that lies lapped in peace.368

The majority of newspapers made little or no attempt to analyse the motives for the
visit, while the enormous public participation emphasised the earnestness of a stronger
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relationship. Admiral Sperry, the fleet’s commander, called his fleet’s visit a
‘monumental success.’369

Whatever the public genuinely thought about the visit of the Great White Fleet, ‘there is
little reason to question Thomas A. Bailey’s conclusion that, “the alleged Oriental peril
bore an important relation to the extravagance of the welcome [in New Zealand and
Australia].” In both countries there existed a current of popular concern, sometimes
approaching hysteria, over the intentions of the Japanese.’ Deakin appeared to have
high hopes that the visit would inspire Australia to create a navy of its own. When
Australia spoke on security or foreign policy issues or took a particular stand, Deakin
wanted it to do so with the impact of (a nation like) the United States or as an arm of the
British Empire. More importantly the Mother Country needed to see, for those who
shared Deakin’s view that, as a new nation within the Empire, Australia had its own
voice and views. Deakin needed to have the leverage of seapower. The navy would
increase Australia’s standing for membership in the councils of the Empire and as part
of the Imperial Fleet, preserve and protect Pacific possessions and project the Empire in
the region:
It was Australia’s way of telling Great Britain something extremely important,
something … that she had difficulty in telling the Mother Country about up to
this time. It was that if England expects, as she has the right to expect, that
{Australia} shall come to the assistance of the Mother Country when that
country may be enfeebled.370

Franklin Massey, a correspondent with the New York Sun noted:
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the Mother Country must take heed at this very moment of Australia’s dread and
Australia’s aspirations. Australia’s dread is the yellow peril, and influx of
Orientals into this fair land … In short Australia meant by this welcome to the
representative of a people who lately had shown signs of anti-Japanese feeling
{In Hawaii and California} to tell Great Britain that Australia demands of the
Mother Country the right to make Australia a White Man’s country and she
expects the Mother Country to accede to that demand, to the comfort and profit
of both Mother and Daughter.371
Britain was not unsympathetic to dominions determining that they shall be ‘a White
Man’s country’, according to Sir Charles Lucas, the Head of the Dominions Department
at the Colonial Office. Nor did Britain want to interfere with immigration policy, but
Lucas advised Colonies Secretary Elgin in a memorandum in July 1908, ‘We may
conceivably have to choose between our self-governing Dominions and the Japanese
alliance …’ and, as if prefacing the enthusiasm and boldness from both sides of the
Pacific, Lucas told Elgin ‘the matter is now, and will always be, one which may give
cause or pretext for complaints against us by the United States, and for attempts at
interference on the part of the United States in our relations with the Dominions.’372
Lucas’ contention, if made public, would only add to Australians’ abiding concern that
Britain would preserve itself and its international relationships before it would preserve
or protect a dominion in the Empire.

The New York Times also sensed the Australian search for identity. It declared ‘that in
future, affairs in the Pacific could not be settled without regard to Australia, and went
even further by adding that America’s problems often paralleled Australia’s in the
Pacific.’373 In this regard, Australia, the maritime nation, would need to be a sovereign
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naval power to assert its identity and security in the Pacific. ‘Without such a navy a war
declared tomorrow between Britain and almost any hostile power would infallibly
involve us in most dire trouble,’ The Age newspaper declared:

The Imperial Australian Squadron, poor thing that it is, would be withdrawn
immediately from our waters to the more distant scenes of conflict. Of this there
is not the smallest shadow of doubt. Britain had repeatedly warned us that we
must expect it. Our situation then would be positively hopeless, hideously
hopeless.374

Locally, the Commandant of the Commonwealth Naval Forces of Victoria, Captain
Frederick Tickell, already thought that the Commonwealth Navy was ‘in most dire
trouble’ and had difficulty perceiving the delivery of the Deakin’ proposal for a navy.
He reported his concerns about the scheme’s deficiencies and lack of detail regarding
personnel, training or establishments to the Secretary of the Department of Defence,
Robert Muirhead Collins in a memorandum for the information of the Defence Minister.
His first concern was that of insufficient personnel for the service. ‘At the present time,’
he wrote, ‘there is little or no inducement for the Australian to take to the sea as a
profession. His ambition to become a sailor is checked by a lack of opportunity.’ None
was to be found in the merchant navy and as to the Royal Navy there was ‘such
restrictions that it is almost impossible for him to accept.’375 Tickell considered the lack
of Australian naval cadets for training at British naval colleges as being due to the age
clause (12.5 years) and the inabilities of parents to financial support and supervise their
sons in England; nor were the cadets, given the distance from home, able to visit or
vacation with their parents. In Tickell’s view training ships were needed before
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Federation, but now it was an imperative: ‘It is the personnel, not material, that will
make an Australian Navy.’ This was all very well, but there were the twin issues of
accommodating existing personnel into the flotilla configuration and adequately
crewing the vessels whilst awaiting cadets to complete their training. Tickell seemed to
assume the Royal Navy would be providing the crew (and, in fact, it substantially
contributed to the ships’ crews in the early years of the Royal Australian Navy), but he
contended that the local Permanent Force was quite capable of destroyer duty.

Tickell did not think that the proposed submarines and destroyers should be massed at a
single port, as were the British ships on the Australia Station at Sydney; they provided
no protection to Adelaide, Brisbane or Melbourne. To Tickell, submarines were ‘of low
speed and dependent on fine weather for making a passage,’ while destroyers were not
weather dependent, they would take six days to get from Sydney to Adelaide. For
Tickell, one thing would be certain - a marauding cruiser would have done its damage
and departed before a CNF destroyer arrived. However dispersed among the ports, the
ships would distribute the strain on a single shore establishment, whilst establishing or
increasing marine engineering skills base in the local workforce and, Tickell claimed,
‘there are establishments in Australia quite capable of building submarines and
destroyers should sufficient inducements offer.’376

Labor continued to call for an Australian owned and crewed navy, strengthening its
defence platform at its national conference held in Brisbane in 1908. Labor was not
unopposed inside or outside the Conference but it did give the Federal Parliamentary
Party the unequivocal backing to act in a clear, deliberate way. Yet this failed to prompt
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Deakin, who depended on his alliance with Labor to be in government, to establish a
local naval force. In a series of questions the Member for Lang (NSW), William Elliot
Johnson, asked Deakin in the House on 22 September when would the Commonwealth
be ‘absolutely determined to secure an adequate coastal navy? Have the people of the
Commonwealth ever been consulted on the subject? Has the Government proposed, or
does it contemplate proposing to the British Government any reductions of the British
Fleet in Australian waters?’ Deakin replied that ‘the Government has not suggested, is
not likely to suggest any reduction of the British Fleet in Australian waters; quite the
contrary.’377 This was an ambiguous approach by Deakin. Since becoming Prime
Minister in 1903, he appeared to vacillate between embracing and then standing aloof
from efforts to have an Australian navy. He vacillated over having the support of the
British Admiralty before proceeding; the British Admiralty had Deakin right where they
wanted him: in government and in step with Imperial policy.

On 24 September 1908, ten months after Deakin’s defence policy statement Defence
Minister Thomas Ewing introduced a Bill for naval and land defence into the House of
Representatives. Ewing’s Second Reading speech on 29 September was mostly devoted
to land defence and army logistics, reserving some criticism ‘to those opposite for
putting complete faith in the British Navy.’ He asserted that ‘Civilization in Australia
stands in more danger of absolute destruction than it does in any other part of the British
Empire.’ It was not until an interjection from Sir John Quick (eight CPD pages into
Ewing’s speech) querying, ‘what is proposed with reference to Naval Defence’378 that
Ewing made his first substantive comments about the matter. The facts were, according
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to Ewing, ‘that the British Navy was not the sea power it used to be. It was losing the
dominance it once had and ‘it is doubtful whether it will be able in a little time to hold
its own successfully.’ There was no reference to creating a local navy. What the
defence minister did tell the House was that Britain’s first resort is also its last resort: it
will look after itself and prevail. ‘The British Navy – and I say this as an Australian has
as its main responsibility the protection of the heart of the Empire. If the heart goes,
everything goes. We might be scorched and hurt a little; still the Empire would recover
and the white man win …’ Ewing said in an oblique reference to the triumph of the
white man over Australia’s perceived threats; but ‘… The main work of the British
Navy is to protect the heart of the Empire.’ Australia needed to look after itself. The
next logical step from this annunciation, one would have thought would be the creation
of local naval protection of coast and commerce, but no, Ewing advised the House that
in preparation for such an eventuality there would be ‘200,000 men of the National
Guard partly trained and with, at least a knowledge of the rudiments of the work.’379
Defence of Australia would be land defence and he returned to that topic after
responding to the Quick interruption.

The Defence Bill was opposed by the Free Traders and the conservative Protectionists.
This anti-local navy, pro-imperialist parliamentary bloc were at ease with, and had
complete confidence in, the supremacy of the Royal Navy to discourage or destroy any
invading force. It was inconceivable that an enemy of Britain, - the perception being
that the enemy was European - and hence of Australia, could or would mount an armed
force, travel unimpeded across the oceans of the world and land an army on Australian
soil without being challenged – and destroyed – at sea. Sir George Reid, the leader of
379
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the Free Traders was not averse to using the advocates for a local navy in opposing
Deakin’s Bill. He chided Deakin:

The Prime Minister is at issue with his naval advisers on his naval policy. That
is an extraordinary state of affairs. The naval advisers of the Government –
Captain Creswell and a committee of naval officers – are absolutely opposed to
the obtaining of the submersibles which the Prime Minister desires – probably
on good advice from the Mother Country… Captain Creswell is the gentleman,
who more than any other officer, has inspired the movement of naval defence.

It was unreserved recognition for Creswell from one of the principal opponents of a
local navy, who would still argue, as he had done in July 1901 with the first defence
bill, that ‘if we have an efficient protection, why should we duplicate vessels merely for
the sake of hoisting our own flag?’ Australian sentiment was in the balance for and
against a local navy but Reid’s view of the defence of Australia remained absolute:

The Imperial Government and the people of the Mother Country, are responsible
for every act of the Military and Naval Forces, whether Imperial or colonial. The
responsibility in time of war is absolutely with the Imperial Government and the
British people, not with Australia.380

Supporting the imperialist position the Director of Military Studies at Sydney
University, Colonel Hubert Foster wrote two articles for the Argus on (3 and 14 October
1908) on the defence of Australia. A retired British army officer, he came to Australia
in 1906 to take up the University of Sydney appointment. He became Chief of the
Australian General Staff in 1916. As one historian put it ‘Always an apologist for the
British view of Australian naval defence, he [Foster] consistently opposed the views of
… … Creswell.’ 381 Foster contended that ‘Australia is, by her geographical situation, in
less danger of attack than any other part of the Empire. Japan the nearest naval power is
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as far away as Turkey from the United States. From Sydney to Yokohama the distance
is that of New York from Athens’ He relied on the supremacy and presence of the Royal
Navy for ‘no nation in the world can attack Australia without the certainty of having on
its hands an immediate war with Great Britain.’ Australia, in Foster’s view, could also
be confident and secure because of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and, therefore, with
supremacy at sea assured, there was little value in creating a local naval flotilla.

Ewing sought Creswell’s views on Foster’s articles, Creswell replied with the
undeviating arguments with which he had advised past governments. ‘All defence must
depend upon the power of foreign navies’ Creswell asserted:

If there were no foreign navies, possibly one gunboat or cruiser would suffice to
ensure unchallenged supremacy. If there were but weak foreign navies, a
moderate but relatively strong navy would be required to ensure supremacy.
With the growth in strength of foreign navies, the standard of force to meet them
must be raised.
Then most tellingly, he advised the minister, ‘There is no law of eternal friendship or
indissoluble alliance. The friend of today may be the foe tomorrow.’ 382 Creswell did not
like Deakin’s Admiralty-inspired scheme for a local navy nor did he like the appearance
of an entente cordiale there appeared to be between Australia and the United States with
the visit of the Great White Fleet. The reality was Britain was withdrawing warships,
relying on Japan to substitute for the balance of naval power in the Pacific, while the
government seemed to be flirting with the United States as a protector rather than
having a realistic naval plan to build and deploy suitable warships to defend Australia.
Creswell repeated the warning of some English writers at the time ‘that the time is fast
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approaching when the existence of Australia will depend on the goodwill of America
and the politeness of Japan.’

One only had to look at Brassey, Jane and other naval journals, according to Creswell,
to observe the change that had come across the navies of the world. Creswell told the
minister that ‘today Great Britain’s supremacy is commanding but the Dreadnought
launch marks an epoch, and every year that passes since sees the value of the older type,
on which British supremacy mainly rests today, sensibly diminishing.’ The rate of
construction of battleships by foreign naval powers equalled Britain, in Creswell’s view,
as he forewarned the Deakin government of what would be termed the ‘Dreadnought
scare’. ‘The Japanese average rate of ship construction has been only two years to the
British three. Germany has authoritatively declared her ability to build as fast as Great
Britain. In 1911 Germany will possess but one less Dreadnought than Great Britain. In
the same year, Japan will have one or, perhaps two, dreadnoughts less than Great
Britain …’ Creswell needed to make it clear in Ewing’s mind, and for whoever else
may read his views, that ‘supremacy depends primarily in modern Naval warfare not
upon the number but upon the class of vessel.’ Further, he reiterated a central theme in
his campaign for a naval defence that ‘to an Admiralty charged with the conduct of a
great naval war there could be no more weakening distraction than responsibility for the
safety of great interests at a great distance.’383 This correlated with Ewing’s contentions
that Britain’s prime naval directive was defence of the homeland; Creswell had been
arguing the local navy cause for so long that in a barb directed as much to governments
as to people of Foster’s ilk he said that ‘British sea supremacy for a century, and in
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Australia the added safety of thousands of miles of ocean, have been the main
contributing causes to our indifference.’384

The Labor parliamentarians continued to alert Australians of the current maritime
security position. Speaking in the Defence Bill debate Billy Hughes said, ‘There is
every reason to believe that, at least, one Power has the deliberate intention of invading,
or striking a blow at, Great Britain, in which event, of course we must suffer in common
with other parts of the Empire.’ This echoed the Creswell’s advice to Defence Minister
Ewing in October 1908. Hughes pressed the Naval Director’s line on the strength,
disposition and availability of the British Fleet, when he said in the House that:

It is clear that by the readjustment of the British Fleet there is in the whole of the
Pacific only the Australian Squadron, which consists of one first-class protected
cruiser, two second-class, five third-class, and two small ships unclassified. Of
these vessels there is only one which, if in England, would not be on the scrapheap – that is the Powerful. … There is nothing between us and invasion, or
even a raid, except the Powerful, which, on the face of it, is quite unable to
police, much less defend, 8,000 miles of coastline.385

By the end of 1908 Labor had formed the view that its 27 Members of the House of
Representatives had a better claim to be the government of the day than Deakin’s 15
Liberal Protectionists. Decidedly, Deakin wanted Australia to have a greater voice
within the Empire and greater protection for its borders. The integrity of both and of
himself, as prime minister, was now at stake. Mentally and politically he was
diminishing. The cache of personal regard was no longer enough to keep him in power
with the consent of Labor, whose leader, Andrew Fisher, advised the House on 6
November that the party would withdraw support for the Deakin government. On 10
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November 1908 Deakin resigned and the Defence Bill lapsed. On 17 November Labor
formed government with Andrew Fisher, as Labor’s second Prime Minister and George
Pearce, the nation’s ninth Defence Minister within eight years. The creation of a navy
was uppermost in their minds.

194

CHAPTER V
1909 – 1911 Building a Naval Defence: “A good sturdy dependable Naval Cub in
the Pacific”386

As the first decade of the new Commonwealth drew to a close, Creswell was still
battling people, time, place and finance to have an Australian crewed and owned navy
established. His argument became more persistent, firstly highlighting the growing
strength of the seapower of Japan which was accompanied by the Japanese army’s
territorial expansion into North Asia; and, secondly, the close proximity of Germany’s
colonial possessions to the north of Australia coupled with its taunting naval race with
Britain.

It could be claimed that Creswell was the founder of the Australian Navy but the part
political parties and governments played in the foundation should not be ignored. Late
in the first decade it was the political decisions that set the navy’s establishment in place
and time. It would still be a struggle: a ‘tension’ between those who favoured an
Australian navy and those who saw it as an affront to Imperial unity of control; between
aspiration and what was finally put in place. Nor was there one version of a way
forward. Though a few contemporaries have been anointed with the accolade of
‘founder’, the one constant thread through all the years of struggle was Creswell.
Andrew Lambert described this ‘tension’ well when he wrote that:

Navies have always been costly, resource intensive organizations demanding
professional skills and experience that cannot be acquired as easily, and more
significantly as quickly, as those of contemporary armies. It has been far easier
for great naval powers to create armies than vice-versa. If a nation is to sustain
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the costly commitment to naval power the body politic must be convinced there
is a real need.387

Creswell knew what it would take to acquire a navy, yet in the ten years since
Federation there were three abiding factors in his unanswered call: Commonwealth
revenues, Australia’s small population and the lack of a consistent, proactive Australian
naval defence policy.

Economies of scale had little relevance when six Australian colonies federated, what
revenues there were went to establishing departments of state, a high court and
government agencies and providing social welfare, such as pensions. One revenue
source, customs duties, which had been transferred from the colonies under the
constitution, came at a price: to gain this financial power the constitution provided for
three-quarters of the customs revenue to be re-distributed to the States for a period of
ten years. Creswell’s successive naval schemes were modest in the type and number of
vessels proposed for coastal and commerce protection, within the context of an Imperial
navy presence in Australia and under Imperial command and control in time of war.
While Creswell’s cost projections and cost benefit analysis for his various schemes
supported his arguments, there were still real – and imagined – dividends from a naval
agreement with Britain for the early Australian governments with limited revenues. For
a fraction of the cost, Australia had Royal Navy ships, men and infrastructure; and, it
was imagined, for the naval agreement said so, training would be provided to
Australians and if attacked the Royal Navy would protect them.
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The second factor, the small population, impacted across the economy, the social
infrastructure and the very functioning of the Australian community: the population in
1901 was 3,788,000 people and by 1913 it had only increased to 4,820,000. Creswell
identified the number of men required to crew the vessels in his schemes, but unless he
offered pay in excess of the Royal Navy or local civilian occupations, he could not hope
to have the necessary complement for a local navy. For years Creswell had reported the
government neglect in the recruitment, training and operational experience of Australian
seamen. The Admiralty stifled local navalist ambition by arguing that Australia’s ability
to finance a navy and its small population to generate skilled crews were prohibitive to
it possessing a credible naval force. When the ‘Fleet Unit’ was commissioned in the
second decade, all ranks (officers and sailors) were substantially filled by seconded and
former Royal Navy men. The U.S. naval theorist, Mahan, had wondered at laws, such as
those passed in Australia, that restricted immigration and excluded certain people from
the country. ‘Fill up your land with men of your own kind, if you wish to keep it to
yourself,’ Mahan conceded, though he wondered how long immigration laws would
last. ‘It is very different for those who are severed from their like by sea’, particularly
when one is trying to resource this outpost of the Empire and provide a naval defence
for ‘all the naval power of the British Empire cannot suffice ultimately to save a remote
community which neither breeds men in plenty nor freely imports them.’ 388 There was
an addendum to this recruitment dilemma: Henry Feakes noted a further limitation for
officer entry to an Australian navy, where defence regulations stipulated ‘that
candidates for commissions in the Commonwealth naval forces must be the bearers of a
commission in (a) Royal Navy, (b) Royal Naval Reserves, and in possession of a Master
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Mariner’s certificate.’389 Preference was given to candidates of Australian birth, but
tenure in the CNF gave all the appearances of being temporary as all entrants were
commissioned as sub-lieutenants, on probation and subject to the commission being
withdrawn with three months’ notice.

The third factor, the lack of a consistent, proactive naval defence policy, came from the
collateral damage arising from the disruptive changes of government and prevailing
policies favouring the development of the land forces first. There had been eight
defence ministers between 1901 and 1908 though, except for brief tenures by Watson
and Reid, Alfred Deakin was prime minister throughout this period. Deakin was aware
that Australia only had certain sovereignty to the shoreline – not beyond. If the
Commonwealth could not have an autonomous foreign policy, the value and utilisation
of a sea-going navy was limited.

George Pearce, Labor’s Defence Minister, believed that Australia did have the fiscal
strength to maintain a navy; the party had called for it and he was determined that this
should occur. He wrote to the new Prime Minister, Andrew Fisher, on 21 January 1909:

I feel strongly tempted to say we should order the torpedo destroyers now and

take the responsibility when Parlt. meets, delay I think in this matter will
damage us with the people, more than it will gain for us with Parlt. I believe
such an action would be the most popular thing we could do. 390

The Labor platform had called for an Australian owned and controlled navy since 1904
and the most recent Labor Party Conference had re-endorsed this call. Pearce told
Fisher, ‘I am more than convinced as to its wisdom and urgency.’ Here was the
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opportunity to bring the party’s goal to fruition; if not, Pearce feared ‘that if we delay
till Parlt meets, we may not get the opportunity, and our opponents may.’ Against the
call for an Australian navy, the anti-navy parliamentarians – mostly pro-imperialists in
the Free Trade Party - had combined with Deakin’s supporters to quarantine money on
naval expenditure, which could only be released following parliamentary debate. Pearce
advised Fisher, “Our Party has made the question of an Australian navy; we have made
public opinion on this question. I strongly urge we should reap the harvest whilst we
have the chance. I trust you will give this your earnest consideration.”391

To Pearce’s call Creswell also added his plea to the Prime Minister on 5 February: ‘The
Commonwealth is without any power of Naval defence on its coasts, and has it only to
the most limited and fast diminishing degree within its ports.’392 The 1903 Naval
Agreement promised the local naval force would be strengthened and brought up to date
yet this had not materialised. Between 1901 and 1909 in Australia there was little naval
policy, little direction and no capital expenditure. The local naval presence and morale
could have withered and died. Hyslop has argued ‘That it did not was due in the main to
Creswell’s leadership.’393 Creswell was preaching to the converted when he told Fisher,
‘our Naval Defences are at the front doors of the Commonwealth.’ 394

For Andrew Fisher, Labor had the will, now was the time and Australia could
demonstrate, at least in part, that it had the manufacturing capability. There was also the
£250,000 unspecified defence trust fund. Creswell advised Pearce how this could be
used: ‘order three Destroyers now, instead of two destroyers and one 1st Class T.B,’ at a
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cost of £256,000 as opposed to £217,000. Creswell suggested that as the destroyers took
fourteen months to build, the extra funding could come out of the next year’s estimates.
Creswell had not forgotten his goal of establishing local infrastructure: ‘Also it would
be possible to send home skilled workmen to get instruction in the home yards in the
building of Destroyers.’ These acquisitions were part of Creswell’s scheme of four
ocean-going destroyers, sixteen (River class) destroyers and four 1st Class torpedo
boats. Fisher immediately adopted Creswell’s destroyer scheme with a slight variation:
there would be four ocean destroyers, nineteen (Improved River Class) destroyers and
one police vessel.395 On 5 February 1909, Fisher issued the order to build the first three
destroyers (hereafter known as ‘Fisher’s Destroyers’ and commissioned as HMAS
Parramatta, Yarra and Warrego) without consulting the Commonwealth Parliament,
the Admiralty or the Commander-in-Chief of the Australia Station.

In early February Prime Minister Fisher addressed the annual luncheon of the
Australian Native Association in Melbourne at which Deakin was also present. While
Fisher acknowledged Deakin’s advocacy for the defence of Australia, Fisher was
providing more: executive action. He knew what would appeal to this most xenophobic
of audiences: Labor would deliver for Australia its ‘own navy, controlled by our own
people and co-operating with that of the mother country.’396 Why? For the reasons that
made politicians and most Australians on at least one issue bi-partisan: Australia with
New Zealand according to the Melbourne Age were ‘outposts of the great white race …
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the guardians of the civilisation, of institutions and of the safety of a white people.’397
The nation’s fears and resolve were reflected in the poet, Henry Lawson, who wrote in
1908 that ‘the White world shall know its young outpost with pride …’

398

Lawson

called on this outpost of the British race in the South to be vibrant and prepared to
participate in a sub-imperialism of its own, securing Pacific islands for the
Commonwealth.

The cornerstone of the security of Australia, for Creswell, was naval defence. In
correspondence with Richard Jebb, Creswell acknowledged that ‘matters in Europe are
looking black’ and war with Germany would surely come. One needed to be vigilant
when war came for ‘then it will be hard enough times especially if brother Jap wants to
land here.’

He had informed Jebb in 1907 that ‘It has always been the great Naval

action in Europeans waters that will decide Australia’s fate, - so we have always been
told. Is there the same certainty now that the Jap has had the Pacific made over to him?
How long will that alliance last?’399

This would be a long standing concern for

Creswell, which could be eased by local naval defence: ‘From your point of view in
England, is not this an additional reason for developing the Naval capacity and
resources of Australia to the utmost? Some day we may need of ourselves to be strong
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in the Pacific’400 It reflected the growing political and popular consensus from 1907 to
1909, according to Meaney, of a ‘new strategic perspective … a serious possibility, an
invasion of Australia, which would be launched by an Asian power.’401 Creswell was
also alluding to the geo-political challenges of Europe being different to Australia,
which sought security in the Pacific.

Creswell could advise Jebb in 1909 that ‘At last it is a Labour Govt. that makes a
beginning to do something for Australia. To Creswell there was a sound plan by a good
minister of ordering destroyers and establishing a dockyard for future warship
construction. While this was private correspondence, Creswell was well aware of the
influence Jebb could have promoting the credentials of the Director of CNF to the
British public and authorities. Creswell envisaged a fleet which would steadily develop,
within an evolving naval defence replete with engineering infrastructure, training
facilities and an intelligence service. He adhered to the principle of an Australian navy
within ‘the one flag, one fleet’ Empire, apprising Jebb that:

Deakin’s silly Naval Scheme, largely Admiralty planned is ‘blown out’. I will be
glad if you tell all and sundry that we have no idea of an ‘independent’ Navy –
but if a force capable of the closest co-operation with the Navy. Our fitness for
this depends entirely with the Admiralty and this must be impressed upon
them.402
Creswell’s aspiration was that the ‘British Lion’, the Royal Navy, would:
Let our Navy people join their Gunnery and other schools and learn in their
fleets and generally say ‘here is a promising colt let us teach him cricket, give
every start and bye & bye he will be a good man in the eleven’. If they do that
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they will touch Australian enthusiasm in a way they will not have thought
possible resulting in a good sturdy dependable Naval Cub in the Pacific.403
More than British co-operation would be required to realise the ‘Fisher Destroyers’.
Recalling the early phase of procurement some months later, Andrew Fisher, whose
government wanted to maximise local warship construction, said that the
Commonwealth could not obtain the construction specifications unless it agreed to have
at least one of the vessels built in Britain. His government was ‘politely informed by the
firms concerned that they conducted their business for profit and not on a purely
sentimental basis. Like everyone else they were prepared on occasions to cry out for the
defence of the Empire but they desired to deal with us on a business basis.’ 404 Thus the
Fisher government, by agreement, proposed that two destroyers be built in Britain and
the third assembled in kit form and sent to Australia for construction. Pearce wrote to
Fisher on 10 February that Robert Muirhead Collins, the Commonwealth’s
representative in London, had advised him that quotations were being submitted and
that particulars should be sent by 23 February. In his letter, Pearce also told Fisher that
Hughes was wiring him to not accept the tenders until the manager of the NSW State
Dockyard had been consulted about constructing the ships locally. Pearce rejected this,
wanting the first ‘boats’, as he put it, to ‘be constructed on safer rather than
experimental lines.’405 By April Collins wrote to Fisher advising him that McKenna, the
First Lord of the Admiralty, was ‘anxious to assist the Commonwealth government in
their naval defence in every possible way’ and only wishes to ‘know what the
Commonwealth government wishes to do.’406
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To assist Collins, Engineer-Commander William Clarkson, already in Britain, was
directed to participate in assessing the tenders. Clarkson recommended the 700-ton, fast,
oil-burning and turbine-driven vessels proposed by the consortium of William Denny
and Brothers of Dumbarton and Fairfield Shipbuilding and Engineering of Govan.
Clarkson remained in Britain as the naval engineering representative during
construction. The Parramatta, with a displacement of 750 tons, was laid down at the
Fairfield Shipbuilding and Engineering Company on 17 March 1909 and was completed
with armaments and stores for a cost of £82,500 - the cheapest ship ever built for the
Australian navy! Yarra, of 700 tons, was built by William Denny and Brothers and laid
down in 1909, while the Warrego, (700 tons’ displacement) built by London and
Glasgow Engineering and Iron Shipbuilding Company of Govan, was laid down in
1910. The latter was dismantled and re-assembled at Cockatoo Island Dockyard,
Sydney.

Pearce, having recommended the ordering if the destroyers, now sought Creswell’s
counsel to counter the arguments that would come from those who opposed a local
navy. Pearce posed two questions to the Director of Commonwealth Naval Forces in
February 1909: Why does Australia require any naval defence? Why that is more than
any other British dependency? Creswell took Pearce through the reasoning for his
proposals. There were details that could be questioned e.g. destroyers versus cruisers or
his opposition to submarines, but his arguments were compelling. “Our coastlines are
our business lines’, Creswell told Pearce on 22 February. “Australian coastal defence
protects imperial food and raw material…until it can gain the open sea and safety.”407
He was very clear when he informed Pearce that should the British Fleet be completely
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pre-occupied elsewhere ‘this country would be open to invasion. If we are without any
Naval defence whatever, the sea up to the line of our beaches is as safe to an enemy as
the waters in his own harbours.’ There was a basic condition ‘fundamentally influencing
our defence – isolation. We are at the end of the world.’ The Pacific was an area of
European colonisation and the basing of squadrons for European navies. Creswell was
particularly concerned about ‘the ownership of the immense archipelago stretching from
East to West to the North of us’ – a strategic concern to which he would return in 1912
and 1918 in reports to the Commonwealth government.

In his straightforward, unambiguous manner Creswell advised Pearce, ‘We must have a
sea force...a squadron of half a dozen Dreadnoughts with cruisers, destroyers and
smaller torpedo craft in due complement would render us perfectly safe, but that was
quite beyond our means.’ Creswell knew that for the politician cost would be a major
consideration, so he reasoned that a feasible Australian naval force would be
supplementary to and effective for co-operation with, the Royal Navy: defensive,
responsive and self-sufficient (i.e. an Australian naval defence with infrastructure to
build, repair and supply such a force). As a defensive force, the torpedo boat destroyer
seemed to be commensurate with Australia’s needs and financial means and, as a flotilla
force, be complementary to the Royal Navy Squadron despatched when trouble arose in
the Pacific. Creswell was basing such a naval force on the assurance given by British
government’s that the Royal Navy would defend the dominions in the Pacific. The new
Commonwealth government, Creswell counselled, should consider that ‘any Australian
Naval Force is … a portion of the sea power of the British Nation the world over.’408
Therefore, Creswell advised that ‘The force we require must completely meet our local
408
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needs, and be at the same time the most valuable auxiliary or supplementary force for
co-operation with the Royal navy.’409 Five months later, at the Imperial Conference in
London, the Admiralty would make an offer, initially baulked at by Deakin’s
representative, which, remarkably, resembled Creswell’s ‘sea force’: locally complete
and supplementary to Royal Navy needs.

In Creswell’s twenty-two years of advocacy, his schemes and correspondence revealed
a vision of a credible self-reliant naval defence. There needed to be warships of the
quantity and type suitable for Australian conditions, well-equipped infrastructure:
officer, entry and specialist training of personnel; skilled local construction and
maintenance engineering facilities; wireless telegraphy; and an intelligence gathering
and assessment service. Finally, and significantly, there needed to be a capability which
could be neither bought or recruited: experience, particularly operational experience,
and professionalism. Time may bring both, but only interchangeability with the Royal
Navy would bring them sooner.

1909 would prove to be a defining year for Creswell, Australian naval defence and the
Empire. Prime Minister Fisher, with the initial naval acquisitions underway, drafted a
memorandum to the Colonies Secretary in April 1909 outlining the views of the Labor
government on naval defence and Australia’s future relationship with Britain and the
Admiralty. Fisher wanted to signify that Australia was to be a sovereign naval power:
capable of operating a navy to secure Australia’s borders and contributing to Imperial
defence in time of war. The draft was given to the Governor-General, Lord Dudley, who
objected to the clause requiring, in time of war, consent of the Commonwealth before an
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Australian warship was placed under the command of the Admiralty. Dudley largely redrafted the clause himself to make the transfer automatic, which the government
accepted. Cunneen has said that ‘Dudley can be criticised not only for interfering in a
matter of Australian concern, but also as exceeding his diplomatic instructions.410 The
memorandum sent by Fisher to the Colonies Secretary in April 1909 advised the
continuance of the current naval agreement, ‘to provide, equip and maintain the
defences of Naval bases for the use of the ships of the Royal Navy’ and the
establishment of a local navy consisting of a torpedo flotilla whose sphere of action
would be coastal defence with the Director of Naval Forces and his officers to come
under the sole control of the Commonwealth Government in peace time. Sharing the
burden of maintaining Britain’s supremacy as a naval power, according to Fisher, would
be achieved ‘by encouraging Naval development in this country, so that the people of
the Commonwealth will become a people efficient at sea, and thereby better able to
assist the United Kingdom with men, as well as ships, to act in concert with other sea
forces of the Empire.’ If naval vessels travelled outside Commonwealth territory, and
assuming vessels of the Australian navy would be where the British Navy was present,
command would devolve to the British naval officer – ‘if senior in rank to the
Commonwealth officer.’ In the Dudley-approved war provisions ‘all the vessels of the
Naval Forces of the Commonwealth shall be placed by the Commonwealth Government
under the orders of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty.’411

To do this each commander of an Australian vessel would have sealed orders and
instructions to this effect when a state of war or emergency arose. When it came to
coastal defence vessels, the approval of the Commonwealth government would be
410
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required. Essentially, though there would be later avowals and Admiralty refinements,
Fisher was presaging what occurred in the Great War six years later: the governorgeneral’s declaration transferred the Australian Fleet to the Admiralty, the Australia,
Melbourne and Sydney were removed to the northern hemisphere. In 1916, the
Admiralty would seek and be given approval by the Australian government for
Australia’s destroyers to be deployed from Asian waters to the Mediterranean.

The intelligence from the Commander-in-Chief Australia Station, Vice-Admiral
Richard Poore, to the Admiralty’s First Lord, Reginald McKenna, was that the new
Australian Prime Minister ‘does not think imperially’.412 Poore appeared somewhat
affronted when in a meeting with the Prime Minister on 7 March, Fisher said, ‘there is a
growing idea that a great empire cannot be governed or controlled by one central power
and therefore it is the duty of each colony to take care of itself and be entirely self
supporting and capable of undertaking its own defence.’ To Poore, Fisher just did not
understand the imperative: to keep open the trade routes, its lines of communication,
Australia needed the Imperial Navy for its very existence. The Vice-Admiral
acknowledged Fisher as ‘a shrewd man of the people: quiet and conscious of his lack of
training for the post he holds. I should think he has a fair share of obstinacy but in the
hands of a clever man would be easily led. Not a great leader, nor will he ever be.’ 413
Over the next five years, the shrewdness and obstinacy of Fisher brought not only the
achievement of foundation social and infrastructure legislative programmes but also the
establishment of an Australian navy, with training colleges for both army and navy
along with requisite engineering and logistics (small arms factory, dockyards and
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purchase materiel) for the defence services. Seemingly exasperated, Poore wrote in his
private letter to McKenna that, ‘a certain type of Australian politician wants an
Australian Navy: Australia does not want an Australian Navy.’ If Poore correctly
assessed Fisher’s qualities as ‘a shrewd man of the people’, then his anti-navy claim
suggests that: Poore misread the the mood in Australia. One needs to remember that
Admiral Poore was representing Britain in the South, not Australia; to Britain he owed
allegiance and intelligence on Australia’s thinking about naval defence. The new Labor
government’s meaning was clear: Australia wanted a navy and Parramatta, Yarra,
Warrego would be the tangible proof of that. Alfred Deakin, however, was another
matter.

Poore reported to McKenna that Deakin had been ‘speaking at different

meetings and leaving his audiences cold. He is at present sitting on the fence, holding
out hands to Mr Fisher and the Leader of the Opposition alternate – I think he will
eventually find a resting place in the ditch.’414

In Britain, a greater concern was about the accelerated battleship construction by
Germany. The First Lord of the Admiralty, McKenna, and his First Sea Lord, Jacky
Fisher, sought a construction programme of six dreadnoughts but faced a cabinet which
opposed the laying down of even four. Fisher encouraged a public campaign of ‘we
want eight and we won’t wait’.

Finally, a compromise was agreed for four

dreadnoughts to be laid down in 1909 and, if required, for four more no later than 1
April 1910. Though the campaign in Britain had been to gain domestic support for
increased naval spending, New Zealand willingly offered to fund the construction of a
dreadnought for the Royal Navy. Initially the British government declined. However the
opportunity having been presented, no encouragement was needed for First Sea Lord
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Fisher to present a scheme, in which dominion nationalism could be sated and, through
greater and more permanent assistance, British capital ship supremacy over Germany
could be assured.

In Australia, the reaction pitted nationalism against imperialism. The Commonwealth
government was urged by sections of the public to present a dreadnought to the British
Navy. ‘Germany has stolen a march on Britain, and Britain’s naval supremacy is
threatened... Is Australia rich and loyal enough to give Britain the wherewithal to build
a Dreadnought?415 Melbourne’s The Age challenged. The public mood in New South
Wales and Victoria was such that the state government was prepared to buy a
dreadnought; subscription lists of donors were drawn up, meetings were held and even
the Governor-General, Lord Dudley, did some private lobbying. Dudley suggested to
Andrew Fisher that ‘the moral effect of presenting a dreadnought might be very great, as
illustrating the solidarity of the Empire.’416 Opposition Leader Deakin awaited the wind
of public opinion and when it predominantly favoured a dreadnought for Britain, he
called for its purchase. ‘His fervent and uncritical endorsement of the Dreadnought cry
was hasty and opportunist’, Deakin’s biographer, La Nauze, asserted. ‘He had
committed himself to this specific proposal without knowledge of the needs or desires
of the British government and without reliable information about the reality of the
‘crisis’.’417 Later, when Deakin gained office, as so many times before, he tried to avoid
commitment, couching the purchase of a dreadnought as merely ‘a desire’.
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By contrast, the Fisher government did not waver: it would build and crew a navy of
ocean-going destroyers. This would be the Australian contribution to Imperial
defence.418 The mood of the public may have shifted from possessing a local navy to
building a dreadnought for Britain but Fisher wanted to replace a supposed British naval
crisis and local hysteria with consultation. Urged on by Defence Minister Pearce to
discuss colonial naval defence and co-operation with the imperial navy, Fisher called
for a conference to be held in London on Imperial defence. Britain agreed to an Imperial
Conference on Naval and Military Defence and arranged for self-governing dominions
to meet in London in late July. Whoever attended from the government, Pearce advised
Fisher, should be accompanied by Captain Creswell,419 Fisher agreed.

After the rising of Parliament, Prime Minister Fisher, in government for barely three
months, travelled to every state to better acquaint the Australian people with Labor’s
policies. At Gympie on 30 March 1909 Fisher called for a land tax to break up the great
estates, a stronger conciliation and arbitration act and a change to the Constitution to
nationalise monopolies. He also called for an Australian defence force with compulsory
military training, a munitions industry and, particularly, a navy consisting of four ocean
destroyers, sixteen (improved River Class) destroyers, in addition to the three already
ordered, and one vessel for police duties; twenty-four vessels in all. For Deakin, Cook
and Forrest (who led the anti-Labor Protectionist conservatives) the Fisher speech
‘smacked’ of socialism.
418
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manufacturers) and the Free Traders (merchants) together - each normally suspicious of
the other - into an uneasy alliance against Labor. Deakin, more than at any other time
since Federation, did not have the numbers in parliament – and what numbers he had
were now primarily Victorian based. He needed to ‘fuse’ with others if he was to have
the prime ministership and break free of following a Labor based legislative
programme. Deakin struck a bargain with the conservative, pro-imperialist, anti-local
navy Free Traders: their leader, Sir George Reid, whom Deakin detested, would be
‘jettisoned’ and rewarded with the appointment as Australia’s first High Commissioner
in London once Deakin was in government. Joseph Cook (the new Free Trade leader)
would be Deakin’s deputy in a ‘fusion’ of the two parties into the Liberal Party; the
‘three elevens’ had become two.

Conspiring with his new colleagues, Deakin moved on the Fisher government at the
Address in Reply, which had outlined Labor’s programme for the coming session of
Parliament. Deakin defended his action to the House by saying, ‘I object to a
Government in a minority filling any office or any representative position while under
challenge.’420 It was a baffling contention when one considers that Deakin and his
dwindling Protectionists had been the beneficiary of past support that permitted him to
lead minority governments - governments which minimised parliamentary sittings to
avoid challenges. The end came quickly. Willie Kelly, the anti-local Navy, Labor hater,
referred to so admiringly by Ottley in his 1906 CID memorandum, moved that the
debate be adjourned, which Labor opposed. Effectively, it was to be a motion of no
confidence and on 27 May 1909, Fusion (the Liberals) defeated Labor in the House of
Representatives by 39 votes to 30. The real reason for the haste may have been that
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Deakin did not want Pearce to represent Australia at the Imperial Conference. ‘Kelly,
some time later, explicitly agreed that this was indeed his intention.’

As La Nauze conceded, if Deakin knew of Kelly’s intention in advance, it was an
ungenerous and unworthy course to permit the government to be slain on the motion,
not merely of a private member, but of the private member most objectionable to the
Labor party. Fisher asked whether Kelly had moved his motion with Deakin’s
concurrence and Deakin replied, ‘Certainly’.421 If he was not surprised by the tactic, ‘to
his dismay Deakin found that all those with whom he had laboured to lay the
foundations of a liberal bourgeois state were on the opposite side of the House, while
his erstwhile opponents had become his political friends’422 sitting behind him as
members of the conservative Liberal Party. His new won friends, who would keep him
in power in the short term, were arch-imperialists and opposed to a local navy.

Labor politicians regarded Deakin’s actions as duplicitous and unprincipled. As one
historian put it ‘Fisher presided over unforgiving men who were determined to make the
life of the succeeding Ministry of Deakin and Cook as difficult as possible.’423 The fury
was not confined to the Labor Party with Deakin likened to Judas Iscariot by Sir
William Lynne for withdrawing his support for the government; he found what Deakin
had done as ‘most contemptible’.424 Fisher attempted to gain a dissolution of parliament
from the Governor-General, but Dudley refused the request. Fisher’s position was
untenable: on 1 June the Labor government resigned. The only alternative was the new
majority party in the House composed of Free Traders, who opposed a local navy, and
421
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the smaller numbered Protectionists who, if they did not align with Labor, would, at
least, support a policy to petition the Admiralty for a local squadron. The GovernorGeneral then called upon Deakin to become Prime Minister with Joseph Cook as
Defence Minister.

The immediate concern for the new government was representation at the Imperial
Conference on Naval and Military Defence in London in July 1909. So precarious was
Deakin’s hold on office that he could not spare a senior minister to travel overseas; it
had to be left to the Honorary Minister and former Free Trader, Colonel Justin Fox
Greenlaw Foxton, to lead the delegation. In parliament, the Member for Lang (NSW),
William Johnson, drew the Prime Minister’s attention to a newspaper report that
Captain Creswell was being sent to the Imperial Conference in London to act as an
‘expert adviser’425. He asked, “If so, is it expected that such candour will be encouraged
by sending to the Conference as ‘expert’ an officer whose proposals it has already
characterized as being ‘based upon an imperfect conception of the requirements of naval
strategy at the present day and of the proper application of naval force?” Deakin, in
reply, advised that:

It is proposed to send Captain Creswell to London, and, in fact he is now on his
way. He is the principal naval officer of the Commonwealth. He has, I believe,
differed from even the Lords of the Admiralty on certain questions. The
honourable member will recollect that the Conference is called, among other
things, for technical discussion.426
and with that Deakin finally acknowledged Creswell’s repeated complaint:
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That technical discussion could not take place without the presence of a naval
officer. Captain Creswell as the principal naval officer of the Commonwealth
was necessarily the proper officer for that post. I have no doubt he will render
good service in the Mother Country.427

Creswell went to the Conference having fostered with the last Defence Minister the
introduction of a destroyer flotilla scheme premised on a government’s ability to pay.
He was attending an imperial conference where he had no ‘allies’ with a minister from
two fused parties, one of which was opposed to a local navy and the other had a
‘destroyers and submarines’ local navy policy. So, what was the new government’s
naval policy on which Creswell could provide technical advice?

The Imperial Conference opened in London on 28 July 1909 with delegates from
Canada, New Zealand, Cape Colony, Newfoundland, Natal, Transvaal and Orange
River Colony joining Australia’s Colonel Foxton, with Colonel Bridges and Captain
Creswell as advisors. In opening remarks British Prime Minister Asquith assured
delegates that for the British ‘with the other great Powers of the world…so far as we
can foresee, there is no immediate and no imminent cause of a quarrel’ despite Germany
accelerating its warship building programme. In this regard the Empire was faced, in
Asquith’s words, with ‘new contingencies, new possibilities’ and Britain’s response was
the construction of at least eight capital ships of the Dreadnought or Invincible type. He
then admitted that the Naval Agreement, ‘the futile tribute’ in the view of many
Australian politicians, was ‘an existing state of arrangements, which, however well
adapted it may have been to the past, is after all more or less and recognised by all
parties to be more or less, of a makeshift and a provisional arrangement.’428 However,
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defending the Empire was a substantial cost to Britain and, for the Asquith government,
all parts of the Empire should contribute to the maintenance of one navy under one
command. Colonel Foxton responded that Australia wanted its own portion of Imperial
naval defence not some ‘isolated small naval squadron’ that could be ‘fossilised’,429
which included not only the interchangeability of officers and men, but also of vessels
to ensure an equal standard of training, maintenance and efficiency. Foxton and
Creswell advanced arguments based on fiscal, procurement and workforce capability.

John Arbuthnot Fisher, 1st Baron Fisher
On the third day of the Conference, 3 August, attention turned to naval defence. The
First Lord of the Admiralty, Reginald McKenna suggested that the Dominions embrace
the fleet unit concept: one armoured cruiser (Indomitable class), three unarmoured
cruisers (Bristol class), six destroyers, three submarines and the auxiliary craft of stores
and depot ships. This came at a price tag of £3.75 million, an annual maintenance cost
of £170,000 and a wages bill for naval personnel, at English rates, of £155,000.
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McKenna indicated that Australia with its fleet unit would combine with two other units
to form the ‘Australasian Fleet’, but he did not expect any dominion to be capable of
furnishing a fleet unit immediately, nor for several years. An armoured cruiser of the
‘Indomitable’ type, crewed by Australians presently in the navy supplemented, if
required, by British officers and seamen, would suit the immediate purpose. McKenna
advised:

If the Commonwealth Government desired to have in future a Navy of its own, it
would have to begin to take thought now for the training of its own men … I do
not think the Commonwealth has the means of building ships of this type; but
here again, I think, steps might be taken to start works, at any rate for hulls and
machinery.430
The McKenna concession – build a dreadnought but do not think this is the start of a
navy – left the Conference astonished. Given the history of the Admiralty’s objections
to local naval forces, the dominion representatives sought more time to consider the
First Lord’s proposal.

In subsequent days the Admiralty, especially McKenna and Fisher, increased the
pressure on Foxton and Creswell to accept the fleet unit proposal. Belittling the
destroyer flotilla scheme, variously proposed by Creswell, the Naval Officer’s
Committee in 1906, Deakin and the 1907 British government (Tweedmouth), Jacky
Fisher emphasised that a fleet unit must be to Britain’s specifications and ‘if any
Dominion desires to have a navy of its own that navy must be founded on a permanent
basis, and the only permanent basis upon which can found it is one in which you offer a
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life-career to the men who enter your service.’431 Foxton suggested that Australia start
with destroyers. ‘Waste of money’ the First Sea Lord rebutted Foxton; if Australia
wanted to make a real contribution to the naval defence of the Empire then it needed to
be an Indomitable type of battle cruiser. Foxton tried to ‘water down’ the offer of a
dreadnought: the Commonwealth, Foxton said, ‘did not comprehend the maintenance of
the vessel as well as its original cost. The offer was an expression of a desire …’432

Creswell, putting aside momentarily the destroyer argument, emphasised that the
foundations of an Australian naval defence needed to be laid: training schools,
dockyards, gun factories and other establishments based on what Australia could afford.
This would be a better long term investment, Creswell suggested, than building a
dreadnought now. Creswell stressed throughout the discussions that his comments were
predicated on there being no immediate danger – as Asquith and McKenna had stated in
the plenary sessions - and therefore no urgent current need for more vessels of the
Indomitable type Creswell was trying to integrate the Admiralty’s stance of ‘One Flag,
One Fleet’ with Australia’s ability to sustain the purchase and maintenance of ships and
the availability and training of Australians crews. Creswell could argue that large ships,
such as dreadnoughts, were not suitable for coastal defence: their role was part of a
‘Blue Water’ (deep ocean) navy. Creswell did contend that constructing a capital ship in
a British shipyard was inconsistent with the expenditure policies of Commonwealth
governments while a dreadnought did not meet current Australian naval requirements or
development.
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British command of all the oceans assured protection locally, regionally and the sea
highways between Australia and ‘Home’. Australians knew this because any attempt at
establishing a local force had been met with ridicule or parochial rebuttal by Britain.
Even when Britain forged an alliance with the nation Australians feared most, Japan,
and even when warships were being withdrawn from the Australia Station, successive
British governments and the Admiralty assured Australians of British naval protection.
So, when Australians thought ‘local navy’ in the past, it was wishful thinking to hope
for ocean going cruisers and torpedo boats; Creswell did – and had been ‘punished’ for
it. The enticement for Australia now was that the British appeared to realise that
something needed to be done about the naval situation in the Pacific: for while the
Admiralty felt secure with the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, its expiration in three years
time would be too late for a re-appraisal of naval requirements in the area.

The First Sea Lord underscored the argument put to the Australians so far. He reiterated the need for dreadnoughts; otherwise Australia’s contribution was valueless.
War would come in four to five years, he prophesised, and a dreadnought took at least
two years to build. Fisher, very well aware of Australia’s desire for its own navy,
suggested that their offered dreadnought along with their own coastal defence forces
would form a solid deterrent in combination with the Royal Navy to any aggressor in
time of war. The ‘fleet unit’ was to be of common configuration across the British Fleet.
Be it in ship design and construction, repair and maintenance, training, discipline or
tactical doctrine, officers and ratings from ‘Home’ or dominion navies would be able to
operate seamlessly. Promotion and interchange of service personnel was therefore not
only possible but to be encouraged for effective workforce and succession planning.
Fisher hoped that Canada, South Africa and India might also become involved in their
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own defence by making the same offer as Australia and New Zealand. The Canadian
delegation rejected outright the dreadnought proposal, but were prepared to build the
other warships for a fleet unit in Canada.

Foxton, recovered from the earlier rebuke from Fisher, re-entered the debate and volteface enthused about the fleet unit proposal, though he expressed his doubts that
Australia could meet the £500,000 upkeep. In any case, Foxton advised, he would need
to get Deakin’s approval for this scheme. Creswell must have realised that if the
government was prepared to adopt the fleet unit proposal, it was no longer necessary to
maintain ‘a sustainable naval development only’ argument. He had suggested to Labor’s
Defence Minister Pearce in February 1909 that Australian naval force of ‘a squadron of
half a dozen Dreadnoughts with cruisers, destroyers and smaller torpedo craft in due
complement would render us perfectly safe.’433 Now the British government was
sanctioning a variation of Creswell’s suggestion to complement the Imperial Fleet.
Australia would accept the proposal, legislating to establish its own navy in 1911,
following an investigation by Admiral Reginald Henderson, R.N. into the
Commonwealth’s organizational and current and future strategic requirements. The
Australian Fleet would consist of one battle cruiser (eventually the Indefatigable class,
Australia), three protected cruisers (Bristol class) – Melbourne, Sydney and Brisbane,
six destroyers (River Class) – Yarra, Parramatta, Warrego, Swan, Derwent and
Torrens, and three submarines (‘C’ class), later amended to two submarines of ‘E’ class.

Britain, while locked in a naval rivalry with Imperial Germany, was finally admitting
that the Pacific could turn nasty. By his Royal Navy re-organisation plans of 1904,
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Jacky Fisher contributed towards closing the Trafalgar Century and, as a consequence,
helped to dissolve Pax Britannica. The battleships had been going home for some time,
re-deployed to fleets to defend Britain in a war all knew was coming. Fisher and the
Admiralty envisaged in the fleet unit the answer to the peacetime protection of the
possession and interests of the British Empire in the Pacific. As the First Sea Lord told
Viscount Esher, it would mean the dominions and India ‘running a complete Navy! We
manage the job in Europe. They’ll manage it against the Yankees, Japs, and Chinese, as
the occasion requires out there!’434 The Admiralty would allow a naval unit of its
determination - but assigned to the Imperial Fleet in time of war. While the ‘fleet unit’
was created in Britain’s global naval strategic interest, the Admiralty was not entirely
conceding local navies to the dominions: if attacked, England expected every dominion
to do its duty. The new Trafalgar, it was assumed, would be in the North Sea (Jacky
Fisher’s prophesised ‘Armageddon’), not in the South Pacific or off the coast of
Canada, South Africa or China. Writing to Gerard Fiennes, a confidante and a naval
journalist with The Times, Jacky Fisher said:
I coined the title of ‘the Pacific Fleet’ for the great Imperial Navy to be hereafter
provided as one homogeneous whole by Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South
Africa and India. The keel is laid (though no one knows it) of that great Pacific
Fleet, which is to be in the Pacific what our Home Fleet is in the Atlantic and
North Sea – the Mistress of that Ocean as our Home Fleet is of the Atlantic.435
Foxton cabled Deakin on 11 August outlining the fleet unit proposal and then by letter
to Deakin on 13 August reporting about all the hard work he had put in, particularly
such adjustments to the proposal that ‘would be acceptable in Australia, assuming the
adoption at all.’436 To ensure Deakin appreciated his key role – Foxton would later
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petition Deakin unsuccessfully for an imperial honour as a reward – he noted that
‘Creswell’s advocacy of Destroyers only fell to pieces at once under the criticisms of
Fisher, Ottley and others at our meeting at the Admiralty. He is I think converted on that
point.’437 Foxton was hardly going to show himself in a poor light when he, the only
Australian witness reporting back to his Prime Minister, had Creswell on hand to blame
for the hesitancy. It was Foxton who responded to the fleet unit proposal with pursuing
the affordable destroyer option whilst downplaying the offer of a dreadnought as ‘a
desire’. It was Foxton who had been silenced by the withering rebukes of Fisher, as the
Proceedings of the Imperial Conference on Naval and Military Defence record. Deakin
telegraphed Foxton on 19 September 1909 that the Admiralty proposals were
acceptable. Deakin’s ‘only a desire’ had become a reality.

1 March 1901, the day the constitution provided for the defence forces to become a
Commonwealth responsibility, is recognised as the Navy’s Foundation Day.
Arguments would ensue for a number of years as to which party was politically
responsible for the foundation of the Australian navy. The fact was, the placing of the
order on 10 February 1909 for ‘Fisher’s Destroyers’ with initially two to be built in
Britain and a third to be re-assembled in Australia was not revoked; the keels for
Australia’s first warships were laid in March 1909. Defence Minister Pearce recounted
in his autobiography, that when the Fisher Government came into office at the end of
1908 ‘a vigorous defence policy’ was pursued:

This was the first definite step for the commencement of the Royal Australian
Navy. These ships were ordered before the orders given by the third Deakin
government for the battle cruiser Australia, which in certain quarters has been
claimed as the beginning of the Royal Australian Navy. In fact it was the
placing of the orders for these destroyers by the first Fisher Government that led
437
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to its downfall, as the parliamentary opposition claimed we had acted without
the authority of Parliament in placing those orders.438

This was the basis for the claim by Prime Minister Fisher and Defence Minister Pearce
that they, and not Deakin, were the political founders of the Australian Navy. Writing
two years later, in June 1911, Pearce would still claim that ‘the historic ‘Dreadnought
Scare’, so far from forcing the growth of public opinion in the direction of ‘One Navy,
one control’, had in Australia the opposite effect of solidifying opinion in favour of an
Australian owned and controlled Navy.’439 Deakin’s Liberals came to regard ‘the Scare’
and the fleet unit plans of Sir John Fisher as the origins of the Australian navy. Labor
accepted the unilateral action of Andy Fisher and Pearce and the delivery of actual
warships as the culmination of Labor policy since 1904. In a similar way Hyslop
asserted, that ‘Australia now had a naval policy’ 440 as a result of accepting the
Admiralty proposal of a 12 ship unit within a British Eastern Fleet, remains a difficult
claim. There was no underpinning principle, strategic or political, no cabinet or party or
parliamentary consideration for this ‘naval policy’. Deakin had simply said ‘Yes’ in a
telegram and later sought parliamentary approval.

The 1909 Imperial Conference on Naval and Military Defence turned out to be more
about consideration of British naval needs and strategy than facilitating an independent
navy for Australia. It was a convergence of unequal maritime interests: between the
threat of Germany in Europe for Britain and, for Australia, the potential threat of Japan
in the Pacific. However, ‘the outcome thereby was not the attainment of an independent
Australian navy’, Ross Lamont has noted. ‘Instead Australia acquired a fleet unit,
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subject more to imperial considerations and strategic requirements than to
Australian.’441 An Australian navy was acquired more out of the rivalry between Britain
and Germany, than recognition of the Commonwealth’s – or Creswell’s – aspirations to
establish and develop its own naval defence. For at least the next ten years, it would be
a navy that was not truly Australia’s.

The outcome for Alfred Deakin would be an Australian navy to complement a foreign
policy – the ‘White Australia’ policy being the cornerstone - reflecting Australian
interests. The threat of conflict with Japan, however remote Britain may think it may be,
did not leave Australian consciousness. In an effort to protect Australia from the
Japanese, Deakin wrote to Lord Crewe, Secretary of State for the Colonies, in
September 1909 seeking Britain’s help to create a ‘Pacific Pact’ among like-minded
nations and persuade the United States to extend the Monroe Doctrine into the South
Pacific. In this letter, Deakin suggested that the Commonwealth, when deemed
appropriate, would the warships of other nations (particularly, the United States) to visit
each other in an effort to foster friendly relations with like minded Pacific powers. As if
to underline Australian concerns, Deakin had not been impressed by the uninvited visit
of the Japanese Naval Squadron to Australian ports in 1903, and he was not keen to
have such a thing happen again.

The reception in London to this letter was rather predictable: Lord Crewe called it
“Deakin’s curious letter” and added that he rather dreaded a concrete discussion

441

Lamont, R., ‘A.W. Jose in the politics and strategy of naval defence, 1903-1909’, p.213 in Stevens,
D. and Reeve, J. (Eds.), Southern Trident: Strategy, history and the rise of Australian Naval Power,
Allen & Unwin, Crows Nest, 2001

224

between ‘Australia and ourselves on these subjects’. Deakin received a reply from
Crewe on 15 December 1909 rejecting his proposed ‘Pacific Pact’. Lord Crewe wrote
‘regarding the Monroe Doctrine, one has to remember that this so-called principle is
really only an assertion, which those who advance it are presumably prepared to back
by force. We acquiesce in it generally, because it suits us to do so, but I don’t know
that we should agree to every application, which the United States might conceivably
choose to make of it.442

Deakin’s foray into international relations presumed preservation of the White Races of
the Pacific, backed by a naval capability, but in Australia’s case that naval capability
needed to be made a reality. To progress this the Deakin government proposed a
Defence Bill detailing the requirements for having a fleet unit with three-quarters of a
million pounds set aside for naval defence. Accompanying the Defence Bill was a Naval
Loan Bill seeking to authorise the Fusion Government to borrow £3.5 million on the
open market. It was envisaged that a preliminary capital outlay of £3.75 million would
be required for one armoured cruiser of the ‘Indomitable’ class, three armoured cruisers
of the ‘Bristol’ class, six destroyers and three submarines. ‘Invincible’, ‘Indomitable’ or
‘Indefatigable’ Class? References at the time varied, as if one was unsure what Australia
was getting or, perhaps, acknowledging that the class had varied little since the
Invincible. The Indefatigable class Australia and the New Zealand, according to the
historian H.P. Wilmott, were irresponsibly laid down at a time, when the British had
introduced the Lion Class as a successor to the Invincible. He considered that ‘the
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Indefatigable class was one of the worst classes, if not the worst class, of capital ship
laid down before the First World War.443

Speaking in the debate on Deakin’s Defence Bill, Opposition Leader Fisher said, ‘our
primary purpose and almost our sole duty is to provide for the defence of this great
island continent and the territories under its control.’ The Labor parliamentarians could
agree to the bill as ‘the scheme will work out ultimately for the good of Australia, and,
if passed into law, help to safeguard the best interests of the Empire.’ He alleged the
Liberals were introducing Labor’s proposed destroyer scheme ‘in addition to the
armoured cruiser of the ‘Indomitable’ class.’ For Fisher, ‘the only difference … is that
we had the courage to do a new thing, and the responsibility for it.’ What was
particularly reprehensible to Andy Fisher (and no doubt Creswell) was ‘that until we
enter upon the construction of these vessels in Australia, we shall suffer a loss of
prestige, and miss an opportunity to have men trained for the work. Many people think
that because such vessels have not been built in Australia they cannot be constructed
here.’ Fisher recognised the necessity of a link between the British and the Australian
navies, but insisted that ‘the sole control of the fleet must be with the
Commonwealth.’444 The Naval Defence Bill and the Naval Loan Bill was approved by
parliament on 24 November.

On 16 November Creswell voiced the need to move expeditiously: the Admiralty had
recommended that the construction of the ‘Indefatigable’ class cruiser should proceed
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forthwith because of its long construction period.445 Yet the Deakin government seemed
somewhat ‘flat-footed’: support for a local navy capability was so overwhelming (the
parliamentary vote for the bills were thirty-six to six), the necessary arrangements
should have followed immediately after legislative approval. It was not until 8
December that Defence Minister Cook sought advice from Creswell on the next steps to
be taken to give effect to the fleet unit scheme. The following day, 9 December, Cook
cabled the Colonies Secretary that the Commonwealth Parliament had approved the
fleet unit scheme and the funds to construct the ships. The Admiralty was asked to make
arrangements for the construction without delay of the armoured cruiser of the
Indefatigable type (the future HMAS Australia), then the three improved Bristol type
cruisers. It was not until 29 December 1909 that Cook cabled the Colonies Secretary to
acknowledge the three ‘Fisher Destroyers’ under construction in Scotland and proposed
that the remaining three be built in Australia.

Incredibly, Cook advised that the

Commonwealth government looked to the Admiralty for assistance, suggestions or
recommendations in building the destroyers. This was an astonishing approach by
Cook, given the years Creswell, Professor Biles and Clarkson had already spent on
research, design and construction for the destroyer building programme. In March the
following year, Deakin and Cook accepted the tender of John Brown and Company to
construct Australia with the keel laid on 26 June 1910 at an expected cost of £2 million.

To achieve a local navy, Deakin determined that the Admiralty had to be part of the
solution. As a dominion within the Empire any local naval force would be part of an
Imperial fleet – at least operationally. Britain possessed the local repair and
maintenance facilities (as Australia Station assets). Britain had the expertise not only
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for design and construction of warships, but for basic, officer, gunnery, torpedo and
technical training; and Britain needed to be the source of skilled seamen to substantially
crew and command Australian vessels initially until local competency and crew in
sufficient numbers were acquired.

The Deakin government fell prior to proclamation of the Naval Defence and Loan Acts.
Labor could stand Deakin’s prevarication no longer. It was too little, too late on naval
matters. ‘Deakin introduced the first concrete measures for Commonwealth defence, but
he did so, on the inspiration of the Labor Party; without their support he could not have
carried them forward.’ Booker has noted: ‘The conservative politicians had no interest
in an independent defence force, being content to leave it to the British, and Deakin
alone could not have won sufficient support from them for the kind of programme he
inherited from the Labor leaders to be able to put it into effect without Labor’s help.’446

Deakin’s naval defence policy had been acquiescence in Britain and shadow boxing at
home. He talked schemes and programmes, as he talked in the same breath of the
unavailability of finance and deference to what Britain would allow. Deakin saw the
creation of an Australian navy as something Australia should do, but it was not
something he did. It was only in the last months of his insecure government, with pronavy Labor support, that the bills passed.

Deakin had lacked executive assertiveness. “Like so many gifted advocates” Admiral
Feakes asserted, “he was apparently weak in execution.”447 Generally, he could
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persuade parliamentarians to accept his thinking or legislative programme but to Feakes
it would almost appear “that the greater the advocate, the lesser the executive.”448
Defending her grandfather, Judith Harley said that ‘real achievements require time,
influence and tact. Deakin was neither a naval officer nor a strategist’449 and yet Deakin
did not value the expertise about him. What Deakin failed to do was lead: he did not
bring Creswell or other local naval officers into his counsel. He did not allow the
advocacy and negotiations to be undertaken by his relevant ministers, seemingly
allowing the navy to be caught up with his political destiny and spiritualism. (Deakin
believed:
in prophecy and inspiration … whose insights and experiences gradually
convinced him that his political labours were mandated by the Divine will, and
that the fate of his beloved nation was somehow linked to his own capacity for
spiritual gnosis and moral improvement.450
He did not put in place an organisation of naval administration to support his ‘concept
of an Australian Fleet’, nor, for instance, make better use of Tickell, Clarkson and
Colquhoun. These three serving officers not only could have delivered technical data,
options and strategic considerations to government but also bring an appreciation of a
local naval capability to a broader audience (parliamentarians and the general
public).Unlike Fisher and Pearce, Deakin did not translate advocacy to action. He did
not convert oratory into deeds. Deakin was not the catalyst for acquiring a navy. He was
not a visionary. He accepted that the instruments of naval warfare would protect the
interests of Australia, but Deakin did not transcend the orthodoxies of his day: only with
the consent, expertise and unity of control of the British Navy, whose fleet would
remain the prime protector in Australian waters, would a local naval force be possible.
448
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Deakin spent time in this ‘worthy course’ building relationships to gain approval to gain
access to the naval expertise and the construction yards. However, his influence was
ineffectual and his tact looked more like subservience. Disguised as the Morning Post’s
special correspondent, Deakin in part condemned the governments he led when he said
in January 1910 that:

During the previous eight years of the Commonwealth, though much has been
said, nothing has been done even approaching the work accomplished during the
last few months towards the organisation of up-to-date forces naval and
military.451
What Andrew Fisher did in government was respond to his party’s long-standing
position on naval defence – for a truly Australian navy; a navy according to a Creswell
concept of cruisers and destroyers into which a dreadnought would now be
incorporated. What Deakin did was respond to the priorities of Britain for a
dreadnought, followed by cruisers and destroyers; a fleet unit according to a Jacky
Fisher concept.

Deakin was ultimately impotent in achieving a local navy. His potency to manipulate
the conduct of parliament was also fading. Arthur Jose in a letter to Deakin in March
1910 warned him that ‘you don’t know the men with whom you are now entangled … I
–and not only I– am so miserable about your connection with the N.S.W. ‘fusionists’.452
After 1910, Deakin would never have majority support again on the floor of the House;
he could not be trusted by Labor and he never served as Prime Minister again and, since
at least 1907, dementia was closing in on him. In the Senate on 13 September 1911,
Liberal Senator James McColl praised Deakin’s efforts in setting aside funds, calling for
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an Australian navy and for making one of the finest speeches in the House on the
matter. Referring to Deakin’s frequent, profuse utterances, Labor’s Defence Minister,
Senator Pearce replied mockingly, ‘If eloquent speeches could have built a navy, we
should have had the biggest navy in the world.’453
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Chapter VI
1910- 1913 An Australian Navy: ‘A great bond of union’

In the four years leading up to the outbreak of World War I, the themes of the past
decade continued to reverberate: though Britain acknowledged the Commonwealth’s
aspiration for a navy and agreed to assist Australia in achieving it, Britain did not
deviate from its naval creed of One Flag, One Fleet. Britain still played the role of the
controlling parent. In the pre-war period the First Lord of the Admiralty Winston
Churchill would disparage local navies. Australian politicians continued to bicker over
who deserved the credit for establishing the navy, while not confronting Britain to
substantiate its commitment to an Imperial Pacific Fleet. Meanwhile, Creswell’s task as
the pre-eminent Australian navalist was made difficult by divisions amongst members
of the Naval Board. The Commander-in-Chief Australia Station, Vice-Admiral Sir
George King-Hall, encouraged Creswell to resign and with the personal and public
traumas of 1913 Creswell considered resignation. These difficulties made Creswell’s
vision of a genuinely Australian navy ever more difficult to achieve.

The Liberal government was defeated at the general election held on 13 April 1910 with
Deakin barely holding his electorate, Ballarat, by 443 votes. Labor won in a landslide,
becoming the first political party in a federal election to have majority in either House.
Andy Fisher was Prime Minister for the second time at the head of the world’s first
elected socialist government. On entering government Labor scrapped any idea of a
defence loan; Deakin had proposed a loan to pay for a navy, Fisher a land tax. Deakin’s
financing was object specific, Fisher’s land tax proposal was targeted to not only pay
for a navy but also finance an assisted immigration programme that directly would
232

increase the population in Australia and indirectly could provide recruits for its defence
forces.

The Labor Government brought in its own Defence Act for the administration, control
and organisation of the defence forces. Much of the Act reflected the February 1910
report prepared by Lord Kitchener, who had been invited by the Deakin Government in
late 1909 to critique Australian defence and its requirements. His strategic
considerations were based on the Empire’s existence being dependent on British sea
superiority. ‘No British dominion can be successfully and permanently conquered by an
organised invasion from overseas’454 his report stated. Kitchener held to the British
naval stratagem: concentrate the Royal Navy in the theatre of operation (Europe), while
dominions maintained adequate land forces against local attacks until Britain had
asserted its sea superiority and then proceeded to the affected dominion. His report
submitted in February 1910 proposed an 80,000 personnel peace time strength army,
with 107,000 available in wartime provided through compulsory service; an unCreswellian approach to the defence of Australia.

To progress the Party’s navy policy, Pearce placed before cabinet on 16 May a proposal
for a senior Royal Navy officer to visit Australia and advise the government on a naval
defence scheme for Australia. He wanted ‘sound, experienced and unchallenged’ expert
advice on training, gunnery, torpedo and signal schools, a boys’ training school and the
location of naval bases. In an obvious reference to Creswell, Pearce stated he ‘fully
valued’455 the advice in the Commonwealth, but he sought the expertise of a British
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naval strategist, possibly Beaumont, Custance, Seymour or Neal. In doing this, he
advised the cabinet, it would counter not only local or parochial interests (presumably
Creswell), but defeat the challenges from anti-local navy lobbyists. He told his
colleagues, ‘we are practically commencing our Naval Policy.’456 This would be an
undertaking of extraordinary expenditure, building the fleet unit to Royal Navy
specifications in British shipyards. Creswell was unlikely to have felt slighted by the
Australian government utilising British naval expertise. In advocating an Australian
navy, Creswell had always been in favour of a modern navy reflecting the latest
technical developments.

On 24 May the government decided to enquire whether the recently retired First Sea
Lord Jacky Fisher could come to Australia. Fisher, who resigned on 25 January 1910,
already thought that Kitchener had forgotten that Australia was an island, criticising the
emphasis that Kitchener placed on land forces. He wrote to Lord Esher on 27 May
1910 of his reaction to the Australian proposal: ‘I’ve declined. I’d go as Dictator but not
as Adviser.’ To date, the posture of non-Labor Commonwealth governments had been
land before sea in developing a self-defence force. Fisher had not agreed with an army
man, though distinguished, providing the first defence review. He told Esher, ‘they have
commenced all wrong and it would involve me in a campaign I intend to keep clear of
with the soldiers. By the wording of the telegram I expect further pressure. Besides
what a d-d fine thing to get me planted in the Antipodes.’457

The retired First Sea Lord, though residing on continental Europe, was still influential in
British naval appointments, strategy and development, while observing and critiquing
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European naval power interplay. All this could not be done from the Southern
Hemisphere. Instead, Lord Fisher and the new First Sea Lord Admiral Sir A.K. Wilson
strongly recommended, and the Australian government accepted, the recently retired
Admiral Sir Reginald Henderson. Admiral Henderson had never held a sea-going
command and had spent the last ten years of his naval career in control of dockyards
and reserves. Creswell had known Henderson when they served together aboard HMS
Phoebe during the world cruise of Admiral Phipps-Hornby’s Flying Squadron in 1869.
He brought with him fellow Fisher ‘acolytes’ on his staff: Captain Francis HaworthBooth, Staff Paymaster H.W. Eldon Manisty and Lieutenant John Ambrose Slee.

Jacky Fisher may have declined to conduct a review of naval defence for Australia;
however, he did give the Antipodes the benefit of his advice. Stating the obvious, Fisher
wrote to Australian Defence Minister Pearce in July 1910 that “Australia is an island
like England” and encouraged Pearce to consider the strategic thinking of Sir Julian
Corbett’s latest work, The Campaign of Trafalgar. Corbett’s work was reviewed in the
Times Supplement of 7 July 1910 and Fisher provided Pearce with a copy of the
newspaper, drawing Pearce’s attention by underlining a significant observation:
… Throughout the entire campaign the responsibility for the defence of these
islands and for the maintenance of Empire devolved upon the seamen; the
function of the soldiers were secondary and subordinate. It was essential,
however, that the defence should take on the character of offence, and that the
military forces should be used as it were as projectiles to the guns of the Fleet.458
Pearce realised that ‘a navy is a creation of slow growth and must have small
beginnings.’ He also appreciated the place the navy had in the defence of Australia: ‘It
is better for us to meet the invader on the sea – a truism that has always been recognised
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in the island home of our race. The Australian Navy, small as it is, is a perpetual
guarantee to the Australian people that there can be no invasion of the Commonwealth
until their fleet has been destroyed.’459 For Australia, it became an early truism: an
Australian military force could not be delivered to a theatre of war, except by sea.

The Australian Navy would be the creation of Australia declared acting Prime Minister,
Billy Hughes, when speaking on 16 November in the debate on the Naval Defence Bill,
and this included declining acceptance of an Admiralty contribution of £250,000
towards the maintenance of this fleet: “We propose to accept nothing from Great
Britain, but to pay for the whole fleet ourselves; since we are going to do the work, we
might as well do it well.”460 Hughes thought it remarkable that the Empire was robust
enough to allow diversity amongst the dominions, and yet be one Empire. Therefore it
was possible he said ‘to create an Australian Navy, which shall be under
Commonwealth control, and yet shall be an integral part of the British Fleet in time of
disturbance, or where an emergency shall arise. The principle is that it shall be a
Commonwealth Navy, manned and officered by Australians.’461

Joseph Cook, the former Liberal Defence Minister, followed Hughes in the debate and
bristled at Labor’s references to ‘our naval scheme’, claiming it was the Liberals’
scheme. He was reminded by members on the government benches as to who purchased
the destroyers, which were part of the current scheme and Labor’s longstanding support
for a local navy. On 25 November 1910, the Naval Defence Act was given royal assent,
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confirming the 1909 Naval Agreement of an Australian Fleet Unit comprising one
armoured cruiser, three unarmoured cruisers, six destroyers and three submarines.

The destroyers, Yarra and Parramatta steamed from Portsmouth on 19 September
under the overall command of Captain Frederick Tickell, CMG, CNF, with Lieutenant
Commander Feakes, CNF commanding the Parramatta and Lieutenant Commander
T.W. Biddlecombe, CNF the Yarra. The Times reported that, ‘the ships are
commissioned as vessels of His Majesty’s Navy for the passage and temporary
commissions have been issued by the Admiralty to all officers.’462 It was not yet a navy
Australia could call its own. The destroyers were accompanied to Australia by the
cruiser, HMS Gibraltar, which carried the destroyers’ relief crews, commanded by
Captain EPFG Grant, RN. The wife of the British Prime Minister, Mrs Herbert Asquith,
had launched the Parramatta on 9 February 1910 from the Fairfield Ship Company’s
yard at Govan, Scotland with words that set Parramatta’s place in Australia’s history
and the Australian Navy’s place within the Empire. ‘First-born of the Commonwealth
Navy, I name thee Parramatta.’ Mrs Asquith invoked. ‘God bless you and those who
sail in you, and may you uphold the glorious traditions of the British Navy in the
Dominions overseas.’463 The Yarra was launched from Denny’s yard Dumbarton a few
weeks later on 9 April. On 23 November 1910, the small flotilla arrived at Fremantle,
having first reached Australia at Broome on 16 November. Feakes later recalled
Creswell met the arriving destroyers and declared to the young officers onboard ‘You
will benefit by the labours of your predecessors; the new navy will be your
inheritance.’464
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Prime Minister Fisher enthusiastically embraced the development of the Australian
Navy, but was of the view that Australian warships should be at the disposal of the
British Admiralty in war time. In Mahan’s view the decisions of the Fisher government
provided the right balance in the security and protection of Britain and Australia:

The British Empire territorially is an inheritance from times not democratic, and
the world is interested to see whether the heir will prove equal to his fortune.
There are favourable signs; one of the most so that has met my eye has been the
decision of the Labour Government of Australia that in time of war the
Australian Navy should be at the absolute disposal of the British Admiralty.
Such sentiment, realised in commensurate action, is effective imperial
democracy.
According to Mahan, ‘the security of the British Empire, taken as a whole with many
parts, demands first the security if the British Islands as the corner stone of the fabric;
and, second, the security of the outlying parts.’465 Creswell, too, was pragmatic enough
to realise that British control over the Australian fleet in wartime was inevitable.

Australia’s naval development and relationship with the Royal Navy prompted Prime
Minister Fisher to suggest an Imperial conference on naval matters. The Admiralty
initially responded by calling for the creation of a three-unit Pacific Fleet (the East
Indies station, the China station and the Australian station). The Australian unit would
be controlled, financed and, eventually, in time, would be entirely crewed by
Australians but would be part of an Imperial Fleet. It was a fobbing attempt not to have
a conference and a reiteration of Jacky Fisher‘s Fleet Unit proposal. The British
government finally agreed to an Imperial conference in mid-1911.
465
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From the Opposition benches, Deakin maintained his declarations to Britain, and the
world at large, that Australia’s interests needed to be taken into account when matters of
foreign and defence policy were being considered in imperial forums. On the last day of
sitting of the House of Representatives in 1910, 25 November, Alfred Deakin delivered
what Meaney considered one of the greatest and most prescient speeches in the
Commonwealth Parliament. To the ministers (Andrew Fisher, George Pearce, Defence
Minister, and Egerton Batchelor, External Affairs Minister) who would attend the
Imperial Conference in 1911 Deakin affirmed what had become bipartisan policy:
‘Australia is being forced into a foreign policy of her own because foreign interests and
risks surround us on every side. A Pacific policy we must have’ Deakin declared. ‘They
(foreign politics) affect our business more and more. We must be observant, like every
other nation, providing buffers to prevent shocks, and placing intervals, between us and
danger centres’ 466

Deakin favoured the Imperial Conference concept, but considered that the growing
needs and emergencies of the Empire were such that an Imperial response required
Britain and the dominions to work in concert. He would not let go of his proposition for
an imperial council, advocating the need for a body “representative of our race in every
part of the world”, to follow through on the resolutions of Imperial Conferences, which
met only every four years. “It is by means of an Imperial Conference, and in no other
way, that the peoples overseas can obtain a voice in Imperial affairs, which are their
own affairs, as they are affected by interests or actions within or without the Empire.”467
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The navy had emerged as the instrument of protection and security for this maritime
nation and on 1 March 1911 Admiral Henderson delivered his report for the structure
and development of the naval organisation. He recommended a navy board of
administration and a £23,000,000 staged development of the Commonwealth’s navy
over twenty-two years for a fleet of 48 vessels (eight dreadnoughts, ten protected
cruisers, eighteen destroyers and twelve submarines), three depot ships and one fleet
repair ship. This would be a ‘Two Ocean’ type navy of 15,000 men. The Eastern
Division would have Sydney as the headquarters with the First Main Squadron of four
Invincibles and the First Cruiser Squadron of five improved Bristol classed vessels
based in Sydney. Based at Brisbane would be the First Destroyer Flotilla (six
destroyers), while at Westernport, Victoria there would be the Second Destroyer Flotilla
along with a submarine flotilla; another submarine flotilla would be based at Port
Stephens on the mid-north coast of New South Wales. The Western Division would be
based at Cockburn Sound, Fremantle, Western Australia and comprise the Second Main
Squadron (four Invincibles), the Second Cruiser Squadron, a destroyer flotilla and a
submarine flotilla. Included in the Western Division was a submarine flotilla based at
Port Lincoln, South Australia.

Henderson in his report’s introduction raised the old spectre that ‘once the Command of
the Sea is lost by the Empire, no local system of defence, Naval or Military, could
secure Australia’s autonomy and she would be the prey of the strongest Maritime
Power.’ He reinforced the long-time stratagem that only ‘Unity of purpose … will give
great strength to the Sea Power of the Empire, and, unity of control in War of all the
Naval Forces of the Empire is of paramount importance.’ As the Report unfolded it
became evident that Henderson concurred with and may have been influenced by his
240

colleague of midshipman days: the argument, logic, recommendations and sentiments
were Creswellian. Henderson repeated the dictum which Australian navalists well knew,
that ‘being girt by the sea and having no inland frontiers to protect, Australia is
compelled to regard the sea itself as her first and natural lines of defence.’ 468 It was the
sine quo non of the naval officers’ committees of 1899 and September 1906 and the
annual reports of Creswell to parliament. Yet Britain, threatened – real or imagined – by
the loss of ‘One Flag, One Fleet’, had denied Australia a local navy for years. It should
be remembered that Creswell’s 1901 report had envisaged four cruisers for Australia by
1909.469

Lord Fisher, misguidedly assured Henderson that “you will live to be gratified to see its
completion.”470 It was a vision of a fifty-two vessel navy with fifteen thousand
personnel by 1933. By 1934 Australia had six ships in commission and thirteen in
reserve and a strength of 3248 personnel.

471

Australia had neither the political will,

economy or population required to sustain such a naval force. This flaw was
accentuated when Henderson’s report underlined the enormity of the task. Australia
would struggle, given the restraints of population and economy, to match even a ‘One
Power Standard’. In the Asia-Pacific region Japan, with a 113-ship navy by 1914, was
utilizing British technology and expertise, to build its own warships. Henderson
reported:

If Australia were an independent Nation, the Sea Power required by her to
render her immune from aggression would be determined by the Sea Power of
her possible enemy or enemies; the existence in a state of independence could
468
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only be assured by the maintenance of an Australian Naval Force equal to, if not
greater than, that of the possible enemy.

Power given under the Constitution to have a defence force was never utilised because
of Australia’s deferential relationship with Britain. As Henderson noted, this meant that
‘Australia cannot, do more than undertake her share of the burden now borne, almost
entirely, by the Mother Country.’ Australia had little choice but to acquiesce: Australia
was bound to the Royal Navy by ‘the enormous cost of modern Navies, coupled with
the present comparatively small population of the Commonwealth.’472

The Henderson Report was in line with Creswell’s vision of a naval defence reflected in
his many reports, not only with regard to ships and infrastructure (bases, dockyards,
training schools), but implicitly the maritime doctrine underpinning it. The Report was
extensive – seventy pages in length - covering control and administration, personnel,
training, naval bases, communications and intelligence systems, naval reserves and
stores. The minutiae of the report was extensive: from the remuneration rates of officers
and ratings to the clerical requirements for the Navy Board (twenty six in total) and that
the Commonwealth’s contribution to the Fleet Unit would even include 22 bandsmen
and 3 ship’s musicians; it was also a small, subtle example of the ‘parental’ guidance by
the Royal Navy to the infant Australian Navy.

One of the significant recommendations related to control and administration. It would
prove controversial to the Royal Australian Navy’s operation and relationship with the
Commonwealth government over the next eight years. Henderson noted that the current
Board did not ‘appear to have any executive authority or control over the Naval Forces
472
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…’ and under the Defence Act of 1910 ‘the control of the Naval Forces, under present
conditions is, therefore, exercised by the Government (i.e. the Minister of Defence)
through the Naval Board, but the Naval Board has no power of its own, and is merely a
mouth-piece.’

Henderson brought to the Commonwealth Government’s attention that in Britain the
Board of the Admiralty ‘is responsible as a whole for the government of the Navy, and
is appointed, and acts, as a single authority.’473 He recommended that the
Commonwealth Naval Board should be similarly constituted with each member of the
Board having specific responsibilities. Of all the recommendations that Henderson put
forward, this would have been the one to gain Creswell’s strongest endorsement.
Henderson may have been made aware from Admiralty briefings or discussions with
Creswell of the attitudes of past Commonwealth governments to constituting a naval
force and the ‘false dawns’ on commitments to an Australian navy.

Whatever the failure of past governments to provide for a local naval capability, it is the
hallmark of a constitutional democracy, that it is the determination of the peoples’
representatives what, how, when and where national resources are committed. Two
years earlier, Andrew Fisher relied on William Creswell and expeditiously requisitioned
the ‘Fisher Destroyers’, while Deakin relied on Britain for advice and accepted the
Jacky Fisher Fleet Unit model. Now, with an overwhelming parliamentary majority and
a political platform, which had long included the creation of an Australian owned and
controlled navy, the Labor Government would determine the measures necessary for an
integrated naval defence. While the arrangements would prove difficult for Creswell in
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particular in the future, executive authority and control would rest with the Minister.
Robert Hyslop noted that:
… some of Henderson’s ideas on politics and administration were quaint …
Henderson had apparently forgotten that the relationship between Minister and
Navy Board was almost precisely the same as that between First Lord and the
Board of the Admiralty [and] Henderson seems to have missed the point that in
cabinet government a board or a committee can only be advisory.474

It would be the cornerstone of the civil-defence services relationship: the defence
services were-and- are the instruments of the state, subservient to the state, affirming the
state’s national security and foreign policy.

On 1 March 1911 the Australian Naval Board was formally reconstituted and on 11
April, the Australian Naval Office was opened at 460 Lonsdale Street, Melbourne. The
sixty-year-old Creswell was promoted to Rear-Admiral, knighted (Knight Commander
of St Michael and St George) and made the First Naval Member of the Board. The rest
of the Board consisted of a President (Minister of Defence), the Second Naval Member
(Captain BM Chambers, RN), the Third Naval Member (Engineer Captain W. Clarkson,
CNF), and the Finance and Civil Member (HWE Manisty, RN). Where once Creswell
had one staff clerk and a coxswain for administrative staff, now he headed more
significant arrangements with the appointment of professional naval officers who would
exercise responsibility for recruitment, training and stores (Second Member); bases and
establishments – including control of dockyards, construction and repair of ships (Third
Member); and finance and contracts (Finance and Civil Member). Creswell needed to
co-ordinate and encourage co-operation between talented, but untried executive officers,
while as First Naval Member be responsible for war preparation, intelligence, ordnance,
474
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fleet operations, naval works and senior appointments. These key officers knew
Creswell and were aware of the direction the Australian Navy was to take. Manisty had
been secretary of the Henderson Naval Mission and was now Secretary of the
Australian Navy Board as well as the Finance and Civil Member, while, Captain Francis
Haworth-Booth, RN, also a member of the Henderson Mission, became the Naval
Adviser to the High Commissioner for Australia, a position he held until 1920.

Clearly, Australia needed British co-operation during its navy’s infancy. It did not have
sufficient skills, training or expertise to crew each vessel. Nor did it have,
understandably, an ample senior or junior officer class. For two senior officers, age and
a non-Royal Navy background seemed impediments to executive functions, yet both
were to perform significant roles in wartime. Chapman Clare, 57, who had been second
on the Commonwealth Naval Forces’ seniority list, was appointed District Naval
Officer, Western Australia. Having delivered the destroyers Parramatta and Yarra,
Captain Frederick Tickell, 54, third on the seniority list, was appointed Director of
Naval Reserves. Henderson made it quite clear in his recommendations that the
appointments of Naval Adviser in London and the Second Naval Member should be
officers of the Royal Navy. For Henderson, the Naval Representative was a channel of
communication between the Board and the Admiralty, maintaining harmony and
uniformity between the two Boards and generally looking after the naval interests of
Australia. In particular, with the position of Second Naval Member, as Britain was
providing so many officers and ratings to the Fleet Unit ‘it is desirable that such officers
and men should know that they are represented by one of their own officers on the
Board under which they are serving.’475
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Henderson was seeking a situation where the British Navy would look after their own,
while also maintaining unity of control. For Australians, the inference was that it would
not be entirely a navy of their own. It was in evidence when on 15 November the
Australian Blue Ensign was hoisted in the torpedo destroyers Parramatta and Yarra at
Port Phillip. The Admiralty had approved the flying of the White Ensign only for the
ship’s passage from the United Kingdom.

Australia’s acquisition of a naval capability, plus the protection of Britain’s Pacific
interests by its ally Japan, allowed Britain to concentrate its naval forces in Europe. For
many Australians the enemy was not in Europe and the threat of invasion did not come
from a European force majeur in the South Pacific. Richard Arthur writing in the radical
journal, Lone Hand, was in no doubt when he identified that ‘there is one nation, and
one nation only, with whom we have a standing possible casus belli on account of the
exclusion of her subjects, who is earth hungry owing to overpopulation of her own
territory, and who could easily strike at Australia. That nation is Japan. Japan is
therefore is the enemy. If Japan is not the enemy, then there is no enemy.’ For Arthur,
Japan had the warships and transports to land an army of 250,000 men on the east coast
of Australia within 16 to 18 days of leaving Japan. ‘It would take the Japanese fleet
something under ten minutes to destroy utterly this Australian flotilla were it mad
enough to venture into the open.’476

The Sydney Morning Herald also had concern about Japan’s territorial ambitions and
would not let its readers forget Britain’s past lack of concern over foreign domination of
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the Pacific: ‘There is nothing more certain than that the brown and yellow races must
come south in course of time. … That the indifference or sentimental bias of the home
Government lost us a great opportunity in New Guinea is a matter of history, and for
that supineness and lack of foresight we may yet have to pay dearly’ 477 Yet without an
alliance, it may be conjectured, Japan could become more unfettered in its expansion,
threatening Britain’s interests in the Asia-Pacific region. Responding to this scenario,
British naval forces could not be diminished or diverted in the northern hemisphere.
British naval stations would need to be strengthened, changing the current naval
strategy and balance of supremacy in the North Sea. With a sense of inevitability, the
Anglo-Japanese Alliance would be renewed in 1911. British Asia-Pacific interests
would continue to be dependent on Japan, while at the same time the benign attitude of
the United States would allow open sea lanes, with no perceived threat to British
interests in the western hemisphere.

The Australian delegation assembled in London in May 1911 for the Imperial
Conference still dissatisfied with the defence arrangements in the Pacific and with a
desire to exercise some influence on imperial foreign policy. Matters concerning naval
and military defence were discussed separately with the Foreign Office and the
Admiralty within the Committee of Imperial Defence (CID). Australia’s position
regarding defence seemed emphatic: ‘Australia believes that in the interest of the
Empire itself’, Defence Minister Pearce wrote, ‘we cannot leave British interests in the
Pacific either to the arbitrament of the European nations or the friendly keeping of an
Asiatic ally.’478 On arrival in London Prime Minister Fisher declared ‘that the Labor
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Party’s present view was that “Australia must first be able to defend itself before she
could consider her share in a general Imperial defence scheme.”’479 Britain would need
to give Australia some guarantee to its security and protection from attack. Although the
British ministers in office in 1909 and 1911 would give guarantees, particularly with
reference to the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, there was one abiding preferential element to
Imperial defence policy: ‘Home’ before dominions. By 1913-14, Australia would
realise, with British admissions, that an Eastern Fleet was an illusion and rather than
diminish the British naval forces in Europe, the Admiralty wanted dominion
contributions to defend Britain.

In his opening remarks at the Conference on Tuesday 23 May, Prime Minister Fisher
said, ‘With regard to Defence, speaking for the Commonwealth, our object is to protect
the liberties of our people, and assure the safety of our country.’ To make it clear to
Foreign Office and Committee of Imperial Defence officials present (including the
ubiquitous Rear-Admiral Sir Charles Ottley, Secretary of CID), Fisher added,
‘Aggression is not our aim.’480 When the dominion leaders met with the CID,
discussions turned to imperial control of the dominion navies in time of war. The
Canadian, Sir Wilfrid Laurier made his position quite clear as he had done in
introducing his country’s Naval Service bill into the Canadian parliament in January
1910: ‘If England is at war we are at war and liable to attack. I do not say we shall
always be attacked, nor do I say we would take part in all the wars of England. That is a
matter that must be guided by circumstances, upon which the Canadian parliament will
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have to pronounce, and will have to decide in its own best judgement.’ 481 As the leader
of an autonomous self-governing Commonwealth, Fisher, in principle, agreed with
Laurier’s stance. However, he could not envisage a situation in which Australia would
not support Britain in time of war.

The memorandum of the conference between the Admiralty and the representatives of
Canada and Australia in June 1911 resulted not so much in affirming the exclusive
control by the dominions over their navies, but their subservience to the Admiralty. The
King’s Regulations and the Imperial Naval Discipline Act were to apply to the
Australian Navy. Training was to be treated in a similar manner, facilitated by the
interchangeability of British and Australian naval personnel. Further, the ships of
Canada and Australia would have the White Ensign at the stern ‘as a symbol of
authority of the crown’ and the national flag at the jackstaff. By Navy Order No.77,
which appeared in the Commonwealth Gazette of 5 October, the White Ensign of His
Majesty’s Australian Ships replaced the Blue Ensign, (which was part of the apparel of
British government ships and others of special status). As Rear-Admiral Feakes later
recalled, Creswell’s:

disappointments and frustrations were many, but he had the satisfaction finally
to control a force whose vessels flew the White Ensign at the Ensign Staff and
the Southern Cross at the Jack Staff, the White Ensign under which he had been
born and bred, and the Southern Cross, symbol of the country in which he
completed his life’s work.482

Possession was all pervasive in the Conference memorandum: If the Canadian or
Australian government desired ‘to send ships to a part of the British Empire outside
their own respective station, they will notify the British Admiralty ’and if they sent
481
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ships ‘to foreign ports, they will obtain the concurrence of the Imperial Government, in
such a manner as is usual between the British Admiralty and the Foreign Office.’
Further, commanders of dominion ships in foreign ports were to furnish the Admiralty
of their proceedings and obey any instructions received from the British government ‘as
to the conduct of any international matters that may arise.’483 That these provisions to
the legal and administrative status of dominion navies needed to be made was
remarkable enough, but the permeation of the administration, operation, training and
seniority permitted the Admiralty’s control over the Australian Navy.

What Britain was re-asserting at this Conference was that the dominions of the Empire
were not sovereign: they self-governed to their shoreline. Take to the sea and in
defence, trade and foreign relations it was the Union Jack and White Ensign that defined
their existence and protection. When dominions abdicated responsibility for foreign
relations, the Imperial government needed to know that there was no bumbling
intrusions into international affairs, which impacted on British interests or for which
Britain would have to extricate itself or the offending dominion. The Australian navy
was appropriately ‘branded’ when on 10 July King George V granted the title ‘Royal
Australian Navy’ to the Permanent Commonwealth Naval Forces and the Royal
Australian Reserve with the Royal Assent later signed in October, in time for the launch
at Clydebank in Scotland on 23 October of the battle cruiser, HMAS Australia.

As a result of briefings by the Foreign Office and the Admiralty at the 1911 Imperial
Conference, Fisher, Batchelor and Pearce considered a European war inevitable. On
their return the ministerial delegation had no difficulty in persuading the Cabinet to
483
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agree to a more rigorous defence policy. For the Australian government, it remained
only to restrain the dominant power in Asia. The delegation particularly appreciated the
Foreign Secretary, Lord Grey, consulting with the dominions regarding the renewal of
the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. The Conference was well aware of Australia’s fears,
though the Canadian Prime Minister thought them unfounded. ‘The Australian
delegation was intensely relieved to learn that Britain’s treaty with Japan, the country
Australians feared most, would be renewed until 1921: “Now we’re safe for another ten
years,” remarked Fisher.’484 It deferred invasion but did not allay concern. A Round
Table article written in May 1911, possibly by former Prime Minister Chris Watson,
expressed the view that:

the rapid rise during the last few years, of two military powers, Germany and
Japan, the one apparently challenging the mother country’s supremacy on the
sea, and forcing her to concentrate a large portion of her defensive strength in
her own waters; the other a possible menace to white civilization throughout the
whole Eastern world. Australia, virtually an outpost, peopled by a mere handful
of Europeans, facing the teeming millions a newly awaken Asia cannot close her
eyes to the grave peril of isolation, and the absolute need of union with her
fellow Europeans of her own race, who will aid her to hold her own.485

The sense of vigilance was captured in a directive jointly signed on 25 October 1912 by
Fisher and Defence Minister Pearce: ‘In case of war Major General Kirkpatrick of the
Commonwealth Defence Forces shall take command and that he be verbally advised of
this by the Minister of Defence.’486

In the midst of these pre-war soundings and preparations, parliamentarians still
descended into squabbling over who founded the Australian navy. On his return from
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the Imperial Conference, Defence Minister Pearce was challenged in parliament about
Labor’s claim to be responsible for creating the navy. “Mr Deakin was always in favour
of an Australian Navy” a Liberal senator asserted. “Then why did he not bring it
forward?” Pearce replied:

As a matter of fact, he was a member of the government which turned it down,
and which introduced the proposal for a naval subsidy … … It is true that in
1906 he advocated the creation of an Australian Navy; but it is also true that in
1903 he was a member of the Government which adopted the naval subsidy in
opposition to the votes of the Labor Party, which advocated the establishment of
an Australian Navy; So that between 1903 and 1906 his views changed.

The Liberals then moved to claim ownership for the fleet unit. Pearce produced an
Admiralty memorandum of 20 July 1909 to contend it was the British who originated
the term, quoting from the memorandum that “a scheme limited to torpedo craft would
not in itself, moreover be a good means of gradually developing a self-contained fleet
capable of both offence and defence.” The Defence Minister informed the Senate that
‘unless a naval force – whatever its size – complies with this condition it can never take
its proper place in the organization of an Imperial Navy distributed strategically over the
whole area of British interests.’ The value, as Creswell and Jacky Fisher had foreseen,
‘such a fleet unit would be capable of action, not only in defence of the coasts, but also
of the trade routes, and would be sufficiently powerful to deal with small hostile
squadrons should ever such attempt to act in its waters.’487

Australia was the more advanced of all the self-governing dominions in developing a
local naval defence, but following the Imperial Conference the commitment of Britain
to a fleet for the Pacific dominions soon faded. In October 1911 McKenna was replaced
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as First Lord of the Admiralty by Winston Churchill, who was keen to further
rationalise British overseas squadrons in favour of concentration at ‘Home’. The
Director of Naval Intelligence, Rear-Admiral Alexander Bethell, reminded Churchill on
1 November that ‘ “We are under a promise to Australia and New Zealand to maintain a
fleet of a definite size in the East divided between the East Indies and China stations
and they will no doubt protest if we do not carry out our obligation.” Churchill was
unmoved. A fortnight later Bethell was banished to command the East Indies squadron.’

By January 1912, Churchill wanted every ship in Australian waters brought ‘Home’.
The First Lord informed the Colonial Secretary that he doubted whether the
Commonwealth would hand over HMAS Australia, while the New Zealand government
should be pressured to allow their battle cruiser to be kept in ‘Home’ waters. Churchill
was critical of the 1909 Agreement with Australia, finding ‘the whole principle of local
Navies is of course, thoroughly vicious.’488 Churchill advised the Governor-General of
Australia that as First Lord, he had to remind Vice-Admiral Sir George King-Hall,
Commander-in-Chief of the Australian Station, ‘that he must be careful to stick to his
task’ and not pursue ‘his desire to see New Zealand join forces with the Australian
Navy’ as Churchill was ‘certainly not prepared to encourage this idea.’489

In July 1912 Churchill informed newly elected Canadian Prime Minister Robert Borden
that ‘the decision to allow local navies … was a “thoroughly vicious departure from the
fundamental strategic principles of concentration and centralised British control.”’490
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Instead Churchill wanted Canada to give Britain $35 million to build three of the latest
battleships. Borden accepted ‘One King, one flag, one Empire and one Navy – a
powerful navy to vindicate the flag and to maintain the Empire.’491 For a dominion to
make this naval contribution. the British government would grant Canada representation
on the Committee of Imperial Defence (C.I.D.). To help Borden convince the Canadian
parliament (ultimately unsuccessfully) to approve these purchases, the Admiralty
prepared a memorandum on the status of British naval supremacy and Britain’s
disposition to respond to threat. There were two revealing features of this memorandum,
which had implications for the Pacific dominions: firstly, by 1912 Britain had only 76
vessels on overseas stations compared with 160 vessels in 1902 and, secondly, the
British now proclaimed two kinds of supremacy: general and local. It still meant, at
best, Australia was on its own until, or if, help arrived. The memorandum was explicit
about Britain’s naval position: the Royal Navy retained global reach and the right to a
fleet unit within the Imperial Fleet imposed responsibilities upon Australia. To the
Admiralty ‘general naval supremacy consists in the power to defeat in battle and drive
from the seas the strongest hostile navy or combination of hostile navies wherever they
may be found.’ This seemed a more vigorous engagement and, implied a European
‘Battle of Armageddon’ while ‘local superiority consists in the power to send in good
time to, or maintain permanently in, some distant theatre forces adequate to defeat the
enemy or hold him in check until the main decision has been obtained in the decisive
theatre.’ The Admiralty repeated the oft-recited mantra that ‘it is the general naval
supremacy of Great Britain which is the primary safeguard of the security and interests
of the great Dominions of the Crown.’
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The Admiralty also gave the ‘traditional’ warning that this safeguard was intact ‘so long
as her naval strength is unbroken.’ Dominions needed to forgo their sectional interests
and support Britain’s battleship programme against an intensifying naval race - not only
by the building programme of Germany but by many Powers. The eurocentric
Admiralty noted “Whereas, in the present year, Great Britain possesses eighteen
battleships and battle-cruisers of the Dreadnought class against nineteen of that class
possessed by the other Powers of Europe, and will possess in 1913 24 to 21, the figures
in 1914 will be 31 to 33; and in the year 1915, 35 to 51.’492

The Admiralty’s memorandum did not allay the Fisher Labor government’s concerns
regarding Britain’s commitments to the Pacific dominions. Britain wanted Canada, New
Zealand and Australia to bind with the Royal Navy to defend ‘Home’. The offer of
representation on C.I.D., Prime Minister Fisher perceived, would provide little
influence on imperial defence or foreign policies. Fisher rejected both propositions in
late 1912, proposing to the Colonies Secretary a conference in Australia to discuss a
common naval policy, co-operation in naval defence and better ‘maintenance of
Imperial rights …especially for the defence of the North and South Pacific Oceans.’493
It was a provocative suggestion, further compounded when he suggested New
Zealand,

South

Africa

or

Canada as alternative venues. Fisher was asserting

Australia’s autonomy, and that of the maritime dominions in these matters, and the need
for these dominions to be treated by Britain as equals. No conference took place.
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New Zealand’s Defence Minister, Colonel James Allen, told Churchill in late 1912 that
he was uneasy about the British security arrangements in the Pacific and displeased at
the assignment of HMS New Zealand to the Grand Fleet. He was rebuffed by Churchill,
who considered Australia and New Zealand safe, protected by the Anglo-Japanese
Alliance. Allen continued to fight for a greater British presence but was refused
repeatedly by the Admiralty. In December 1913 the New Zealand parliament passed a
Naval Defence Act to establish a national naval force: a division of the Royal Navy,
controlled by New Zealand in peacetime and under the control of the Admiralty in war.

In Australia, the challenge remained to deliver a naval defence capability: infrastructure
had to be provided for construction and engineering services, victualling and clothing;
training provided, not just of officers and ratings but for a skilled dockyard workforce;
and, importantly the ships needed to be commissioned for operations. The tempo
increased with the launch of the ‘Town’ class light cruiser, HMAS Melbourne on 30
May 1912 at Cammel Laird’s Yard, in Britain, the transfer of HMS Challenger (cruiser)
on 21 June and HMS Pioneer on 1 July to RAN and, on 29 August, the launch of
HMAS Sydney, the second Town class light cruiser at London and Glasgow
Shipbuilding, Govan Scotland. To complete the vessel acquisitions, HMAS Tingira was
commissioned at Sydney on 25 April 1912 as a training ship with, over the next fifteen
years, three thousand naval boys trained. The Defence Minister in July provided
Parliament more detailed arrangements for sourcing and training personnel for the Fleet
Unit. Under the Naval Agreement of 1903 there were three hundred and forty one
Australians serving in the Imperial Squadron in Australia, who would soon depart for
England and return amongst the crew of the new Fleet Unit, while one hundred and six
Australians served on the Imperial Squadron on the China Station and a further sixty
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three were in naval training establishments in England. The plan would be for three
hundred and twenty of this number to transfer to the Royal Australian Navy while
‘those now in Australia will be sent to England and will come out again in ships of the
Fleet Unit.’494 Captain M.L’E. Silver, CBE, RN, would command HMAS Melbourne
and Captain JCT Glossop, CB, RN, would command HMAS Sydney. Most of the
officers and senior ratings of the ship were on loan from the Royal Navy. In addition the
British 2nd Class cruiser HMS Encounter, with officers and nucleus crew, would be lent
to the Royal Australian Navy while awaiting the arrival of the Fleet Unit. It would be
under the command of Captain CB Chambers, RN, while he awaited command of the
Royal Australian Naval College at Jervis Bay. In the meantime, the Naval College
would be situated, temporarily, at Osborne House, Corio Bay, Geelong. By November
1912 a draft of ratings from Encounter were on their way to England to bring HMAS
Melbourne to Australia. Two more ‘River’ Class destroyers had been laid down on 25
January 1913: the Torrens of 750 tons at Fairfield Shipbuilding and the Huon of 700
tons at Cockatoo Island Dockyard.

To command the Australian Fleet Unit a retired British officer, George Patey, was
appointed Rear-Admiral Commanding Australian Fleet and knighted KCVO by King
George V on the deck of his flagship, HMAS Australia before his departure from
Portsmouth with HMAS Sydney in company. The Rear-Admiral Commanding (RAC)
according to Naval Order 69 of 1913 was under the orders of, and reported to, the Naval
Board. Following Patey’s appointment there was some dispute over the provision of
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housing for the Rear-Admiral. Whether it was mischievously intended is difficult to
know, but Creswell suggested the provision of a house in Hobart for Patey.495

Fisher’s second term as Prime Minister had seen a phenomenal 113 acts passed,
including legislation establishing the administration and structure of the Royal
Australian Navy, Duntroon Military College and the compulsory military training for
men between 18 and 25 years. Fisher was particularly proud of the naval college, rather
exuberantly extolling in the Labor election policy speech in March 1913 that, ‘In the
Australian navy boys can begin below the deck and rise to the top. … That is the
democratic spirit of our national defence forces. It is the national feeling associated with
the Australian owned, manned and controlled navy.’496 The Defence Minister echoed
Fisher when he linked an Australian naval defence with democracy in an article he
wrote for Lone Hand:

We are part of the British Empire and we have been safe from attack overseas,
because the British Fleet has been stronger than the fleets of any other nation …
it is not manly that we should depend for our protection on the British taxpayer.
Therefore the Labor Party has declared for an Australian Navy, which is now
being created.497

It was a call to national loyalty, but also a jibe at the Liberal opposition, which
campaigned against alleged defence extravagance and who relied for proof merely upon
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the mounting defence expenditure. The Defence Minister admonished the Liberals that
‘defence should not be a party question.’498

In the election campaign of 1913, Fisher promised to continue the expansion of the navy
and its infrastructure. In addition to the current building programme one battleship,
three destroyers (to be built in Australia), two submarines, a supply ship (to be built in
Australia) and ‘a naval aviation vessel’ would be built, while a naval ship building yard
would be established at Jervis Bay. Fisher claimed for Australia that ‘we have built,
manned and equipped an Australian navy with our own money, and established an
effective defence force’. According to Fisher, this self-reliance would continue: ‘We
build ships, make arms and ammunition, but we also open the door wide to young
Australians on their merits, to command on sea and land.’ This self-reliance also
translated into a security policy: ‘We shall join hands with all those who desire peace in
the world, while preparing for the emergencies of which history gives warning.’ To
assist this process, Fisher proposed ‘a conference of the self-governing Dominions of
the Empire in Australia, New Zealand or Canada.”499 The Liberals narrowly won the
General Election on 31 May 1913 with Joseph Cook as Prime Minister. Cook had
replaced Deakin who retired the previous January. Leo Amery visiting Australia in
1913, called on Deakin in October and ‘found a mere shadow of his former vivid
self.’500

The Commander-in-Chief Australia, Station, Vice-Admiral Sir George King-Hall, was
keen to talk to the new government about Royal Navy control and the Australian Navy.
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King-Hall found the new prime minister, “very sound and showed him a confidential
document on placing RAN under Admiralty. I sounded him as to Australia being sent
home if necessary. He said that if she went, the Adm., under pressure from Chancellor
of Exchequer, would utilise her as a substitute ship and not as an additional one.’ Prime
Minister Cook appeared to indicate that he would not accept a secondary role for
Australia’s capital ship – nor for the navy’s commander. At a later meeting, Cook
suggested to King-Hall ‘that Admiral Creswell could take command at sea over Patey’.
King-Hall noted in his diary: ‘I put him right on that score’501, unimpressed with any
hint of independent thinking on naval matters by the new government. King-Hall was
not impressed with the new defence minister, Senator Edward Millen, when they met on
21 July. Defence Minister Millen, keen to know where the Admiralty stood on the
Pacific, may have gained a similar impression of King-Hall, when the Admiral could
not give him an answer. Millen intimated to King-Hall that the naval development
programme had not been amicably bi-partisan; there could be future financial
constraints. “Senator Millen said he did not see how politics could be kept out of Naval
matters. I implored him to do so, and to stick to the Henderson programme.”502

In the last quarter of 1912 two retired British naval officers, both gunnery experts,
accepted appointments in the Australian Navy. The appointment of Commander Walter
Hugh Charles Samuel Thring to the Board in 1912 as Assistant to the First Naval
Member would prove its greatest acquisition. His contribution to the Australian Navy
endured beyond his own lifetime. Though Thring was to leave Australia in 1920 and the
RAN in 1922, his organisation and leadership of a naval intelligence service and his
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authorship of the Report on The Naval Defence of Australia (1913) and Post Bellum
Naval Policy for the Pacific (1915) provided prophetic warnings for World War I and
World War II regarding Japan. Creswell transferred his responsibility for naval
intelligence to Thring, who had hoped there would be an exchange of intelligence
information with the Royal Navy. The Admiralty rejected this favouring a lower level
exchange between the Royal Australian Navy and the Royal Navy’s China Station.

Australia’s First Naval Board.
Back row: Staff Paymaster Eldon Manisty, RN, Engineer Commander W Clarkson, RAN.
Front row: Rear Admiral WR Creswell, RAN, Defence Minister Senator George F Pearce, Captain
Constantine Hughes-Onslow, RN.

The other appointment, that of Captain Constantine ‘Crusty’ Hughes-Onslow as Second
Naval Member on 15 October 1912 was to prove the greatest threat to the viability of
the Board in 1913. Hughes-Onslow challenged the administration of the Australian
Navy, factionalised Board members and parliamentarians and fought a nasty rear-guard
action which ended in his dismissal. Hughes-Onslow had three basic ‘irritations’ with
the Board:
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1) the interfering activities of HWE Manisty, the Finance and Civil Member and
Naval Secretary, in the Second Naval Member’s areas of responsibilities,
2) the dysfunction of the Board, particularly the role of the minister vis-à-vis the
Board and the lack of binding on Members for Board decisions and
3) the rebuttal of the report, co-authored by Hughes-Onslow, on the naval defence
of northern Australia.
Nicknamed ‘Crusty’ while in the Royal Navy, Hughes-Onslow did not abide fools – nor
being treated like one: He intensely disliked Manisty, who combined the roles of Naval
Secretary and Finance and Civil Member of the Board. Responsible for personnel and
victualling, the Second Naval Member clashed bitterly with Manisty, whom he referred
to derisively as ‘a clerk’. Hughes-Onslow’s argumentative behaviour finally split the
Board over the proposition that proposed naval bases in the south be abandoned for a
northern concentration of forces, forces that would be fewer than Henderson envisaged.
It was a reasonable, logical proposition, but the Second Naval member ‘savaged’ any
opposition.

In April 1913 Creswell asked Thring and Hughes-Onslow to investigate the future of
Thursday Island as a naval base. With the Chief of General Staff Brigadier Gordon
providing advice on military aspects of fortifications, the investigation evolved into a
strategic defence survey of Australia. Thring presented The Report on the Naval
Defence of Australia on 9 July, which highlighted Australia’s vulnerability with three
key findings: Japan was Australia’s enemy; Australia could not rely on the British Fleet
for its defence and would have to defend itself; and the Henderson Report was
inadequate. It was the third finding that became the basis for Hughes-Onslow’s dispute
with certain members of the Navy Board. While critical of the Henderson Scheme, the
strategic reasoning and assertions of Thring were akin to Creswell’s abiding contention,
as Gobert has described:
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Geographically, the position of Australia with respect to Asia and the Pacific
may be compared to that of England to the North of Europe … the danger of a
descent by the Japanese, in their own good time, is a very real danger, almost
amounting to a certainty, unless adequate steps are taken for defence against it
… British ships … in the case of a European war would be largely occupied
with matters other than the defence of Australia.503

Britain’s fixation with concentrating its naval forces in Northern Europe made it clear to
Australia that a British Pacific Fleet would not eventuate. For Thring and HughesOnslow the solution was a forward defence strategy to the north of Australia and
downgrading the stages of the Henderson Scheme. Surveillance from Singapore in the
west, to Java, Timor, Papua, the Solomon Islands to Fiji would alert the Australian
Navy of the passage and direction of the Japanese invasion fleet (estimated in the
Thring Plan to be 27 battleships), troop transports (with possibly 20,000 troops) and
possible points of invasion. Distance was to be used to Australia’s advantage: the lines
of communication from Japan to Australia would be, as the historian David Stevens has
noted, ‘a critical vulnerability’ subject to troop convoys being harassed and on-route
coaling interrupted. Located in two fortified harbours, Bynoe Harbour near Darwin and
Sewa Bay on Normanby Island, South east Papua New Guinea, the Australian Navy
would act as ‘fleets in being’.

The Naval Board agreed at its 17 July meeting that the armed threat to Australia would
come from the north and that the end of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance would mark the
beginning of maximum vigilance by Australia. Having considered this prospect,
partnership with other dominions was important, particularly in contributing to a
regional fleet with a size equal to 70% of the strength of the strongest regional naval
503

Gobert, W., Lieutenant Commander, The Evolution of Service Strategic Intelligence, 19011941, in Australian Defence Force Journal, No.92, January/ February 1992, p.56

263

power. The Board deferred consideration of the Thring/Hughes-Onslow proposed bases
but agreed that all the matters considered by the Board at this meeting should be part of
the discussions at the next Imperial Conference.

Creswell was receptive to the ‘Thring Plan’. However for Creswell and Manisty the
Henderson Scheme need not be deferred or abandoned. As a Fisher-Henderson acolyte,
Manisty was in key Board roles to ensure adherence, while Creswell found the proposed
bases were cost prohibitive. Australia’s centres of commerce were south of the Tropic
of Capricorn, particularly Sydney and Melbourne as the principal population as well as
commercial centres. The greatest danger to Australia, Creswell reasoned, was the threat
to trade routes by enemy cruisers (Creswell’s bette noir); the naval bases needed to be
in proximity to the commercial sea lanes. Hughes-Onslow was supported by Clarkson,
Third Naval Member, who continued to complain about the inadequate engineering
facilities in Australia. Both criticised the Board’s lack of leadership and action in
responding to the Thring Plan; but Creswell was not for changing.504.

From mid-1913 there were not one but two stories being played out: one became known
as the ‘Hughes-Onslow Scandal’ and the other was the public speculation about
Creswell retiring. What was intriguing in this ‘affair’ was the role – accepted by all
parties – that the British Naval Commander-in-Chief, Vice-Admiral Sir George KingHall played in these proceedings. King-Hall’s agenda appeared to be that this
contretemps was not to affect the Admiralty’s influence within the Board or Australia’s
war obligations to the British Navy. Two matters would influence the resolution. Firstly,
504
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the opportunity to remove Creswell could not be ignored: he had and, if left in
command, would continue to champion an autonomous local navy, much to Churchill’s
annoyance. Secondly, as to the recalcitrant RN Board member: Hughes-Onslow needed
to be a team player, drop his independent ideas, and return to a ‘One Flag, One Fleet’
posture – again easing Churchill’s and the Admiralty’s concerns. King-Hall, who wrote
in his diary about the course of both events, seemed to view it as his mission to not only
mediate between the disputing parties but also counsel and hasten Creswell’s
retirement. In the earliest diary reference, 26 May, King-Hall met Creswell to discuss a
number of matters, including the strategic importance of the oil fields in Papua. Without
any preamble King-Hall noted, “we both fear Hughes-Onslow as 2nd Naval Member
having trouble with Patey, as H-O is so erratic and excitable.” In a later reference, KingHall wrote that in the opinion of the former Defence Minister, George Pearce, ‘everyone
… was disappointed with Hughes-Onslow, as he is so badly balanced, which is the
case.”505 Hughes-Onslow became increasingly acrimonious, his argumentative,
stubborn and erratic behaviour compounding ill-will amongst Board members. Thring
did not openly challenge Creswell or support Hughes-Onslow, but at a Board level and
in parliament506 factions formed over the dispute. The Board was in danger of
irreversibly imploding.

Overall, in King-Hall’s view, the situation would be best resolved by having a good
British flag officer as First Naval Member. Early on 9 August King-Hall raised with
Creswell the matter of a successor to the First Naval Member “and suggested that a
billet should be found him, for he has no pension. He is not looking well, poor fellow,
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and I am afraid is much worried over matters at Navy Board.” Later that day King-Hall
“lunched with Creswell, and he told me he had been thinking over what I had said, and
thought it a good idea.”507 Creswell’s melancholy was being ‘worked on’ and by 19
August, King-Hall ‘had a long talk with Creswell and Manisty - great disorganisation
and chaos through Onslow’s fighting and excitability. He should be sent home, and a
good man got out to take his place and succeed Creswell in six months time – that is
what I suggested.’ A month later Defence Minister Millen sought King-Hall’s advice on
reconstructing the Board.

The current First Naval Member’s resilience had been sorely tested for the past six
months, not only on the professional front, as he had been mourning the death of his
daughter.508 On 5 April 1913, Creswell’s daughter, Margaret, committed suicide and the
results of the inquest held on Monday 7 April, the day of the funeral, were not made
public at the request of the Admiral.509 For generations the family did not speak of this
matter. At the time it may have influenced Creswell’s intentions to continue in public
service. In October, the day before the entry into Sydney of the long desired navy,
King-Hall had a confidential meeting with Creswell and Manisty: “the former would
like to leave; he is finding it too much.”510 It was not the office that had burdened
Creswell but the destructive force of Hughes-Onslow, his supporters (Clarkson and
sections of the press, parliament) and Creswell’s vulnerability to the entreaties of KingHall. With Creswell’s despairing acknowledgement, it remained only to progress the re-
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organisation of the Board and deal with Hughes-Onslow, whom the Minister suspended
from the Board on 3 October 1913.

Support for Millen’s re-constituted Board came from King-Hall, former Defence
Minister Pearce and Rear-Admiral Patey. King-Hall’s diary entries appear conclusive:
Creswell would resign and Rear-Admiral Patey, the Defence Minister and King-Hall
agreed that a ‘first class’ British naval officers be found for membership of the new
Board. King-Hall made one last –but failed – attempt to mediate with Hughes-Onslow
on 23 October 1913. Creswell advised the Commander-in-Chief that Manisty would
resign rather than serve with Hughes-Onslow on the Navy Board, a decision confirmed
to King-Hall by Manisty on 24 October. Defence Minister Millen was disturbed by this
development and King-Hall advised the minister that if it came to a choice between
Manisty and Hughes-Onslow, it was certainly the latter who should depart.

A month later Defence Minister Millen made his decision about Captain HughesOnslow known to the parliament. In his long awaited statement on 20 November 1913
Millen acknowledged the flaw in the Henderson scheme of Australian naval
administration: although members of the Navy Board were given seniority as First
Member, Second Member and Third Member, “not one of them has greater executive
power than another. The recommendations of any or all of them are subject only to the
decision of the Minister.”511 Thus each member in a practical sense was equal to another
and, for the Board to function, goodwill, a good understanding and respect of each
others talents and responsibilities and civility needed to exist between them. Creswell
and Clarkson had a professional relationship of almost thirty years. Manisty and Thring,
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though at least nominally from opposite Royal Navy factions (Jacky Fisher and Lord
Beresford respectively), fitted in well to the Board. The problem was Hughes-Onslow,
who took his case outside the appropriate forums and, as well, made the argument
personal.

Millen, on taking office in May 1913, found disharmony within the Navy Board:
friction to the point of hostility. This could not stand with the impending arrival of the
new Australian Fleet Unit. Millen informed the Senate that he had spoken individually
to each of the Board members and gained assurances from them that they would end the
squabbling; that is, all but Captain Hughes-Onslow. ‘Captain Hughes-Onslow’s attitude
regarding the Board, his method of expressing himself towards certain of his colleagues,
and my personal observation of his demeanour, gradually compelled me to the
conclusion that he was primarily responsible for the unfortunate state of affairs’ Millen
told the Senate ‘which was rapidly reducing the Board to a state of paralysis, and
seriously jeopardising the administration of the Department.’

According to Millen, Hughes-Onslow was only prepared to work under certain
conditions, and the Minister was not prepared to give into his demands. Hughes-Onslow
complained about Manisty, but the Defence Minister had found Manisty ‘punctilious’,
always placing before him all the details needed to make a decision – even on matters
with which Manisty disagreed. Millen told the Senate that the suspended Second Naval
Member “re-affirmed his inability to act upon the Board as at present constituted” but
also declined to resign. Millen felt he had no alternative to terminating his appointment.
Finally there was one last matter Senator Millen felt he needed to address: there was no
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“inability of Australian officers to work with British officers … as the division among
the members of the Board has been on quite different lines.”512

The Governor-General’s report to the British government endorsed the ‘official’
position:

I am convinced that Senator Millen was amply justified in terminating Captain
Hughes-Onslow’s appointment. … I should have been glad to have found any
excuses for Captain Hughes-Onslow but it seems to me that it is his own
temperament which has been the cause if the difficulties in which he has been
involved.513

The careful explanation by the Defence Minister of the dispute, leading to the
termination of Captain Hughes-Onslow’s appointment by an Order in Council, was
necessary for domestic politics but was also necessary should the Admiralty or British
government seek to intervene. Australia may have declared that it had a navy of its own,
but it was ‘underwritten’ with British service personnel and vessels. Manisty, Thring
and Hughes-Onslow were prominent examples of the 763 British naval personnel on
direct loan from the Royal Navy with 461 from other imperial services amongst the
2244 officers and men of the RAN in 1913. The Times of London referred to Captain
Hughes-Onslow’s attempt ‘to dictate to the Minister the details of the reconstruction of
the Naval Board, and later had refused either to resign or return to duty.’ Rather
quaintly The Times remarked that, ‘his retirement was consequently inevitable.’514
Hughes-Onslow was dismissed for refusal of duty.
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Manisty returned to the Royal Navy in Britain in March 1914 and was not replaced.
However in late 1914 Pearce, the Defence Minister, appointed Labor parliamentarian
Jens Jensen as Assistant Minister with responsibility as the Board’s Finance and Civil
Member. He was later appointed Navy Minister. Captain A.G. Smith R.N. was
appointed Second Naval Member on 28 January 1914, but departed with the troop
transports in November 1914, while Honorary Paymaster George Macandie was
appointed Naval Secretary to the Naval Board on 10 May 1914.

While Clarkson, the Third Naval Member, differed with Creswell on the priorities for
the Board, it was not an impediment to his appointment as Commander of the Order of
St Michael and St George (CMG) in 1913. The award was recognition for his work in
investigating and establishing a small arms factory at Lithgow as well as for his
contribution in delivering an Australian Navy. It had been a long working relationship
between the blunt Yorkshire-man and the equally forthright admiral and the demands
upon both made their commentary forceful. During early 1914 Creswell reminded ‘the
Minister the official statements made in various dockets by the Third Naval Member
sweepingly condemning the manner in which this work under my control was carried
out and charging me with ‘injudicious expenditure’.’ Clarkson claimed that he was not
attacking the administration of the First Naval Member as ‘the Board control demands
that individual members must be free to state their opinions and I claim that I have
never at any time overstepped my legitimate right in that direction.’515
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By 18 June 1914 the Defence Minister was telling the Senate, “I have not heard an
angry word at the Board meetings since a certain change.”516 Senator Millen was
somewhat surprised when a senator then enquired had it been the intention to retire
Rear-Admiral Creswell and appoint him Commandant of the Naval College the
previous year. Senator George Pearce joined Senator Millen in refuting any such
attempt by the present Liberal or past Labor government to do so. Speculation about
Creswell’s resignation – and the re-organisation of the Board – faded, then ceased in
1914 for a number of reasons. Firstly, the removal of Hughes-Onslow negated
Creswell’s own consideration about resignation. Secondly, Australian governments had
no success in the past in obtaining senior, seasoned, active service British naval officers
for key roles, nor in 1914 and nor throughout the war. Thirdly, Clarkson’s stimulus for
criticism was modified by Hughes-Onslow’s removal and the threatening prospect that
re-organisation would lead to his own demise. Fourthly, initially the Liberal, then
Labor, government did not display any enthusiasm in maintaining the Board’s full
complement following ‘the scandal’.

The Hughes-Onslow Scandal seemed to dominate naval matters in Australia in 1913.
However other events threatened the viability and purpose of the Royal Australian Navy
as a ‘fleet unit’ of an Imperial Eastern or Pacific Fleet. The increasing naval strength of
Germany compelled Britain to concentrate its capital ships and most modern squadrons
in the North Sea. A Pacific Fleet within an Imperial naval strategy was less likely with
the 1909 agreement with Britain unfulfilled. It did not augur well for Creswell’s sense
of national identity and his often expressed desire for Australia to have a naval role in
the security of the Pacific. The campaign had moved on from acquiring a navy to
516
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defining and asserting its purpose and for this Creswell was no longer Robinson Crusoe,
as he once described his lonely campaign to Lord Tennyson. When C.E.W Bean wrote
in 1913 that ‘Australia is the sea continent’, it was not a mere refinement to Edmund
Barton’s 1893 statement of an obvious geographic feature. ‘If Australia ever wants to
make her influence felt, or, as is more likely, to prevent others from making their
influence felt, … she can only do it by sea.’ The fear of Australians, like Bean, who
favoured an Australian and not just a British navy, was that if Australia had left its naval
defence solely to others or abandoned any attempt to provide for itself, the sea would
have been open to its enemy to cross it, to disrupt trade and to transport an invading
force, which it could also replenish with troops and supplies. An invading force, which
could land anywhere on the Australian coast, would have an advantage that a defending
land force could not match. By 1913 Bean had come to realise the blessing and
challenge that ‘we in Australia have four thousand miles of sea separating us from our
nearest probable enemy.’517 If the battle that would save Australia, according to British
naval strategists, would be fought in the North Sea, how then could the ‘One Flag, One
Fleet’ protect Australia against the Imperial German East Asiatic Squadron, the largest
European naval presence in the Pacific?

Unable or unwilling to provide ships for a Pacific Fleet, Churchill, First Lord of the
Admiralty, proposed in March 1913 that a squadron, comprising the New Zealand,
Malaya and the three Canadian battleships, based in Gibraltar, twenty-eight steaming
days from Sydney and thirty-two from New Zealand, could be despatched. The Sydney
Morning Herald criticised Churchill’s strategy for defending the outposts of the Empire:
‘The need of a fleet in the Pacific is greater than ever and so is the importance to
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Australia of possessing a navy of their own which they may see in their own waters.’518
In a series of articles on Japan during June and July 1913 the Herald indicated that the
enemy was closer to Australia than Europe. In campaigning for a local navy over the
past thirty years, Creswell had often raised the prospect that the enemy would be local
as well.

Maritime self-defence was critical for this sea continent. For some Australian
politicians, partnership with the other significant ‘white’ seapower in the Pacific would
be beneficial to Australia’s economy, defence and ‘White Australia’ policy. King
O’Malley, Labor’s Home Affairs Minister, wanted Andrew Fisher to secure better
relations in trade, investment and migration with the United States for the purpose of
fostering a common kinship. He called for Australia to join with the United States ‘in
keeping the Pacific for the Anglo Saxons.’519 The resident Commander-in-Chief, KingHall, wanted Australia to continue to commit to the Royal Navy for the defence of the
Empire and its own protection:

my policy had been, to sympathise, and identify oneself with their aspirations,
and then influence their policy (Naval) once in touch with them, heart to heart.
Capture the movement and make them lean on Great Britain, and thus prevent
eyes being turned across the Pacific to the United States for Naval protection.520
The British admiral may have been ‘rattled’ by the appearance two days earlier of Keith
Murdoch’s article ‘The Home Coming of the Fleet Unit’ in the journal, Lone Hand,
which promoted a co-ordinated defence with the United States to maximise naval
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protection in the Pacific. Murdoch wrote that Britain need not be supreme in the Pacific
as well as the Atlantic, for an ‘Outer Empire Navy’ may suffice to contain an enemy
until the Royal Navy arrives. However:

The white man’s interests in the Pacific are in danger whilst circumstances may
make it impossible for the Royal Navy to leave the Atlantic, … … It may be that
four or five American Dreadnoughts to be stationed in the Pacific after the
opening of the Panama Canal can be counted in the “white man’s” navy …521

Murdoch promoted the view that the United States should be brought into a coordinated Pacific Defence Policy as a ‘navy of a rival race is paramount in the Pacific’.
Six months later Churchill conceded that if the Royal Navy was defeated, then Australia
should look to the United States for naval protection.

The official homecoming of the Australian Fleet Unit, which included the destroyers
Parramatta, Yarra and Warrego, occurred on Saturday morning 4 October 1913
(hereafter celebrated each year as Navy Day) when the ships came through Sydney
Heads. The Melbourne Argus reported that ‘as the flagship passed the Kubu, a wooden
screw steamer built in 1912 for the Sydney Ferries Company, the ensign was dipped as
a compliment to Vice-Admiral Creswell, the first member of the Naval Board, who was
on deck.’ Anchored in Farm Cove were two ships of the Australia Station: HMS
Cambrian and HMS Psyche and, as the Australian Fleet came abreast of them, salutes
were fired and answered.
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To the end, the Admiralty reminded Australia that these ships were part of ‘one great
Imperial Fleet’. On board HMS Cambrian, Vice-Admiral Sir George King-Hall,
signalled the Australian Fleet commander, Rear-Admiral Sir George Patey: ‘Best
wishes to our comrades in our sister Service the Royal Australian Navy, which with the
Royal Navy forms one great Imperial Fleet for the defence of Empire, which Providence
has entrusted to our care.’522 It was not required: Liberal Prime Minister, Joseph Cook,
was relaxed and comfortable about Australian ships within an Imperial Fleet. ‘May I
stress for one moment the words “His Majesty’s Australian Ships”,’ he said. ‘The ships
are none the less Australian because they are His Majesty’s ships because they are
Australian ships.’523 The Times of London reported the Opposition Leader Andrew
Fisher acknowledging that, ‘ “the Imperial authorities are ready to trust us fully and we
are ready to accept the responsibility, nor will we ever betray our trust.” He added that
the Australian ships would be ready for the work of the British Empire in every sea in
the world if necessary.’524 In reasoning, in instinct and in fact the transference of the
Australian Fleet to British Admiralty control by the Governor-General 12 months later
was done without protest. It had all been worked out at the 1911 Imperial Conference
years before.

King-Hall departed Australia on 24 October and an official party, including Admiral
Creswell and Manisty, farewelled the former Commander-in-Chief as he went on board
a steamer for the journey to England. From the gangway “I bade farewell to Creswell in
a loud voice” King-Hall wrote in his diary, “so the whole crowd heard me say, I hope
the country will never forget all it owes you, or all that you have done for her during the
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last 28 years.” The former C-in-C informed King George V at an audience on 20
December 1913 that “Australia was a virile nation, felt their nationhood, most loyal to
his person and to the Empire, but this did not mean to the British Government ” and that
the “Navy would be a great bond of union if people at home handled the question
properly, and Admiralty should let officers understand that service in RAN would be
considered good service for the Empire. He concurred.”525 King-Hall explained to his
sovereign that the Royal Australian Navy needed to be nurtured, partly because, if
Britain did not, Australia would look to the United States, and partly to secure the
Commonwealth against an Asian threat as ‘the Australians had 800,000,000 dark races
round them to the north and the Japanese.’ As to the navy, the King was informed that
the Australian government ‘wanted us to send an Admiral out as 1 Naval Member and a
Captain as 2 Member. He said that was good, and asked if they were to be retired. I said
“No”. He also asked me about Hughes-Onslow affair’. King-Hall was still pursuing a
British naval officer to replace Creswell a month later. ‘Saw De Chair, Naval Secretary
to 1st Sea Lord. Impressed on him the necessity of the right man being sent out as 1st
Naval Member of the Board in Australia.’526

Collectively, at the turn of the century, the senior colonial naval officers set down their
vision of a naval defence for Australia; one of those officers made it his life’s work to
accomplish it. Historically the Royal Australian Navy was the creation of the people: by
the constitution, through governments and with the consent of parliament. Politicians
were prominent in the Navy’s genesis, coming to the arena from different parties and
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backgrounds and bringing different skills and attitudes to achieving naval defence. It
was in fact from the ranks of the first Commonwealth parliament that Australia had the
seven prime ministers and ten defence ministers up to 1923. These politicians
collectively shaped Australia’s defence and external affairs with the values, principles
and mores they had honed through their belief in the supremacy of British Empire and
its navy, and their adherence to a ‘Pacific Monroe Doctrine’ and ‘White Australia’. It
was these tenets of national policy thinking that shaped Australia beyond the last of
them to serve in government together in 1923. Through it all the one constant man in
the arena since 1885 had been William Rooke Creswell and at the zenith of his naval
achievement: the acquisition of the Australian Fleet Unit, Creswell could have retired of
his own volition from the arena in 1913. Yet there was an absence to his vision of a
naval defence. When the colonial naval officers in conference in 1899 declared
Australia the ‘New Power in the Pacific’ it was ‘twinned’ with ‘the recognition of the
primary importance of Naval Defence for Australia.’527

To assert that Creswell’s

campaign ended with either the fleet unit agreement of 1909, the re-organisation in 1911
or the arrival of the fleet unit through Sydney Heads in 1913 falls short of the
achievement of his vision. A naval defence was (and is) more than an armed force
afloat. Warships, engineering and repair infrastructure, organisation, skilled personnel
in sufficient numbers and training were vital, but there were other elements, beyond
advocacy, to complete the characterization of a naval defence. To be identifiably
Australian, as a capable naval force, it needed experience, particularly operations
experience, and professionalism. The naval events of the Great War were more than the
natural outcome of an operational RAN. In the four months between the declaration of
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war and the arrival of Australian warships in the Northern Hemisphere in January 1915,
Creswell’s ‘frontiersmen’ achieved his vision.
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Chapter VII

Australia at War: ‘To sail to a foreign country, and fight for England’s name.’528

Creswell’s long campaign for a naval defence exposed a vulnerability in the security of
the Empire and contributed to the deliberation Australians gave to their own security in
the decade before 1914. Having achieved a great Empire, Britain had the responsibility
and the necessity to firstly protect sea commerce, which brought ‘Home’ wealth, natural
resources and food; and secondly to protect and defend its ‘provider’ territorial
possessions. Britain would be vulnerable to starvation of its people and of its
manufacturing industries if it did not. If Britain were conquered, there was little value of
an empire; the Empire existed for Britain, not Britain for the Empire. From 1904, First
Sea Lord Sir Jacky Fisher redeployed modern capital ships of the Royal Navy to
‘Home’ waters maximising the defence of Britain and the security of its maritime
approaches. As the Trafalgar Century ended, prompted by animosity from Germany
and the escalation of the Anglo-German naval arms race, Britain met the potential
vulnerabilities to its security in a rational and necessary way. Diplomatic arrangements
were made with other naval powers to protect British interests in regions where it no
longer had complete mastery of the seas: Japan, through a renewable alliance (1902,
1907, 1911), watched over the Pacific and East Asia and the Entente Cordiale (1904)
improved relations between France and Britain. The Anglo-French Naval Agreement of
February 1913 formalised a decade-old arrangement whereby the Royal Navy covered
the French Atlantic and Channel, while the French transferred its squadron stationed at
Brest to Toulon to support Britain in the Mediterranean. An informal understanding
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with the United States allowed certain British capital ships to withdraw without loss of
influence in the Americas.

Vulnerability was not Britain’s alone. Over the previous decade Creswell had provided
various scenarios which exposed Australia’s vulnerability: from the enemy commerce
raider in his 1901 Report to his repeated assertions of the distance Britain would need to
traverse to aid Australia if attacked. What if the battle which would save the
Commonwealth was on the seas around the Australian continent? Successive British
governments provided re-assurances that the Royal Navy, not a local navy, would
protect Australia. In 1909, First Sea Lord Fisher gratefully accepted the offers of New
Zealand, Australia and Malaya to fund construction of dreadnoughts for the Royal
Navy, albeit that he would envelope them in fleet units for a supposed Pacific fleet.
Britain insisted that the warships be built to British design and construction with
Australian naval personnel adhering to British naval discipline.

To facilitate integration and re-enforce Australia’s subservient relationship with Britain,
there would be one flag, one fleet and one control. Beyond these core elements, Britain
was not interested in developing an Australian naval defence. When the Canadian
parliament rejected funding three capital ships for the Royal Navy in 1911, Churchill
became more insistent on the re-distribution of the Empire’s naval forces and that the
fleet unit commitments of the 1909 Imperial Conference were not binding. The charade
of an Imperial Pacific Fleet ended in March 1914 when Churchill, speaking on British
naval estimates in the House of Commons, looked to Britain’s alliance with Japan, due
to expire in 1921:
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as the true and effective protection for the safety of Australia and New Zealand
and this bond depends on the maintenance of British naval supremacy. … If the
power of Great Britain were shattered on the sea, the only course of the five
millions of white men in the Pacific would be to seek the protection of the
United States.529
Churchill had the temerity, in the view of the Commonwealth’s Defence Minister,
Senator Edward Millen, to say in respect of HMAS Australia, ‘that a battle cruiser is not
a necessary part of a Fleet Unit provided by the Dominions and that the presence of
such vessels in the Pacific is not necessary to British interests.’ Australia’s reaction was
swift: Millen regarded Churchill’s stance as representing ‘so startling a change from the
opinion and policy with which Australia’ had aligned its naval defence policy and naval
defence scheme. Australia’s effort since 1909 was focussed on the creation of a fleet
unit based on Lord Fisher’s suggested one armoured cruiser, three unarmoured cruisers,
six destroyers, three submarines and the necessary auxiliaries. This had been integrated
and expanded under the Henderson Scheme of 1911. Now, Millen contended, “Mr
Churchill in effect destroys the idea of a joint Imperial Fleet, of which the Royal
Australian Navy is a part … and renders the Royal Australian Navy an isolated
force.’530

Churchill’s pronouncements starkly exposed Britain pursuing the only interests it had in
Empire – its own. HMAS Australia would ‘strengthen the British Navy at a decisive
point’, Churchill claimed, ‘according to the best principles of naval strategy.’ Two or
three dreadnoughts in the North Sea may,’531 said Churchill, ‘make victory not merely
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certain but complete.’ Dismissively he said, ‘The same two or three ‘Dreadnoughts’ in
Australian waters would be useless the day after the defeat of the British Navy in Home
waters. Their existence would only serve to prolong the agony … Their effectiveness
would have been destroyed by events which had taken place on the other side of the
globe.’532

HMAS Australia was not at the core of Britain’s naval defence according to Millen.
His rendition of Australian Naval Policy was that the Australian Fleet Unit was:

an Australian section of the Imperial Fleet – a section built by Australia, manned
by Australians, interchangeable with, and capable of being harmoniously
merged in, the Royal Navy, yet which, in normal times and until its Government
otherwise decided be based upon Australian ports and consequently more
responsible for British interests in Australian waters.
Churchill abandoned this in favour of ‘Australian ships being detailed for duty in Home
waters,’ Millen claimed, ‘or form part of an Imperial Squadron, presumably for service
anywhere.’533

Churchill’s arguments were as old as Creswell’s rebuttals, dating back as far as 1901,
when the Rear-Admiral asserted the need for an armoured cruiser which would prevent
Australian wool bales burning off Sydney’s Heads. ‘What would von Spee have done if
he had had [against him] only the old Powerful and ‘P’ class cruisers Winston Churchill
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deemed ample for Australia?’, Creswell would later question. ‘He would have had fun
frightfulling Australia, skinned up everything afloat, and shattered everything within
gun range of deep water.’534 As to Churchill’s faith in Japan, the Melbourne Punch
commented that ‘to offer us Japanese protection is very like telling Mary’s little lamb:
“Have no fear, small and tender sheep, you are excellently provided for. We have set the
wolf to watch over you!”535 It was too late to complain about the arrangements: within
five months Britain’s representative in Australia would sign the Commonwealth Naval
Forces over to the British Admiralty.

On the afternoon of 30 July 1914, the Governor-General Sir Ronald Munro Ferguson
was warned by telegram from the British government that war was imminent.
Commonwealth parliamentarians were dispersed to their electorates campaigning in a
just announced general election, and the one minister available to the GovernorGeneral, Defence Minister Millen seemed not to comprehend the relevance of the
British warning at all. Creswell did. On leave in Brisbane, Creswell, departed
immediately for Sydney following receipt of the British warning from his assistant,
Commander Thring. By 10.30 pm on 30 July the Navy Office was placed on alert. The
Defence Minister telegraphed ‘that after coaling at Sydney, Australia proceeds to West
Australia (stop) Minister of Defence has approved, as this, while still keeping Australia
under control of

Commonwealth of Australia, will place Australia much nearer

probable scene action should it later be decided to place Australia under Admiralty
orders.’536 In a telegram to Patey aboard his flagship HMAS Australia on 1 August,
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Rear-Admiral Creswell advised that they should meet when he arrived in Sydney; the
Minister of Defence made the same request for himself and the Governor-General.

Patey was alerted by Navy Office to possible German armoured cruisers off New
Guinea and on 3 August he sought approval to enact Paragraph 4 of the War Orders,
which had only been amended by Naval Board letter 14/ 0110 of 21 April 1914:

First duty of Australia after outbreak of hostilities will be to bring to action any
hostile armoured ship that may happen to be in Australian or neighbouring
waters. Subsequent to accomplishment of this duty and in event of Australia
being then required, join C-in-C China, she should proceed by quickest safe
route.537

Creswell later told New Zealand Defence Minister James Allen in February 1915:

that arrangements had been concluded with the Admiralty early in 1913, all
being in readiness shortly after the Fleet arrived here, whereby War Orders for
the Fleet were issued by the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, signed by
their Secretary, and kept locked up in each vessel’s safe ready to be acted on
when the Fleet should be transferred to Admiralty control.538

Patey suggested assembling his naval forces (Australia, Sydney, Encounter and
destroyers) off Port Moresby and if necessary transfer his flag to HMAS Encounter if
Australia was to transfer to China Squadron. He was keen for action and Navy Office
advised Patey that orders had been received to detain German colliers.

Britain declared war on Germany on 4 August, while in Australia, the GovernorGeneral would transfer control of the Commonwealth Naval Forces to the King’s Naval
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Forces on 10 August 1914. On the morning of 5 August Captain Thring asked the
Defence Department whether ‘you wish the Naval Board to prepare a scheme for taking
up transports? If so from what ports and to carry what numbers? What arms and
horses?’539 By 17 August a seven member transport committee under Third Naval
Member, Engineer Captain Clarkson, was established to register, organise and deploy
appropriate commercial vessels to convey the troop contingent to the Northern
Hemisphere. In the initial contingent 21,500 troops and 800 horses were to be
transported. The Royal Australian Navy was not only at sea acting and reacting to
operational orders of the British Admiralty, but taking the initiative to fulfil Australia’s
war commitment.

A War Room was expeditiously established within the Navy Office in Lonsdale Street,
Melbourne and Creswell appointed Commander Walter Thring Director of War Plans,
which included responsibility for naval intelligence and censorship. On 3 August all
wireless stations were placed under the control of the Navy Board, with wireless
censorship imposed the same day and a wireless interception capability established at
Victoria Barracks, Melbourne with Frederick William Wheatley, a fluent German
speaker, in charge.540 The interception of enemy messages was, for Army Captain
Arthur Jose of Naval Intelligence, who later wrote the official history of the navy in the
war, ‘the most important and most widely useful’541 of its tasks. Naval intelligence and
analysis was essential to the protection and security of the country and, in anticipation,
the Naval Intelligence Branch had been established on 25 June 1914, with the
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Admiralty loaning Major Percy Molloy, Royal Marines, to co-ordinate the Branch’s
activities. Molloy, who had spent some years in intelligence on the China Station,
headed the Branch from 1 July 1914 to 30 June 1915. He was followed in the post by
Jose and later, John Latham, who also engaged in domestic political surveillance, whilst
in the position.

The Australian Navy’s first success came on 11 August when the Black German Line
merchant ship, Hobart, was seized in Melbourne by the District Naval Officer, Captain
J.T. Richardson, RAN, who took possession of the German code book, the
Handelsverkehrsbuch (HVB), the code for use between warships and merchant vessels
and it included its first wartime key. The Naval Board advised the Admiralty on 9
September of what it had in its possession and at the end of October the code books,
delivered by fast steamer, were in the Admiralty’s hands. Wheatley broke the HVB
code on 3 November 1914. ‘Although Room 40 [the British Admiralty’s World War I
code breaking organisation] was established within ten days of the outbreak of war
….there was no plan, no experience, no expertise to deal with the situation.’542 By
comparison, the value of placing wireless/telegraph operators on each Australian
warship by Creswell had an immediate effect for with the captured codes and wireless
telegraphy capability the Navy Office was not only able to listen in on von Spee’s
transmissions but provide intelligence to Patey and the Admiralty on the German
Squadrons movements and intentions.

On 1 November 1914 Australian and New Zealand soldiers boarded 36 troop transports
and with their escorts HMS Minotaur, HMAS Melbourne and HMAS Sydney departed
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Albany for Europe, though the troops would eventually disembark at Egypt. IJN Ibuki
and two transports joined the convoy from Fremantle on the 3 November. MajorGeneral Bridges, commanding the First Australian Imperial Force, was on board the
convoy flagship, SS Orvieto. Peter Bastian erroneously asserted that General Bridges
‘by the end of October had managed to organise enough ships to assemble in Western
Australia at Albany.’543 In denying a navy for Australia in 1905, one wonders if
Bridges contemplated that to fight the enemies of the Empire in a foreign land he would
need to traverse the seas; thus he was in receipt of that ultimate of naval barbs: the army
was the projectile of the navy! It was Navy Office which initiated the logistical
operation. Creswell would have never allowed Bridges to ‘manage to organise’ any
naval transports!

HMAS Melbourne and HMAS Sydney were not to return to Australia until 1919,
assigned blockading duties off the east coast of North America to prevent German
merchant vessels from leaving the U.S. Enroute to Europe on 9 November a report was
received of an enemy ship off the Cocos Island and HMAS Sydney was deployed to
investigate. It was the German raider, Emden, detached from the Imperial German
Asiatic Squadron to create havoc in the Indian Ocean while the rest of the squadron
escaped east across the Pacific Ocean and Atlantic Ocean in the hope of reaching
Germany. The Emden engaged the Sydney at 0940 hours on 9 November, ran aground at
1115 hours and was bombarded into submission by the superior firepower of the
Sydney.
Meanwhile HMAS Australia steamed eastward across the Pacific in a fruitless search
for the German Squadron. The Admiralty ordered Patey, in Australia, to take command
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of an allied force off Mexico to prevent the German Squadron from returning to the
Pacific. The German Squadron was destroyed off the Falklands Islands on 8 December
by the Royal Navy. With this threat removed HMAS Australia made its way to
Britain, arriving at Rosyth, Scotland, on 17 February 1915. Australia was made the
flagship of the Second Battle cruiser Squadron of Vice-Admiral Beatty’s Battle cruiser
Fleet. After 1915 the Australian Navy’s seagoing fleet would be scattered to the North
Sea, the Americas and Caribbean, Sarawak and later Italy.

The Great War was a first time experience for the Commonwealth of Australia – for its
people, government, armed forces and press – a nation which was fourteen years old,
whilst Britain had structures, traditions and a long heritage of war and managing
conflicts. When Australia went to war there was one minister for the armed services, a
tyranny of distance and communications (not just in wireless telegraphy, but in real time
communication of events or overseas/ imperial requests and comprehending their real
meaning) and, in the case of the RAN, a Board of Administration without sea assets to
administer. Defence Minister Pearce could not cope with the massive requirements of
large land forces fighting overseas and passed the small responsibility of the navy to
another minister, Jens Jensen, who gave no guidance, support or encouragement and set
no direction or goals; when Cook became navy minister in the Hughes National
Government, he was as frequent an absentee at Naval Board meetings as his
predecessor.544
Despite the long genesis of the Australian navy, time was still needed to develop an
array of Australian seamen with leadership, operational and coaching skills in command
544
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and control, engineering and administration. No sooner had Australia acquired a fleet
unit than it would be dispersed as vessels under British command in the Mediterranean,
North Sea, West Indies and America during the Great War. There had been no time to
develop the substantive chain of command from commanding an individual vessel to
the Naval Board and no widespread evolution of Australian officers in command roles.
There were simply not enough officers at the command level, for instance, to bring the
Fleet and some of the individual vessels home. Australia had a navy that still was not its
own; nor would it be for some time as officers commissioned in Australia were
standardised with further training in Britain, British officers were installed as First
Naval Members and Officers Commanding the Australian Fleet, and successive
Australian governments aligned themselves with the maritime doctrine of Britain.

For generations, according to McMinn, the popular view – the myth – has been ‘that
Australia became a nation on the beaches of Gallipoli. But the influence of the Great
War on the development of the national idea in Australia is too complex to be
accurately summed up in such an aphorism: powerful as the Anzac legend became ...’545
it benefited from the writing and encouragement of Charles Bean, the official war
historian. Gallipoli and the other theatres of the Great War in which Australian forces
participated seemed to exemplify ‘One Flag, One Command’ (army and navy):
Australia was in a subservient relationship, no matter what the cost or saneness of the
operation. The multi-faceted question of the ‘national idea’ is not entered into here,
except to assert Creswell’s continual association of the nation’s identity and destiny
with the identity and destiny of a national navy. The naval historian David Stevens has
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rightly noted that in comparison with the Australian army, ‘particularly in the war’s
early months, the navy was the more influential instrument of national power
...Australian sailors managed to forge their own unique naval and national identities.’546

The destiny of Australians was that war would dramatically, deeply change their lives:
personally, socially, economically and politically. The Commonwealth government
would exercise greater power at home (censorship, control of industry, domestic
surveillance) and many of the men sent away to war would not come back. Courage,
patriotism and individual heroism by land forces, as well as enormous casualties, would
change Australia’s identity and status – momentarily – entitling it to separate
representation at the Peace Conference in 1919. In March 1915 an article in the Round
Table, written in December 1914, attempted to define Australia at war:
Nations, like men, have often to face great crisis’ before the secret of their being
becomes revealed to the world and to themselves, and it was not until the
outbreak of the war, which has jeopardised the very existence of the British
Empire, that Australia began fully to realise that empire’s meaning, and the high
and responsible part she has been called to play in it. During the last few years
her sense of Imperial responsibility has been deepened and quickened by two
things – the creation of her national navy, and the acquisition of possessions in
the Pacific.547

The enthusiasm for its creation was surpassed in 1914 by the enthusiasm by many
Australians for this war: And all with a common aim: To sail to a foreign country
And fight for England’s name.548
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Initially the Commonwealth’s entry to war was about protecting the Mother Country
though, in reality, it was about securing Australia: directly seizing the German
possessions of New Guinea, indirectly Samoa and the fortuitous sinking of the Emden.
For Australians, the ‘secret of their being’ revealed itself on the battlefields of Gallipoli,
France and Palestine, where determination, mateship, valour, the loss of innocence and
the display of the larrikin view of life was exhibited in individuals and battalions of
Diggers. At Rabaul, the site of Australia’s first war-time operation, the first deaths and
the first honours are barely recalled with the loss of the submarine AE1with its
complement of 35 personnel and three naval personnel from the land contingent in the
capture of the German possessions of New Guinea. One could be dismissive: it was too
small an action, too few died and honours were neither numerous or highly significant;
besides the action was largely naval. The devastation of a long drawn-out land war in
the Northern Hemisphere with the sacrifice of so many Australian lives would soon
overwhelm every community at home. Protecting the Mother Country cost Australia
60,000 dead and 167,000 wounded. The Australian Navy would appear as minor
references on the pages of the history texts on the Great War, only delayed by HMAS
Sydney’s action against the Emden. The Royal Australian Navy lost 15 officers and 156
sailors killed during the Great War; of these 6 officers and 57 sailors had been on loan
from the Royal Navy.

The success of RAN since the declaration of war: giving clarity to the identity and
status of the nation as a naval power encouraged Creswell and his prime minister to
return to their stance that as an autonomous state, the Commonwealth may in the future
make decisions in their interests, not Britain’s. In late 1914, Prime Minister Fisher
promoted the concept of a trans-Tasman joint naval fleet for Pacific sea defence,
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affirming ‘that the strength and unity of the British Empire will be increased by a wider
distribution of armed forces on the sea, with greater autonomy. If this increase of
autonomy is granted freely and cheerfully by the Mother Country, the striking force of
the Navy will be increased’ acknowledging the view ‘that while unity of command is
necessary, there must be a larger delegation of executive power if we are to make the
best of our Naval Forces.’549 To the New Zealand Defence Minister, Colonel Allen,
Fisher asserted his long-held view that ‘the Commonwealth would have to decide, after
all, whether the Fleet is to be handed over or not, in case Britain enters in war.’ Allen
reported that ‘He led me to think that there were some wars which Great Britain might
enter into for which the Commonwealth would not hand over her ships.

In my

judgement this is a serious blow to Empire. I did look forward to the controlling
authority in the days to come being some other than the British Government, the
Admiralty, and the War Office.’ In Creswell’s view automatic transfer of the Australian
Navy to Britain on every occasion ‘depends on reasoned will and the spirit of the State’.
Yet Creswell resolved that in reality when Britain declared war ‘we have had a fairly
convincing example … … GET THE FLEET – GET THE MEN and all else will come
right. This is the true line of action.’550 Creswell could be satisfied with his thirty years
of advocacy to establish, develop and resource an Australian Navy.

By 1915, devoid of fleet responsibility - a fleet, which he fought long and hard to
establish – Creswell did not claim ‘age’ to retire to the farm. This war was a new
challenge; it was a shared risk with fellow Australians. Rear-Admiral Creswell, RAN,
would need to trust the Admiralty with Australian naval assets and servicemen – his
549
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‘frontiersmen’ - whilst he was about to embark on a new frontier: Australia at war.
There was also a specific reason why Creswell was still in the arena at war’s end. On 10
December 1917, the Admiral delivered the farewell speech to the cadet-midshipmen
from the Naval College, Jervis Bay. In concluding his remarks Creswell said ‘I have not
ventured to advise you as to your conduct and bearing when joining your ships in the
Grand Fleet’ and then revealed something of his own character, whilst being
instructional to the young officers’ development:
However, after fifty odd years’ experience, and drawing near the exit from the
stage you are about to take your places on, I should like to mention two things
that are important. The first is – Absolute Straightforwardness in everything.
There is the greatest confidence in an officer known to be straightforward in
statement and action. The second is – Never leave a job of work, or any duty,
big or small until it is absolutely completed. Be the last to leave it. Only leave
when it is done.551

It at once affirmed his persistent, forthright, long advocacy for a naval defence for
Australia and why, from Creswell’s standpoint, he did not resign in 1914: never leave a
duty until it is absolutely completed. It had only been twelve months since the
Governor-General, Sir Ronald Munro Ferguson, with the First Member of the
Australian Navy Board in company, addressed the first graduating class of cadet
midshipmen from the Royal Australian Naval College in 1916 with words that left
Australians in no doubt they had a navy that was not their own. ‘You, who are of the
same blood, have been trained here in the traditions of a race which for 300 years and
more has never lost its hold on the sea.’ The Governor-General said:

We may confidently expect that you are qualified to exhibit that character and
personality which, from Nelson downwards, has ever distinguished the British
551
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sea officer. … after the first few months you will soon cease to discriminate
between Australian and English born, and you will remember only that you
belong to the greatest of all British Services – that of the sea.552
That ‘motive that is quintessentially selfish and integral to nationalism and status: the
desire for identity and status’, which Hirst attests drove the colonies to federate, seemed
lost in imperial propaganda. As Australia was to find at the Washington Naval
Conference six years later, where Britain represented itself and the Empire, it had ‘no
voice, no rights, no membership in the brotherhood of nations.”553

The Royal Australian Navy lacking much of its sea-going assets, however, could still
contribute significant work through the Naval Intelligence team for the Australian Naval
Board and, in turn, the government. Walter Thring, the versatile member of Creswell’s
team, co-authored with Captain AW Jose the Navy Board’s Post Bellum Naval Policy
for the Pacific, which identified that, ‘The British Empire has interests in and around
the Pacific Ocean, the defence of which is a problem separable from – though of course
intimately connected with – other British defence problems.’ In an obvious reference to
Japan, the draft policy counselled:

The essence of this problem lies in the recent appearance in the north-western
Pacific of a great naval Power. Imperial policy with regard to that Power
consists in the maintenance of the friendliest possible relations with it, although
its known aspirations to the leadership of Oriental races must be carefully
watched.554
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Jose and Thring ominously warned

‘Australian policy with regard to that Power

involves certain action, which is known to be regarded by the Power as unfriendly.’

The policy of the dominions in the Pacific had recognized the real threat, but the British
government had acknowledged, for the present, Japan as ‘friend’ rather than a potential
‘foe’. ‘It cannot, therefore, be safely assumed that relations with the Power in question
will remain permanently on a friendly footing; and there is need of concerted
precautions against its possible enmity on the part of all British Dominions.’ The
Board’s proposal was full of foreboding concerning this nation, which the Board
seemed reticent to name, as ‘the rise of a new Power of different race, eager both for
more territory and for dominance in the ocean, which washes its shores.’555

Twelve months after the end of the Great War, Creswell retired as the First Member of
the Naval Board on 14 August 1919, transferring to the Retired List on 27 November
1919, and withdrew from public life. In the euphoria of victory in November 1918 and
the later scramble for reparations and spoils at Versailles, how it all began for the
Australian Navy seemed forgotten. Creswell received a further Imperial honour, a KBE
in 1919, to add to his CMG awarded in 1897 and KCMG in 1911. The Admiralty were
requested and gave – through the Governor-General – acknowledgement of his naval
service. It read as perfunctory, insincere and insensitive as well as tactless in not
acknowledging him as the one whose consistent advocacy and leadership had brought
about the Royal Australian Navy.

There was begrudging help with his pension.

Creswell thought that, at least, he should advance one rank - on the retired list - by
promotion to Vice-Admiral. That came beyond the time when accolade and service
555
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were linked. His departure from the navy showed the ill feeling of politicians and of the
members of the Naval Board. The Naval Board had initially denied Creswell’s
promotion; Vice-Admiral Grant, Creswell’s successor as First Naval Member, justifying
the denial by saying that Creswell never qualified for flag officer rank from command
or service at sea. Grant may have been ignorant of Creswell’s place in Australian naval
history, (though Munro Ferguson and Clarkson may have influenced his stance) but it
seemed plain ungrateful and mean-spirited. A few months after Creswell’s promotion
on the retired list, Clarkson retired as vice-admiral on 1 September 1922 with no such
impediment to promotion.

Time and circumstance had robbed Creswell of seagoing command, yet he fought and
planned for the instruments of naval warfare. His was a destiny beyond command at
sea, a naval battle or a war. His vision enunciated in schemes and parliamentary reports
were specific, tangible and always subscribed to an Australian navy within an Imperial
navy; however, he increasingly called for an unfettered start to that local naval defence.
‘in my view Vice-Admiral Creswell deserves the title 'Father of the Australian Navy'.
Vice-Admiral Tripovich has said:

His passion, forethought, approach to joint operations, and development of a
capability plan based on strategic requirements were modern even by today's
standards. He spoke and wrote passionately about Australia's needs for an
independent, indigenous naval capability, and pressed his case with successive
Governments until his views were accepted. Without doubt he set the scene for
the Navy, and indeed the ADF, of today. Many of the issues he dealt with
remain relevant, and many of the processes he put in place remain today, albeit
with different titles. The concepts of the sea-air gap, the philosophy of the
Defence of Australia, the principles of self-reliance and an indigenous industry
capability to support the Defence Force all have a familiar ring. Indeed, today's
capability development processes follow a similar path. Admiral Creswell's
arguments were based on clinical assessments of Australia's circumstances.556
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Conclusion

In July 1903, Australia’s first prime minister, Sir Edmund Barton told parliament: ‘Let
us call ourselves Britons … we have not forfeited by our emigration, or by that of our
fathers, any of the rights of Britishers at home, or any of our share of the glory or the
material prosperity of the Empire. We are Britons of the Empire.’ 557 It was the
fulfilment of the call John Ruskin had made thirty years before and set in context the
campaign for a naval defence for Australia.. Yet it was – and still is – the sea that has
defined Australia; it is the land that has sustained us. For a century and a half since
white settlement: the imagery, the geography, the economy and the society has been
dominated by the land. Yet it was the sea which kept the continent ‘incognito’ for
centuries, while later it seemed to be the natural barrier to preserve the white race. It
was the Mahanian ‘highway’ of inter-colonial trade and transport. It defined not only
how commerce could be practiced with Britain or any foreign country, but that it could
only be done by sea. For Creswell there was ‘so little sympathy in Australia’ for a local
navy. Looking back, Creswell noted that ‘from the Admiralty, indeed, we who had the
cause of a self-reliant colonial naval service at heart could not only not look for support,
but had active opposition to fear.’558 At the birth of this new maritime state, Australians
would have readily accepted the adage that ‘people live on the land not the sea’ and
Britain encouraged them not to think beyond it.
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A navy gives mobility: it is quicker to respond than an army and its smallest fighting
unit is more effective than the army’s smallest unit (an individual soldier or platoon). A
navy is more than an armed force afloat: it is the distinctive symbol of a sovereign
maritime state. The extent to which it commands the sea and is an instrument of foreign
policy, sea commerce protection and national defence is far reaching. A navy defines a
maritime state’s influence, authority and potency in the world, enhancing the nation’s
sovereignty.

Creswell learned this from his career in the British Navy. In the late 1880’s, responding
to the vulnerability of Australia - that it could only be attacked by sea - a view not
generally held in Australia or Britain at the time, a young Lieutenant Creswell was one
who asked key questions: ‘What needs to be done?’ ‘What can or should I do to make a
difference?’ From this time onward, Creswell’s trajectory towards the achievement of a
naval defence was steady and purposeful. His writings reveal, as evidenced in this
thesis, that he was conversant with and understood the naval strategic thinking of his
day and the implications of foreign power manoeuvrings in the Pacific. At Federation,
Captain Creswell laid before the nation his naval manifesto: The Best Method of
Employing Australian Seamen in the Defence of Commerce and Ports Report of 1901. It
was a clear, visionary, but practical proposal for a naval defence for Australia; it was
also his commitment as an Australian. ‘Australia has inherited her due share of the
nation’s genius for sea enterprise, either for war or commerce’ He declared ‘I ask
whether it would not be in the true interests of Australia and the Empire, even at
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considerable cost, to develop locally those qualities of race and that sea profession
which gave us, and has since held for us, the land we live in.559

By heritage and not geography, Britain and Australia were not islands. They were
interconnected, woven into one community. The British Empire was a relational cluster
connected to ‘Home’. This relationship was the context through which members of the
Empire viewed the world. This relationship was challenged when Britain withdrew its
modern warships and reduced its naval squadrons from the Pacific, relying on an
alliance with Japan to protect British interests. This prompted Australia and New
Zealand to seriously consider their own naval security.

Creswell had been active in enabling Australians to think about their security with
detailed proposals for the development of a naval capability. Speaking in the Senate on
3 November 1910 Senator Chataway, who had been a stockman with Creswell in
Queensland, noted that ‘only a few years ago, the idea was prevalent that all that
Australia need do was to protect her own coasts’ by paying ‘tribute’ to the Imperial
Government. Too little attention was being given to naval defence and this thesis
endorses the judgement of Senator Chataway said that this ‘idea is spreading amongst
Australians today … a great deal - or nearly the whole – of the alteration in the opinion
of the people of Australia on this subject has been brought about, not by the speeches of
politicians, nor by statements made by experts in the Old Country, but by the present
Naval Director of the Commonwealth, Captain Creswell.’560 Creswell was the catalyst
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who first explained to the Australian public and parliamentarians as to why Australia
needed a naval defence.

In the first decade of the Commonwealth, apart from British self-interest and
intransigence, there were three abiding elements which seemed to mitigate against the
establishment of any local naval defence: limited Commonwealth revenues, Australia’s
small population and the lack of a consistent, proactive Australian naval defence policy.
In Britain’s view, Australia was unable to constitute a navy – certainly not a credible
naval force – and these elements enhanced that argument. Britain had been undeviating
in its naval policy of ‘One Flag, One Fleet’, opposed to local navies in favour of one
Imperial navy to which all dominions should contribute. As this thesis has shown, the
Fisher Labor governments (1908-1909, 1910-1913 and 1914-1915) cut the ‘Gordian
Knot’. However, when war came, Andrew Fisher echoed the sentiments of his
contemporaries to defend ‘Home’ to the last man and the last shilling. Creswell would
have liked a larger and more independent Australian navy in 1914 but knew that what
had been achieved was substantial, given such an unpromising and difficult start.

There were elements which combined to shape and develop an Australian naval
defence. Warships appropriate to Australian conditions and requirements; entry, officer
and specialist training; skilled local construction and maintenance engineering facilities;
a naval intelligence service and wireless telegraphy were required for a capable and
well-equipped naval force. Significantly, there were elements which could be neither
bought

nor

recruited:

experience,

particularly

operations

experience,

and

professionalism. Time and circumstance may bring both, as Creswell, Deakin and the
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British Admiralty would acknowledge, but only interchangeability with the Royal Navy
would bring it sooner. Like many of his contemporaries, Creswell was conscious of
Britain’s role in the naval security of Australia – he was a realist rather than an dreamer.
Creswell was aware, as the young Commonwealth’s leading navalist, that he was in a
position to affect such a change to public opinion and government thinking by which an
Australian navy could be established, which would be valuable, in its own right, to the
defence of Australia.

Vice-Admiral Creswell died on 20 April 1933, reported by The Times obituary as
having ‘had a career of unusual interest.’561 On the eve of the unveiling of a memorial
plaque to the Vice-Admiral at Sydney’s Garden Island Naval Dockyard in July 1938,
Rear-Admiral H. J. Feakes, RAN (retired), recounted Creswell’s life, noting that ‘in
years of thankless pioneering he prepared the way.’:

It must have been a proud day for Creswell to have finally controlled a force
whose vessels flew the White Ensign at the Ensign Staff and the Southern Cross
at the Jack Staff – the White Ensign under which he had been born and bred, and
the Southern Cross, symbol of the country in which he completed his life’s
work.562
Not long before he died, writing to Alfred Deakin’s son-in-law, Herbert Brookes,
Creswell said:
In the great fight – the long tough unrelenting battle for our Navy – for me from
the early 90’s till 1909 – my fight was against the professional front – The Navy,
i.e. the Admiralty and all the ‘High Authority’ – They condemned the Australian
Naval idea as bad strategy – false or no strategy – This I battled against – I knew
I was right – this was my front.563
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In doing so William Rooke Creswell fulfilled the call of John Ruskin: he made
something of himself and did something for his country. Creswell played a conspicuous
role in establishing the Australian navy and in determining the capability, the strategic
purpose and the character of that navy.
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